











DESIGN AND USE OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
SYSTEMS IN TEAM-BASED SETTINGS:  




This dissertation investigates empirically how organizations may design and use 
management control systems in team-based settings. Furthermore, it investigates how 
management control systems relate to social identity to influence team performance. 
Two features of management control systems are analyzed: the interactive control 
system, related to the style of use, and the group performance report, related to the 
design of control systems. The general hypothesis is that management control systems 
in team-based settings may enhance an autonomous motivation of team members. This 
motivation positively influences individual behavior and, therefore, team performance. 
 
The hypothesis is tested in two experimental studies among 288 students in Pablo 
Olavide University in Seville (Spain). Two mediating models are presented. The first 
model analyzes the indirect effect of the interactive control system and social identity 
on team performance, via individuals´ autonomous motivation. The second model 
analyzes the direct and indirect effect of group performance report and social identity 
on team performance, via social comparison processes. Overall, support was found for 
the two models. 
 
This dissertation contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, it introduces 
a new type of individual motivation (the autonomous) on management accounting 
literature which differs from the external motivation traditionally analyzed. Secondly, 
it combines economic literature and social psychology literature to provide new 
mediating models, which relate the individuals´ autonomous motivation with both 
management control systems and team performance. Finally, this dissertation jointly 
analyzes accounting and psychological variables (management control systems and 
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1.3. The importance of studying management control systems 
1.4. The importance of studying social identity 
1.5. The purpose of this dissertation 
1.6. Research question and contributions 
1.7. Dissertation outline 
References 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
This dissertation analyses the relationship between the design and use of management 
control systems and social identity in team-based settings. It is also analyzed how that 
relationship effects on team performance. It presents two experimental studies 
conducted in Pablo Olavide University, in Spain, of three sets of hypotheses. The first 
set of hypotheses relates the use of management control systems, social identity and 
individual motivation in team-based settings. The second set of hypotheses relates the 
use of management control systems, social identity and team performance. The third 
set of hypotheses relates the design of management control systems, social identity, 
social comparison process and team performance. 
 
This dissertation attempts to contribute to the literature in the fields of management 
accounting, social psychology and organizational behavior literature. In these fields 
and specifically in the relationships between management control systems, social 
identity, and individual motivation in team based-settings many questions still await 
academic enquiry. Furthermore, also in practice many questions arise from processes 
related to individual motivation and team performance and the role of management 
control systems and social identity may have in these processes. In this chapter I will 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
8 
first motivate the importance of studying the relationship mentioned. In section 1.2 I 
will highlight the importance of studying team-based environments. Section 1.3 will 
highlight the importance of management control systems in organizations. In section 
1.4 I will indicate the importance of studying social identity for team performance. 
Section 1.5 states the purpose of the dissertation. Section 1.6 presents the research 
question and the main contributions. Finally, section 1.7 describes an overview of the 
rest of the dissertation. 
 
 
1.2  THE IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING TEAM-BASED 
ENVIRONMENTS 
 
The last two decades it appears a phenomena involving organizational restructuring of 
both internal and external boundaries (Berry et al., 2009; Chenhall, 2008; Mathieu et 
al., 2008). Organizations have moved from the bureaucratic hierarchical form, 
considered ineffective in the context of increased competition and globalization, 
towards flatter, leaner and thus more responsive structures. A variety of methods have 
been deployed to bring about this increased flexibility. They included downsizing, the 
centralization of core activities, a growth in subcontracting or outsourcing, and the use 
of autonomous and cross-functional work teams (Berry et al., 2009).  
 
Team-based structures have brought changes within organizations (Berry et al., 2009). 
Traditionally researchers analyzed hierarchical relationships between employees, that 
is, a relation between a manager who delegates work to an employee and the 
employee who performs the task (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Management and economic literature have assumed self-interest behavior of 
employees, and have focused on analyzing how to align employees´ interest with firm 
goals and objectives (Baiman, 1990). Nevertheless, team-based structures represent 
horizontal and collaborative relationships, where two or more employees work 
together to perform a task, and they may coordinate their resources and may cooperate 
to achieve their common goals (Adler & Chen, 2011; Mathieu et al., 2008). Although 
it assumes that team-based structures may help organizations to gain flexibility and 
efficiency, the use of team structures do not let automatically to performance 
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improvement (Lount & Phillips, 2007; Mathieu et al., 2008; Salas, Goodwin & 
Shawn, 2009).  
 
Group performance improvement is frequently not reached because of two types of 
performance losses: coordination losses and motivation losses (Lount & Phillips, 
2007). Coordination losses occur when group members are unable to accurately bring 
together information or resources to efficiently solve their task. Motivation losses 
occur when individuals in the group reduce their effort on the task (Lount & Phillips, 
2007; Sprinkle, 2003). These motivation losses produce additional control problems to 
consider at team level, as social loafing, free-riding behaviors or collusion (Mathieu et 
al., 2008; Sprinkle, 2003). Researchers have suggested motivation works in a different 
way in collaborative environments (Adler & Chen, 2011; Gagné & Deci, 2005; 
Haslam, 2001; van Dick et al., 2009b). Despite the self-interest assumption governing 
traditional management and economic literature, evidence indicates that individuals 
respond to ethical, moral and social principles in collaborative environments 
(Bandiera, Barauky & Rasul, 2005; Gold & Sudgen, 2007; Sprinkle, 2003). Compared 
with a single-person setting, there are additional issues to consider in team-based 
settings, such as social identity, mutual monitoring or social comparison process, 
because teams can result in benefits of these processes (Birnberg, Luft & Shields, 
2007; Haslam, 2001; Sprinkle, 2003). Researchers suggest a more autonomous or self-
determinate motivation fits better with team-based structures (Gagné & Deci, 2005, 
Ryan & Deci, 2000). Therefore, future examination is required to analyze how 
individual motivation works in team-based settings, and how organizations can gain 
benefits of team-based structures (Adler & Chen, 2011; Berry et al., 2009; Mathieu et 
al., 2008).  
 
 
1.3  THE IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING MANAGEMENT 
CONTROL SYSTEMS 
 
The fundamental purpose of management control systems is to enhance firm value by 
ensuring the effective and efficient use of scarce resources (Berry et al., 2009; 
Sprinkle, 2003). Management control systems provide control information to 
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managers and employees, and take different forms, such as budgets, cost systems, 
incentives or performance reports (Berry et al., 2009; Rowe, 2004). The information 
serves two important roles in an organization: (1) to provide some of the necessary 
information for planning and decision-making, and (2) to motivate individuals 
(Sprinkle, 2003). Two different features of management control systems have been 
highlighted for these two roles: the design and the use of control information 
(Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Simons, 1995, 2000). 
 
On one hand, traditionally management accounting researchers has focused on the 
optimal design of management control systems to align employees´ interests with 
managers and/or owners interests to achieve the organization´s goals and objectives 
(Brown, Evans & Moser, 2009). Researchers analyzed technical characteristics as the 
proportion of financial versus non-financial measures in the performance measurement 
system; the proportion of variable pays in the compensation system, or the presence or 
absence of control (Drake, Wong & Salter, 2007; Lau & Moser, 2008). However, 
researchers suggest traditional designs, such as individual or fixed incentives which fit 
with single-work setting, are not suitable to collaborative environments because do not 
lead to group performance improvement (Libby & Thorne, 2009; Román, 2009; 
Towry, 2003). Collaborative environments present new control problems, such as 
free-riding, collusion or conflict, and the manner in which management control 
systems should be designed at this context is yet unclear (Sprinkle, 2003; Birnberg, 
2011; Román, 2009). 
 
On the other hand, management accounting researchers have analyzed different styles 
of uses of management control systems (Henri, 2006; Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 2006, 
2007; Simons, 1995; 2000). Simons (1995) argued that firms often have management 
accounting systems with similar technical characteristic. However, they differ in the 
way in which these control systems are used to achieve particular organizational 
purposes though (Abernethy, Bouwens & van Lent, 2010; Naranjo-Gil & Hartamnn, 
2007). Simon’s framework of levers of control (1995, 2000) differences two opposites 
styles of use of management control systems: the diagnostic and the interactive. 
Diagnostic use represents the traditional feedback role as control systems are used to 
monitor and reward the achievement of pre-established organizational goals. 
Diagnostic use is focused on correcting deviations and represents a negative force 
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(Henri, 2006). Interactive use represents a positive force and focuses attention and 
forces dialogue and communication throughout organizational members (Abernethy et 
al., 2010; Henri, 2006). Traditionally, management accounting literature has focused 
on the effects of this interactive use at organizational level. However, recent 
researchers point to the importance of the positive force of the interactive use to 
influence individual motivation in team-based structures (Adler & Chen, 2011; 
Kominis & Dudau, 2012). Nevertheless, the process through which the interactive use 
influences individual motivation and behavior is yet unclear (Adler & Chen, 2011; 
Tessier & Otley, 2012). 
 
 
1.4  THE IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING SOCIAL 
IDENTITY 
 
Social Identity Theory argues that the potential of a team depends not only on the 
skill, knowledge and ability of the people in the team, but also on their ability and 
motivation to feel the team as a unit (Lembke & Wilson, 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 
1986). That is, if an individual defines themselves in terms of their group membership 
and ascribe characteristics that are typical of the group to the self, thus psychologically 
the group becomes part of the individual (Van Knippenberg, 2000). Therefore, social 
identity can avoid the motivation losses problem at team level (Lount & Phillips, 
2007).  
 
Social identity has been related to a wide range of team outcomes, such as team 
cohesion, internalization of group norms, cooperation among team members and team 
commitment (Haslam et al, 2006; van Dick et al., 2009a,b). However, related to team 
performance, researchers find different effects, because in some situations social 
identity do affect team performance, but not in others (see Towry, 2003; van 
Knippenberg, 2000; van Dick et al., 2009a,b). It seems that social identity is not an 
automatic process but depends on how individuals interpret the social context in which 
they operate or work (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Rowe et al., 2008; Towry, 2003).  
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
12 
Social identity theory assumes individual behavior is a consequence of interplay 
between social and psychological factors. Social factors have to do with the objective 
features of the world that an individual confronts and psychological factors are 
associated with the individual’s interpretation of that world (Haslam, 2001). 
Therefore, organizational variables, such as accounting and control practices, are part 
of the working environment and interact with social identity to influence team 
performance (Towry, 2003; van Dick et al, 2009b). 
 
 
1.5  THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISSERTATION 
 
Two types of mechanisms have been highlighted to influence team performance: 
organizational features such as accounting and control practices, and individual 
features such as social identity (Birnberg et al., 2007; van Dick et al., 2009a,b).  
 
Academic research related to management control systems and team performance is 
still limited, in spite of the growing body of studies in recent years (Birnberg, 2011; 
Libby & Thorne, 2009; Román, 2009). Management accounting researchers have 
realized that management control systems that traditionally worked in hierarchical 
structures produce mixed and confused results in team-based environments (see 
Coletti et al., 2005; Libby & Thorne, 2009; Román, 2009). For example, it seems that 
individual accounting practices do not influence team performance (Libby & Thorne, 
2009, Rowe, 2004). Therefore, management accounting researchers have recognized 
the design and use of management control systems should be adapted to collaborative 
environments (Berry et al., 2009; Coletti et al., 2005; Sprinkle, 2003; Román, 2009). 
However, it is still unclear how to adapt these control systems at team level to achieve 
performance improvements (Adler & Chen, 2011). For example, some researchers 
posit to the design of control practices as group level (Libby & Thorne, 2009; Román, 
2009). However, some of these practices designed at team level, as group incentives, 
enhance free-riding behaviors within the team (Rowe, 2004; Rowe et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, other researchers suggest this group design may be applied to other 
control practices, instead of incentives, such as performance reports because allow 
mutual monitoring and social comparison processes within teams (Rowe, 2004; 
Román, 2009). While others researchers suggest organizations may change the style of 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
13 
use of control information within teams because creates an affective bond between 
teammates (Adler & Chen, 2011; Tessier & Otley, 2012). Therefore, some researchers 
stress the importance of the design of control systems, while others stress the 
importance of the style of use of control information to influence team performance. I 
posit in this dissertation these mixed results may be explained if the models 
incorporate a variable so far has been treated as one-dimensional in management 
accounting literature: the individual motivation (Adler & Chen, 2011; Wong-on-Wing, 
Guo & Lui, 2010). Traditionally management accounting research assumes 
individuals are motivated by external rewards and controls, that is, assumes 
individuals are externally motivated (Adler & Chen, 2011; Malmi & Brown, 2008; 
Wong-on-Wing, Guo & Lui, 2010). Nevertheless, individuals have different type of 
motivations; an external represents only one type (Adler & Chen, 2011; Gagné & 
Deci, 2005).  
 
Recent studies suggest that team work researchers might focus on an autonomous 
individual motivation, such as identified (Adler & Chen, 2011; Gagné & Deci, 2005; 
Wong-on-Wing, Guo & Lui, 2010). This motivation is experienced as somewhat 
internal or self-determined by the own individual instead of an external motivation, 
which is experienced as somewhat controlled by others (Adler & Chen, 2011; Gagné 
& Deci, 2005). External motivation is associated with negative effects´ on individuals´ 
behavior, as lower satisfaction and effort (Adler & Chen, 2011; Malmi & Brown, 
2008; Meyer et al., 2004). In spite of these negative effects, management accounting 
research has largely focused on the relation between management control systems and 
external motivation (Malmi & Brown, 2008). This dissertation focuses on the 
individual autonomous motivation in team-based settings.  
 
In this dissertation I examine how organizations may design and use management 
control systems to increase individuals´ autonomous motivation and how this 
motivation influences individual performance within teams (Adler & Chen, 2011; 
Tessier & Otley, 2012; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Román, 2009). I posit that both features, 
the design and use of control systems, can increase individual autonomous motivation 
(Adler & Chen, 2011). The key process is that control systems may increase mutual 
monitoring, interaction and involvement between team members to influence 
individuals´ autonomous motivation in collaborative environments (Adler & Chen, 
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2011; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001; Román, 2009). I present two mediating models, 
where individual motivation and mutual monitoring are the mediating variables. 
Oppositely to traditional management accounting researchers, who focused on 
additive models, this dissertation presents two intervening models that allow to 
explain the processes by which the design and use of management control systems 
affect group performance (Birnberg et al., 2007). 
 
High levels of identification and association of team members with the group work 
may also increase individual autonomous motivation (Adler & Chen, 2011; Meyer & 
Herscovitch, 2001; Meyer et al., 2004). Identification refers to social identity (Adler & 
Chen, 2011; Haslam, 2001; van Knippenberg, 2000). Therefore, social identity is 
related to individual autonomous motivation (Adler & Chen, 2011). Moreover, social 
identity posits that individuals can be powerfully motivated by group goals, when their 
identities as members of a group have sufficient psychological salience for them 
(Haslam, 2001). That is, social identity might be cognitively activated in individual´s 
mind to influence his behavior (van Knippenberg, 2000). Therefore salience is a key 
process for influencing team performance through social identity. And salience 
depends on the context where the individual is working (Towry, 2003; van Dick et al., 
2009a,b). Accounting and control practices can reframe context (Rowe, 2004; Rowe et 
al., 2008). Yet the manner in which accounting and control practices and social 
identity interact is not clear (see Rowe, 2004; Towry, 2003).  
 
In this dissertation I analyze two effects related to social identity and team 
performance. First I analyze the direct effect of social identity on individuals’ 
autonomous motivation, and team performance. I also suggest a mediating model, 
where the individual motivation is the intervening variable between social identity and 
team performance. Secondly, I analyze the relation between the design and use of 
management control systems and social identity, because previous researchers suggest 
a moderator relation between them to influence team performance (Towry, 2003; van 
Dick et al., 2009b). In summary, I follow organizational behavior and management 
accounting researchers recommendations: team work researchers may consider 
mediating and moderator variables in their models for providing a more 
comprehensive knowledge of team effectiveness and performance (Birnberg et al., 
2007; Mathieu et al., 2008).  
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1.6  RESEARCH QUESTION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
The general research question addressed in this dissertation is the following: 
 
How are management control systems designed and used in team-based settings to 
increase team members´ motivation and performance? 
 
To answer this research question I perform three studies. First, I develop a model 
which relates the use of management control systems with individual autonomous 
motivation within teams. The model proposes two mechanisms to enhance an 
autonomous motivation (i.e. the identified motivation): the interactive use of 
management control systems and the social identity of the team (Adler & Chen, 2011; 
Haslam et al., 2006; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). The model is tested by a 
psychology-based experiment conducted in Pablo Olavide University with 120 
students. The use of experiments enables to analyze cause-effect relationships between 
management accounting practices and individual and group behavior. The results of 
this study support the model. These indicate that organizations can enhance team 
members´ identified motivation by increasing the social identify of the team and also 
by using control systems interactively. 
 
In the second study I develop a mediating model where identified motivation is the 
intervening variable. The model proposes the interactive use of management control 
systems and social identity influence team performance via team members´ identified 
motivation (Haslam, 2001; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Tessier & Otley, 2012). The model is 
tested by the same experiment of the first study. The mediating model is tested using 
the partial least squares technique, which allows estimate models with small sample 
sizes (Chin, 1998).  The results of this study confirm there is no direct effect of the 
interactive use of control systems on team performance, but this effect is via team 
members´ identified motivation. The results also support that the relation between 
social identity and team performance is mediated by the identified motivation of team 
members. 
 
The third study introduces a control mechanism related to the design of control 
information within teams which is the performance feedback or reporting. I focus on 
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the informational feature of this practice instead of the control feature. In this model I 
introduce an intervening variable which is pushed by the design of group performance 
reports: the social comparison process between team members. Following, 
management accounting literature and psychology literature, the model proposes the 
design of group performance reports increases team performance, mediated thorough 
social comparison processes. Furthermore, I introduce the level of social identity as a 
moderator variable, because influences how control information is interpreted within 
teams (Kocher & Sutter, 2007; Rowe, 2004; van Dick et al., 2009a). This model was 
tested by a second experiment conducted in Pablo Olavide University with 144 
students. The results of the experiment point out the informational feature of 
performance feedback produces two types of effects on team members´ performance: 
one direct and the other via social comparison process. These effects are stronger in 
teams with high social identity than in teams with low social identity. 
 
This dissertation provides a contribution to the management accounting research and 
related fields such organizational behavior and psychology. Moreover, the findings of 
this study are also relevant for practitioners. Related to management accounting 
literature, this dissertation provides insights related to two features of management 
control systems: the use and the design. On one hand, this research project is the first 
to my knowledge that examines the direct effects of the interactive use of management 
control systems on individual and group behavior. Combining social psychology 
theories with management accounting literature, this dissertation sheds some light 
about the process by which the interactive use of control systems influences team 
members´ behavior. I posit that this relation is no direct, but indirect via the identified 
motivation of individuals (Adler & Chen, 2011). The use of intervening models 
provides a more comprehensive knowledge about team performance by analyzing 
mediating variables, such as motivational and affective states, between organizational 
inputs and team outcomes (Birnberg et al., 2007; Mathieu et al., 2008). On the other 
hand, this dissertation is focused on one particular feature of performance reports, the 
informational feature. Researchers have largely focused on the positive effects of the 
control feature of performance reports (that is, how people act when they know their 
performance is controlled). However, I focus on how the design of performance 
information provided to team members influences their motivation and performance 
(maintaining control constant, between the different types of designs). Researchers 
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have stressed the informational feature enhances two processes within teams: a 
cognitive process (that is, providing information to teammates related to the context 
they are working -a group context or an individual context-) and a social comparison 
process (the individual compares his performance with the performance of his 
teammates). I posit only a given design of performance feedback, as aggregated group 
information, produces positive effects on team members´ performance, through these 
two processes. However, if organizations provide too detail information related to 
teammate’s performance, the effects of the social comparison process could be 
negative for team performance.  
 
Secondly, this dissertation provides a contribution to the organizational behavior 
literature, related to social identity and social comparison process. On one hand, recent 
social identity researchers suggest that the relation between social identity and group 
performance is not clear. The reason is social identity has been traditionally analyzed 
as one-dimensional concept, whereas it is a multidimensional concept (van 
Knippenberg, 2000; van Dick et al., 2009a,b). This dissertation provides empirical 
evidence of the relation between the two dimensions of social identity (salience and 
identification) and group performance. Moreover, I analyze how management control 
systems, as a contextual factor, can directly push the salience of the group identity, but 
not group identification. On the other hand, social comparison research has been 
applied a wide variety of areas of human functioning. Nevertheless, researchers 
highlight few studies have analyzed social comparison processes in one of the most 
popular settings for investigating human behavior, the teamwork (Brown et al., 2007; 
Greenberg, Ashton-James & Ashkanasy, 2007). When people work closely together in 
a group, they have many opportunities to compare with teammates. Furthermore, I 
posit organizations can activate this social comparison process using practices and 
mechanisms of management control systems, as incentives or performance feedback. 
Nevertheless, although traditionally researchers enhance the positive effects of social 
comparison process on individual behavior, the results of this dissertation highlights 
that this process has the potential of being destructive within teams (Molleman, Nauta 
& Buunk, 2007; Spence et al., 2011).  
 
Finally, the results of this dissertation are also important for practice. First, I posit 
organizations can increase group performance only changing the style of use of 
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control information within teams. Researchers have extensively focused on the design 
of management control systems (i.e. group or individual rewards, horizontal or vertical 
incentives), I suggest the style of use of the control information can also influence 
individual motivation in collaborative settings. Accounting and control practices that 
enhance communication, participation and interaction processes are, therefore, mainly 
important in team-based settings (Adler & Chen, 2011; Berry et al., 2009; Chenhall, 
2008). Secondly, organizations should be careful when design accounting and control 
practices in collaborative environments because individuals have different reactions 
depending on the level of their team identity (Towry, 2003, van Dick et al., 2009a,b). 
When individuals are highly identified with their group, too detailed performance 
information related to teammates could be negative for team performance. If 
teammates free-ride, the other team members can follow these practices assuming it 
represents the standard behavior of the team. Therefore, the level of team identity 
might be considered when organizations design the amount of performance 
information provided for team members. Finally, considering the importance of the 
effects of social comparison processes between individuals, organizations should 
careful analyze how control practices may be designed within teams. In teams with a 
high social identity, a performance report which displays free-riding behaviors within 
the group can enhance negative social comparison processes between team members. 
As a result, free-riding behaviors become common in the group. Therefore, it is better 
to design control mechanisms which do not push these comparison processes within 
teams (Molleman et al., 2007; Spence et al., 2011). 
 
 
1.7  DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
 
The structure of this dissertation is as follow. In Chapter 2, I present the theories used, 
the variables analyzed, and the relation expected between variables. Chapters 3, 4 and 
5 present the three studies developed. In Chapter 3 I present the first study entitled 
“The use of Management Control Systems, Social Identity and Team Commitment”. 
In Chapter 4 I present the second study entitled “The effect of Interactive Control 
Systems and Social Identity on team members´ motivation and performance”. In 
Chapter 5 I present the third study entitled “The effect of Group Performance Report 
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on cooperative effort”. In each Chapter I develop the research hypotheses, describe the 
research method and the results, and I end with some conclusions and discussion about 
the results. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the research findings and gives some 
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In this chapter firstly I discuss the literature deal with management control systems, 
social identity, individual motivation and team performance. Secondly, I introduce the 
main variables of this dissertation: management control systems, social identity, and 
social comparison processes. Finally, I present the expected relations between 
variables, which support the three studies of the dissertation. 
 
I describe the foundations of the different theories used: an economic theory (agency 
theory), and two social psychology theories (self-determination and social identity 
theories). Assuming that individuals respond to ethical, moral and social principles in 
addition to economic incentives, researchers suggest that a behavioral-economic 
approach may help to understand individual behavior (economic and social) within 
organizations and teams (Adler & Chen, 2011; Birnberg, 2011; Birnberg, Luft & 
Shields, 2007) 
 
I also summarize the main variables of this dissertation. First, I analyze differences on 
the use of management control systems and also on its design, since both features have 
been suggested to influence individual behavior (Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Bouwens 
& Abernethy, 2000; Tessier & Otley, 2012). Related to the use, I follow Simons´ 
framework of Levers of Control and I focus on the interactive use of management 
control systems. Related to the design, I describe differences in the design of group 
performance reports, analyzing an aggregated form (where only group information is 
present) and a detailed form (which combines group and individual information). 
Secondly, I introduce two dimensions related to the social identity variable: 
identification and salience, since psychology researchers have suggested these two 
dimensions produce different effects on individual behavior (van Dick et al., 2009a). 
Thirdly, I analyze social comparison processes within teams, following organizational 
behavior research (Molleman, Nauta & Buunk, 2007). 
 
Finally I analyze the relation between management control systems (design and use) 
and team performance, where autonomous individual motivation and social 
comparison process are present. I also analyze the relation between social identity and 
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team performance, where autonomous individual motivation is present. Then I analyze 





2.2.1  Agency theory 
 
Agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party 
(the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that work. Agency 
theory is concerned with resolving two problems: the agency problem and the problem 
of risk sharing. Agency problem arises when the desires or goals of the principal and 
agent conflict, and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent 
is actually doing. Risk sharing problem arises when the principal and agent have 
different attitudes toward risk. The problem here is that the principal and the agent 
may prefer different actions because of the different risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  
 
Agency theory attempts to describe the relationship between the principal and the 
agent using the metaphor of a contract. The focus on the theory is determining the 
most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship given assumptions 
about people (e.g. self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion) and organizations 
(e.g. goal conflict among members). Table 2.1 summarizes Agency Theory overview. 
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Table 2.1.(1): Agency Theory overview 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organization of 
information and risk-bearing costs. 
Unit of analysis  Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion 
Organizational 
assumptions 
Partial goal conflict among participants. 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion. 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information assumption Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing goals and  
risk preferences (e.g. compensation, regulation, leadership, impression 
management, whistle-blowing, vertical integration, transfer pricing) 
Source: Eisenhardt, 1989. 
 
Agency theory has been applied to organizational phenomena such as compensation, 
rewards, board relationships, ownership and financing structures, vertical integration, 
and innovation. Overall, the domain of the agency theory is relationships that mirror 
the basis agency structure of a principal and an agent who are engaged in cooperative 
behavior, but have different goals and different attitudes toward risk (Brown, Evans & 
Moser, 2009; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
However, researchers point out agency theory assumptions are violated in some 
situations (Brown et al., 2009; Bandiera, Barankay & Rasul, 2005; Gold & Sudgen, 
2007). Traditionally, it is almost presupposed that agency is invested in individuals: 
each person acts on her own preferences and beliefs. Opposing to this orthodoxy is a 
body of literature which allows teams of individuals to count as agents, and which 
seeks to identify a mode of team reasoning that are used by individuals as members of 
a team (Gold & Sudgen, 2007; Haslam, 2001). This team reasoning is different from 
the individual reasoning which is based on the assumption of self-interested behavior. 
Therefore, individuals’ behavior within teams may be different from individuals´ 
behavior in a single work situation. In team-based settings individuals work in a 
horizontal structure, while in traditional single-work environments there is a 
hierarchical relation between the agent and the principal (Coletti et al., 2005; Brown et 
al., 2009). In fact, there are many examples in social life that demonstrate that 
individuals do not always act selfishly (i.e. people who voluntary participate or work 
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in non-governmental organizations). Moreover, also on empirical studies focus on 
Prisoner´s Dilemma situations, the proportion of participants choosing to defect is 
typically between 60 and 50 percent, therefore, most of participants choose to 
cooperate1. Researchers suggest self-interested assumption related to individual 
behavior do not fit with collaborative environments, where other types of individual 
motivation fit better (Adler & Chen, 2011; Gagné & Deci, 2005).  
 
In sum, agency theory traditionally has been applied to vertical and hierarchical 
relationships between a principal and an agent. This theory assumes self-interested 
behavior of individuals in any situation. However, there are situations where 
individuals choose to cooperate and align their objectives with other teammates, 
leaving aside their self-interested behavior. It seems that individual motivation in 




2.2.2  Self- determination theory 
 
Self-determination theory suggests the assumption of self-interest behavior of 
individuals describes a specific type of individual motivation, whereas individuals 
have different types of motivations (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
Motivation represents an intention to act and it ranges from amotivation to intrinsic 
motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Gagné & Deci, 2005; Meyer, Becker & 
Vandenberghe, 2004). Amotivation involves a lack of intentions, while intrinsic 
motivation involves people doing an activity because they find it interesting and 
derive spontaneous satisfaction from the activity itself. Extrinsic motivation is 
between amotivation and intrinsic motivation, and requires an instrumentality between 
the activity and some separable consequences such as tangible or verbal rewards 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000; Wong-on-Wing, Guo & Lui, 2010). Thus, satisfaction comes not 
from the activity itself but rather from the extrinsic consequences to which the activity 
leads. 
                                                          
1 The Prisioner´s Dilemma represents a situation where two players must choose if cooperate or defect in 
a game. The unique equilibrium, assuming self-interested behaviors of individuals, is for both players to 
defect. Yet both players would be better off if each chose cooperate instead of defect (see Golden & 
Sudgen, 2007). 
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Central to self-determination theory is the distinction between autonomous motivation 
and controlled motivation (Wong-on-Wing et al., 2010). Autonomy involves acting 
with a sense of volition and having the experience of choice, while controlled involves 
acting with a sense of pressure, a sense of having to engage in the actions (Gagné & 
Deci, 2005). Intrinsically motivated behavior is prototypically autonomous. However, 
extrinsically motivated behavior can vary in the degree to which it is autonomous 
versus controlled.  
 
It can be distinguished four types of extrinsic motivation: external, introjected, 
identified and integrated (Adler & Chen, 2011; Gagné & Deci, 2005). External 
means that it is initiated and maintained by contingencies external to the person (e.g. I 
do the task to obtain a monetary reward). The other three types of extrinsic motivation 
are related to internalization, which is defined as people taking in values, attitudes, or 
regulatory structures, such that the external regulation of a behavior is transformed 
into an internal regulation (e.g. I work even when the boss is not watching) (Gagné & 
Deci, 2005). Introjected motivation represents a regulation that has been taken in by 
the person but has not been accepted as his or her own (e.g. I work because it makes 
me feel like a worthy person). Identified motivation represents people who identify 
with the value of a behavior for their own self-selected goals; therefore, the behavior 
is more congruent with their personal goals and values (e.g. studying for an upcoming 
exam rather than going out with friends). Finally, integrated motivation represents 
people which have a full sense that the behavior is an integral part of who they are 
(e.g. scientist who chooses to spend long hours in the lab in the pursuit of knowledge). 
 
Intrinsic, integrated and identified motivation are the autonomous motivation, while 
introjected and external motivation are the controlled motivation (Gagné & Deci, 
2005; Wong-on-Wing et al., 2010). Figure 2.2 summarizes the type of motivations: 
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Source: own elaboration, based on the Gagné & Deci (2005). 
 
Organizational behavior researchers have analyzed the effects of these types of 
motivation on individual behavior (see Ryan & Deci, 2000; Meyer et al., 2004). Over 
the past decade, researchers have stressed the use of rewards and punishments increase 
the external individual motivation and have a powerful impact on behavior (Brown et 
al., 2009; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Meyer et al., 2004). However, external regulation 
can have negative consequences on long-run tasks and also on collaborative 
environments (Adler & Chen, 2011; Meyer et al., 2004). An autonomous motivation 
works better in settings where coordination and cooperation is needed. Researchers 
highlight the identified motivation at group level because has been associated with 
greater task persistence, affective commitment, work group climate and pro-social 
behaviors (Adler & Chen, 2011; Meyer et al., 2004). Following these suggestions, 
researchers are becoming interested in the processes that can push this autonomous 
individual motivation and its consequences (see Adler & Chen, 2011; Wong-on-Wing 
et al., 2010).  
 
Two types of mechanisms have been highlighted in the literature to increase individual 
identified motivation: mechanisms that prompt high levels of interaction and 
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or the social category (Adler & Chen, 2011, p. 68; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). 
Psychological states, such as social identity, are related to identification mechanisms 
(Adler & Chen, 2011; Haslam, 2001).  
 
In sum, although traditionally economic and management literature assume one type 
of individual motivation, that is, the external motivation, Self-Determination theory 
posits individuals have different types of motivations. Furthermore, it is suggested that 
an identified motivation fits better with collaborative environments, because the 
individual needs to feel a sense of autonomy in team-based work. Two types of 
mechanisms have been suggested for increasing the individual identified motivation: 




2.2.3  Social identity theory 
 
Social identity theory is concerned with how individuals´ mind and behavior are 
influenced by other people (Birnberg et al., 2007; Haslam, 2001). Social identity 
theory was originally developed in an attempt to understand the psychological basis of 
intergroup discrimination: Why do group members malign other groups and what 
makes people so often believe that their own group is better than others?  
 
This theory analyzes how people´s cognitions and behavior are affected. Two 
processes are suggested. On one hand, individual behavior could be represented in 
terms of a bipolar continuum, at one extreme it is interpersonal behavior (character 
and motivations of the individual as an individual), and in the other extreme it is 
intergroup behavior (behavior derives solely from the person’s group membership) 
(Tajfel, 1978; Haslam, 2001). Related to the intergroup behavior, individuals 
categorize their social word into in-groups (e.g. an individual´s work team) and out-
groups (e.g. work teams in other organizations). And intergroup behavior comes into 
play to the extent that behavior is defined at the intergroup extreme of the continuum. 
Individuals want to maximize their similarities with the in-group behavior (Lount & 
Phillips, 2007). Tajfel (1978) suggests that intergroup and interpersonal behaviors are 
qualitatively distinct from each other.  
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On the other hand, people´s cognition and behavior are affected by perceived social 
structure (Haslam, 2001; van Knippenberg, 2000). That is, where the individuals place 
themselves on the interpersonal-intergroup continuum is a consequence of interplay 
between social and psychological factors. Social factors have to do with the objective 
features of the world of the word an individual confronts and psychological factors are 
associated with the individual´s interpretation of that world. Thus, the way we see 
ourselves depends both on events happening in the world around us and on the 
perspective we take on those events.  
 
Two sub-processes are involved in social identity to influence individual behavior: 
categorization and depersonalization (O´Fallon & Butterfield, 2012). First, 
categorization is the process by which an individual is classified into a social category 
based on a variety of characteristics, such as age, race, status, religion or 
organizational membership. Psychology research highlights that contextual factors, as 
accounting and control practices, can help categorization because remind a specific 
social category (see Haslam, 2001; Towry, 2003, Rowe, 2004). Secondly, 
depersonalization occurs when the individual begins to act and think in accordance 
with the groups´ perceived prototypical characteristics, such as norms, values and 
beliefs (Birnberg et al., 2007; O´Fallon & Butterfield, 2012; van Dick et al., 2009a,b). 
This refers to a process of which the self comes to be perceived as categorically 
interchangeable with other in-group members. Therefore, when depersonalization 
process is initiated, the individual begins to be motivated by group goals instead of his 
individual goals (Haslam, 2001). 
 
Social identity theory argues that the potential of a team (the in-group) depends not 
only on the skill, knowledge and ability of the people in the team, but also on their 
ability and motivation to feel the team as a unit (Lembke & Wilson, 1998). Social 
identity has been related to a wide range of factors related to team performance, as 
team cohesion, internalization of group norms, commitment and cooperation (see 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
32 
2.2.4  Summary and conclusions 
 
In this section, I summarize the relations between the three theories described above. 
Firstly, economic, organizational behavior and management accounting research has 
largely focused on agency theory, which is focused on vertical and hierarchical 
relationships and external individual motivation (Gold & Sudgen, 2007; Mundy & 
Brown, 2008). However, self-determination theory points out that external motivation 
works worse in collaborative environments instead of an autonomous motivation 
(Adler & Chen, 2011; Meyer et al., 2004; Deci & Ryan, 1985). Therefore, researchers 
interested on team performance might focus on individual autonomous motivation, 
such as team members´ identified motivation. 
 
Secondly, self-determination theory suggests different processes for enhancing 
individual identified motivation: involvement, participation, interdependence or 
identification (Adler & Chen, 2011; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001; Gagné & Deci, 
2005). I follow this suggestion and I analyze which features of the design and use of 
management control systems fit better with these processes (Won-On-Wing, Guo & 
Lui, 2010). Furthermore, I analyze a psychological variable, social identity, which also 
is related to the identification process within the group (van Dick et al., 2009a,b).  
 
Finally, I analyze the relation between management control systems and social 
identity, since researchers suggest management control systems are contextual factors 
that can influence salience of the social category (Towry, 2003; van Dick et al., 
2009b). In summary, this dissertation analyzes the joint effect of management control 





2.3.1 Management Control Systems 
 
Management control systems (MCS) are defined as a combination of control 
mechanisms designed and used by organizations to enhance firm value by ensuring the 
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effective and efficient use of scarce resources (Sprinkle, 2003). Researchers highlight 
two roles of MCS: the decision-facilitating role and the decision-influencing role 
(Malmi & Brown, 2008; Sprinkle, 2003). The decision-facilitating role provides 
information for planning and decision-making, that is, to improve employees´ abilities 
to make organizationally desirable decisions. The decision-influencing role is related 
to individual motivation. Agency theory has been traditionally used to analyze the 
decision-influencing role within organizations, since it attempts to explain the optimal 
design of management control systems (the contract) between a self-interested 
principal and one or more self-interested agents (Brown et al., 2009; Sprinkle, 2003). 
Two different features of MCS can be used to the decision-influencing role of MCS: 
the type of use and the type of design of control information (Naranjo-Gil & 
Hartmann, 2006, 2007; Malmi & Brown, 2008). 
 
On one hand, the style of use of MCS can enhance the firm value. Simons´ framework 
identifies two types of uses of the formal control systems: a diagnostic and interactive 
use (Simons, 1995; 2000). A diagnostic use represents the traditional feedback role as 
MCS are used on an exception basis to monitor and reward the achievement of pre-
established goals. The interactive use of MCS represents a positive force as MCS are 
used to expand opportunity-seeking and learning throughout the organization by 
reflecting signals sent by top managers. Researchers have analyzed how these two 
types of uses influence firm outcomes, as organizational capabilities (as innovation, 
organizational learning, market orientation or entrepreneurship), strategic 
implementation (cost strategy or flexibility strategy), strategic change or 
organizational performance (see Abernethy & Brownell, 1999; Henri, 2006; Kominis 
& Dudau, 2012; Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 2006, 2007; Widener, 2007). The revised 
framework of Simons Levers of Control by Tessier & Otley (2012) highlighted that 
employees have different perceptions to controls, depending of the style of use. These 
perceptions can influence individual motivation and behavior. However there is no 
empirical evidence of a cause-effect relation between the use of MCS and the 
individual and group motivation and performance (Adler & Chen, 2011, Tessier & 
Otley, 2012). 
 
On the other hand, the design of MCS has been defined in terms of the perceived 
usefulness of several information characteristics (Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Bouwens 
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& Abernethy, 2000; Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 2006). The main dimensions of the 
design of MCS are scope, integration, aggregation and timeliness. The scope 
dimension has three sub-dimensions: focus, quantification and time horizon. It is 
viewed as a continuum with narrow scope at one hand and broad scope at the other. 
The features of data are related to monetary or non-monetary, historical data or future, 
internal or external. The integration dimension includes information about the 
activities of others. The aggregated dimension provides summary information by 
functional area, subunit, team, or time period. Finally, timeliness has two dimensions: 
frequency of reporting (how often information is provided) and speed of reporting 
(time lag between when a person requests information and when it is made available). 
In spite of the fact that all dimensions have been shown to influence individual 
behavior, recent researchers stress that aggregation is an important feature at team 
level, because it allows other processes which are not present in individual 
environments, as mutual monitoring and social comparison process (Rowe, 2004; 
Rowe et al., 2008; Román, 2009).  
 
Aggregation can be applied to different management control mechanisms, as budgets, 
performance reports and/or incentives. Nevertheless, researchers highlight the 
importance of performance reports at team level because enhance two types of 
processes, the control process (e.g. information about the level of goals reached by the 
group) and the informational process (e.g. information about the context and also 
about the performance of other teammates) (see Coletti et al., 2005; Rowe et al., 2008; 
Román, 2009). While previous researchers have analyzed the control feature of 
performance report in team-based settings, the effects of the informational feature is 
yet not clear (Coletti et al., 2005). The important cue is the manner in which 
performance reports are presented to individuals, that is, if only aggregated team 
information is presented, or if also individual information related to teammates is 
presented (Rowe et al., 2008). Two processes can be developed by the informational 
feature of performance reports: a cognitive process (that is, the individual receives 
information related to the context where s/he works) and a social comparison process 
(that is, the individual can evaluate his abilities against other team members). 
However, it is not clear how these two processes work within teams and influence 
team members´ motivation and behaviour (Greenberg, Ashton-James & Ashkanasy, 
2007; Molleman et al., 2007; Rowe, 2004; Towry, 2003). 
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2.3.2 Social identity 
 
Social identity states that a group or social category emerges when a number of people 
perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, and as soon as 
individuals categorize themselves as members of a social category, they will act in 
terms of this membership (Haslam, 2001; Hogg & Terry, 2000). Social identity 
researchers are focus on explain inter-group phenomena. Its main proposition is 
individuals strive to maintain or enhance a positive social identity by comparing their 
own group with relevant other groups.  
 
Social identity can be divided in two dimensions: identification and salience (van Dick 
et al., 2009a). Identification leads individuals to perceive themselves in terms of the 
characteristics they share with other members of their in-groups (their shared social 
identity) rather than in terms of the characteristics that differentiate them from other 
individuals (their personal identity) (van Knippenberg, 2000). Identification blurs the 
distinction between self and the group, and turns the group psychologically part of the 
self. The salience dimension describes the extent to which a specific group, among the 
many social categories that an individual has in a given moment, is relevant for his 
thinking, feeling and behavior. A social category is more likely to be salient if both the 
category and the situation match the individual´s expectations and if reality matches 
these expectations (van Knippenberg, 2000; van Dick et al., 2009a). That is, any event 
that speaks to a group membership (i.e. rather than to the individual) may make the 
social identity based in that group membership salient (van Knippenberg, 2000). For 
example, the prospect of a merger may render organizational identity salient, or 
conflict or competition between work groups may render work group identity salient. 
Furthermore, identity salience may endure for longer periods or may change in a 
matter of moments (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Van Knippenberg, 2000).  
 
In summary, even though identification with a group may lead individuals to act in 
group-typical ways, this does not mean that individuals who identify with a group 
always act in accordance with the social identity based in that group membership. The 
influence of identification on individual behavior is contingent on social identity being 
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salient or cognitively activated by the context (van Knippenberg, 2000; van Dick et 
al., 2009a). 
 
2.3.3 Social comparison 
 
The process of comparing oneself to other people is a basic aspect of human 
experience, on that helps to reduce uncertainty and create meanings. In fact, social 
comparisons may be an “almost inevitable element of social interaction” (Festinger, 
1954; Brown et al., 2007). The primary goal of social comparison is to acquire 
information about the self. It has been identified three specific motives for 
comparison: self-evaluation (how am I doing?), self-improvement (the desire to 
improve about their abilities) and self-enhancement (the desire to protect/enhance 
one´s attitude towards the self). Aside from the motives behind social comparison, the 
direction of comparison is another fundamental distinction. Originally Festinger 
(1954) proposed a unidirectional upward drive whereby the individual looks to 
superior others for inspiration and self-improvement. However, subsequent research 
on social comparisons has found this is not always the case. In particular people may 
opt to compare downward (with others who are worse of) to self-enhancement. 
Therefore, individuals engage in both upward and downward comparisons, which 
occur on a daily basis. Studies have shown that the two types of comparisons represent 
empirically separate constructs (Brown et al, 2007; Buunk & Gibbons, 2007; Gibbons 
& Buunk, 1999; Greenberg et al, 2007).  
 
There are contradictory results about the effects of upward and downward comparison 
processes at team level. Some researchers point out those individuals who compare 
downward can feel better and thus social comparison has a positive effect on the 
individual behavior and attitude (Moore, 2007). Others suggest those individuals who 
compare upward can feel better because they are motivated to improve their work to 
be as their colleagues (Buunk et al., 2005; Greenberg et al, 2007). The difference 
between these results is explained by other important feature of social comparison: the 
contrast and assimilation effect (Brown et al., 2007; Greenberg et al., 2007). Contrast 
effects (“that person is not me”) suggest that upward comparisons are more likely to 
evoke negative effect. Comparing upwards puts one in contrast to someone better off. 
Assimilation effects (“that person could be me”) suggest that upward comparisons are 
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more likely to evoke positive effects (Buunk et al., 2005), because individual may 
engage in upward comparison to confirm that they are similar to the comparison target 
(Buunk et al., 2005). Therefore, there are four types of social comparison processes: 
upward assimilation and upward contrast, and downward assimilation and downward 
contrast. Differences are in the type of thoughts these comparisons produce on 
individual feelings about the self and the comparison target (Molleman et al., 2007). 
Moreover, contextual factors can moderate these relations. A competitive context is 
likely to facilitate contrast effects because the motive for comparison is to self-
enhance, whereas a cooperative context may facilitate assimilation effects because the 




2.4  RELATIONS BETWEEN VARIABLES 
 
2.4.1 Management control systems and team performance 
 
Team performance is frequently not reached because individuals in the group reduce 
their effort on the task. This team problem is named motivation losses (Blascovich, 
2008; Karau & Williams, 1993; Lount & Phillips, 2007). Researchers point out that 
these motivation losses occur because the team is not really meaningful for team 
members. Motivation losses can be avoided if team members think as “us” rather than 
“I” (Gold & Sudgen, 2007; Kocher & Sutter, 2007; van Dick et al., 2009b). 
Management control systems can be used to increase individual motivation within 
organizations (Birnberg et al., 2007). In the last decade, due to the increased 
importance of team-based relations, management accounting researchers have 
analyzed the relation between MCS and group performance (see Birnberg, 2011). 
However, most of the studies have focused on the design of MCS instead of the use of 
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2.4.1.1 Management control systems design and team performance 
 
Related to the design of MCS, two mechanisms have been highlighted in the literature: 
group incentives and group performance reports. Libby and Thorne (2009) analyzed 
the relation between group and individual incentives and group performance in two 
types of group-task environments: a production environment (where individuals 
cannot communicate and cooperate) and a team environment (where individuals can 
help each other and cooperate). The results point out that group incentives increase 
team performance but only in team environments instead of production environments. 
Moreover, the authors find there is no relation between either type of incentives and 
group performance in production environments (Libby & Thorne, 2009). Therefore, 
these results stress two conclusions. First, traditional incentives, based on individual 
information, do not work in group-task environments. Secondly, in some group-task 
environments, group incentives are not enough to influence team performance. The 
reason is group incentives create social dilemma situations in group-based settings 
where communication and cooperation is not allowed (Coletti et al., 2005; Gold & 
Sudgen, 2007; Rowe, 2004, Rowe et al., 2008). In this situation, group incentives 
might be complemented with other type of control mechanisms, as performance 
reports, to really influence group performance (Bandiera et al., 2005; Román, 2009) 
 
Coletti et al. (2005) analyze the relation between control mechanisms and group 
performance. The authors analyze two features of control mechanisms: a control and 
informational feature. The control feature describes a situation where an auditor could 
control the effort of team members. The informational feature describes a situation 
where performance feedback is used within teams. In the study by Coletti et al. 
(2005), individuals’ performance information was share at team level (i.e. individuals 
have information related to effort and performance of other teammates). The results 
stress that this control mechanism reduces free-riding behaviors within teams –where 
communication is not allowed- and increases group performance. However, the design 
of the study does not allow differentiate the effects of the control and informational 
feature on group performance. Román (2009) complements the results of Coletti et al. 
(2005). By using a case study the author analyzes the relation between group 
incentives, group performance reports and group outcomes (absenteeism, quality, 
performance) in a large manufacturing firm. Their results stress that group incentives 
might be implemented in conjunction with other control mechanisms, as performance 
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reports, to facilitate cooperation, and reinforce monitoring within teams. In this study, 
the performance reports was based only on aggregated group information, that is, there 
was no individual information sharing within the group. The results stress that the 
informational feature of group performance report allows that high-performers 
identify low-performers within the team and volunteer help them to improve (Román, 
2009). Although Román (2009) does not specifically mention the social comparison 
process, the case describes how upward and downward comparison work within 
teams, when an aggregated performance report is used. 
 
The studies described above highlight some limitations related to management 
accounting research and team work that can be overcome with further research. First, 
the importance of adapt the design of control mechanisms to group context, since 
traditional designs (i.e. individual incentives, vertical incentives or individual 
feedback) do not work. I posit these types of designs do not fit in group context since 
are focused on the external motivation of individuals, instead of the identified 
motivation (Gold & Sudgen, 2007). Following self-determination theory, I posit 
organizations should focus on identified motivation of individuals in team-based 
setting (Adler & Chen, 2011; Gagné & Deci, 2005). The reason is twofold. First, 
identified motivation is associated with affective states, as commitment, which 
supports pro-social behaviors such as helping others. Identified motivation may enable 
team members´ coordination and promote supportive work climate. Secondly, 
identified motivation is positive related to controls. For example, a control mechanism 
(as feedback) can conflict with intrinsic motivation, as the individual feels someone is 
coercing him to do the task (instead of doing by his own satisfaction). However, 
control mechanisms (as feedback) can be seen as a means to reach the goals in a 
situation where the individual is identified motivated. The work of Román (2009) 
highlights how performance reports push cooperation within teams, because the 
information provided to team members allows them to help each other for achieving 
team goals(Adler & Chen, 2011; Gagné & Deci, 2005; Lau & Moser, 2008). 
 
Secondly, the studies described above stress the importance of the design of 
performance reports to complement group incentives in collaborative environments, 
where social dilemma situation is present (Coletti et al., 2005; Rowe, 2004; Rowe et 
al., 2008). Their results highlight the importance of the informational feature because 
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enhances some processes that are not present in single-work environments, as social 
comparison. Román (2009) describes how an aggregated performance report works 
within teams. Its description highlights how upward and downward comparison 
processes was developed within teams. However, the case study does not allow 
analyzing cause-effect relations between performance reports, social comparison 
processes and group performance. Moreover, few studies have addressed the 
prevalence and implications of social comparisons at work despite the fact that formal 
mechanisms and procedures within organizations and teams can push these processes 
(i.e. with incentives, pay schemes or performance reports) (Buunk et al., 2005; 
Goodman & Haisley, 2007; Towry, 2003). 
 
Finally, most of previous studies are based on additive models, between management 
control systems and group performance. However, these additive models cannot 
explain the process by which management control systems affects group performance. 
Intervening variable models allow test social psychology theories in more detail by 
explicitly representing and measuring at least some of the intervening variables (as 
individual motivation or social comparison) that leads from management accounting 
variables to their effects (Birnberg et al., 2007). In summary, I combine management 
accounting literature and social psychology literature to develop an intervening model 




2.4.1.2 Management control systems use and team performance 
 
Management accounting researchers’ focused on the style of use of MCS have mainly 
analyzed its effects on organizational outcomes (Adler & Chen, 2011; Tessier & 
Otley, 2012). For example, Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann (2006) analyze the relation 
between diagnostic and interactive use of MCS and strategy implementation, finding 
that both type of uses are positive associated with the organizational output. Henri 
(2006) finds that the interactive use is positive associated with organizational 
capabilities as market orientation, entrepreneurship, innovativeness and organizational 
learning, while diagnostic use is only positive associated with market orientation, 
innovativeness and organizational learning. Widener (2007) analyzes the indirect 
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effect of the style of uses of MCS on organizational performance, via organizational 
behavior responses as attention and learning. Nevertheless, although these studies 
were focus on organizational variables, they also described how the styles of uses 
worked at individual and group level within organizations. The interactive use of MCS 
has been highlighted in collaborative environments (see Henri, 2006; Simons, 1995, 
2000; Widener, 2007; Kominis & Dudau, 2012). 
 
Kominis & Dudau (2012) describe a case study of inter-organizational relationships in 
the public sector. The authors describe how the interactive use offers opportunity for 
meeting and involving debates between partners. Therefore, individuals from a 
specific organization feel closer to and in constant interaction with individuals of the 
other organization, working and feeling as a team. The authors highlight that the role 
of interactive system is to promote participation, involvement, dialogue and learning, 
by creating the atmosphere necessary to enable individuals to share their insights. 
Abernethy & Brownell (1999) highlight that the interactive use of budgets is 
consistent with the operation of cross-functional teams. The interactive use can be 
seen, itself, as an integrative liaison device that breaks down barriers between 
individuals that inhibit information flows. Interactive use requires more extensive 
involvement and interaction of organizational members, which facilitate commitment 
to organizational priorities. Therefore, previous studies of management accounting 
literature suggest positive effects of the interactive use on individual behavior in 
collaborative settings. However, there is no evidence of a cause-effect relation 
between the interactive use of MCS and the individual motivation and performance 
(Adler & Chen, 2011; Tessier & Otley, 2012). Some researchers suggest the problem 
has been the confusion in the literature related to the definition of the concepts of the 
style of use of MCS. Although the interactive use of MCS has been analyzed as one-
dimensional, researchers suggest it is a multidimensional construct (Bisbe, Batista-
Foguet & Chenhall, 2007; Tessier & Otley, 2012).  
 
Interactive control system can be divided in two dimensions: the focus on strategy 
uncertainty and the intensity of use by organizational members. Given the distinct 
nature of the two dimensions, they do not necessarily share the same antecedents and 
consequences (Bisbe et al., 2007; Ferreira & Otley, 2009, Tessier & Otley, 2012). It is 
the dimension of the intensity of the interactive use which is related to high levels of 
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participation and involvement of organizational members. Abernethy & Brownell 
(1999) have suggested these processes of participation and involvement help 
employees to reach a compromise with their group goals. 
 
The studies described above highlight some limitations in management accounting 
research related to the use of the interactive MCS, but also support new opportunities 
for future research. First, researchers should differentiate dimensions of the interactive 
use of MCS to separately analyze its antecedents, and also its effects. The analysis of 
the different dimensions may help researchers to understand the effects of the 
interactive use on individual and group behavior (Tessier & Otley, 2012). Secondly, 
the intensity dimension of the interactive use of MCS matches with social-
determination theory suggestions: high levels of participation and involvement can 
increase identified motivation of individuals (Adler & Chen, 2011; Meyer & 
Herscovitch, 2001). Thirdly, including mediating variables, as individual motivation, 
can help researchers to understand the relation between management control systems 
and team effectiveness and outcomes (Birnberg et al., 2007; Mathieu et al., 2008). 
Therefore, combining management accounting literature and social psychology 
literature, I develop an intervening model where the identified motivation is the 
mediating variable between the interactive use of MCS and the group performance. 
This model helps to understand how the interactive use of MCS influences 
individuals´ performance in team-based settings. 
 
 
2.4.2 Social identity and team performance 
 
Van Dick et al. (2009b) analyze the mechanisms that can avoid motivation losses 
within teams. The authors stress individuals would increase their productivity in 
groups under conditions that make the group an important component of their identity, 
that is, under conditions that influence intergroup or social identity. If the individual is 
personally aligned with the group, therefore, he would expend more effort in group 
tasks (Haslam, 2001). In spite of these suggestions, social identity researchers 
traditionally might focus on analyzing the influence of social identity on team 
members´ behavior such as commitment, loyalty, cohesion or turnover (see Haslam, 
2001, van Dick et al., 2009b) leaving aside the analysis of its effects on team 
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members´ performance. Nevertheless, some studies have analyzed this direct relation 
but with different results. For example, van Dick et al. (2009a) do not find a direct 
relation between social identity and team performance. The authors suggest the task 
the group perform it is a task where individual motivation matter less. Towry (2003) 
finds that social identity does not influence team effort when a specific incentive 
system (a vertical system) is used.  
 
I posit social identity influences individual behavior and performance in team-based 
settings only when two processes are activated on individual mind: categorization and 
depersonalization (Adler & Chen, 2011; Haslam, 2001; Haslam et al., 2006; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). First, categorization is related to the context where the individual is 
working and also on how the individual interprets this social context (Hogg and Terry, 
2000; Rowe et al., 2008; van Knippenberg, 2000). That is, if the context reminds a 
group frame, therefore, social identity may influence individual behavior towards 
group goals. Secondly, depersonalization occurs when the individual identifies with 
the group so much that the individual thinks he could be interchangeable with other 
teammates (Tajfel, 1978). At this moment, team members feel attached and bonded. 
And this affective bond is related to individual motivation (Meyer & Herscovitch, 
2001; Meyer et al, 2004). I posit in this dissertation social identity influences team 
members´ behavior through this affective bond, that is, through team members´ 
identified motivation (Adler & Chen, 2011; Haslam et al., 2006; Meyer &Herscovitch, 
2001; van Knippenberg, 2000). 
 
 
2.4.3 Management control systems and social identity 
 
Management accounting researchers have found confusing results related to the 
relationship between social identity and management control systems (Birnberg et al., 
2007; Towry, 2003; Rowe, 2004). For example, Towry (2003) analyzes two types of 
incentives at group level: vertical and horizontal. The vertical system is supported by 
agency theory, and its main feature is that each teammate controls the other but report 
to the principal or manager. Contrary, the horizontal system does not involve to 
reporting the principal, but to the teammate. The author analyzes how these two types 
of incentives work in groups with high and low team identity. The results stress a 
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moderating effect of the incentive system on the direct effect of team identity on 
effort. Under the horizontal control system (which relies on mutual monitoring and 
cooperation) a strong team identity leads to high levels of group performance, whereas 
under a vertical control system, there is no effect of team identity on group 
performance. Therefore, the author only finds a direct relation between team identity 
and group performance under the horizontal incentive system. Rowe (2004) analyzes 
how accounting reports influence individual performance within cross-functional 
teams and posit that team identification is one mediator variable. The author finds 
team identification influences individual performance, but the results do not support 
the mediating relation between accounting reports, team identity and individual 
performance. Therefore, one study stresses control systems act as a moderator variable 
between social identity and group performance (Towry, 2003; van Dick et al., 2009b), 
while the other study stresses a direct effect of controls systems on social identity 
(Rowe, 2004). 
 
The studies described above point out mixed results related to management control 
systems and social identity relation (Birnberg et al., 2007). However, combining 
management accounting literature and social identity literature, some explanation can 
be found. The context can remind a specific social category of the individual (i.e. 
activated the salience of religious category). If the social category is salient (i.e. 
religious category), thus, the individual acts as a member of this category, following 
social (i.e. religious) norms (van Knippenberg, 2000). Therefore, context moderates 
the influence of individuals´ social identity on their behavior, and accounting and 
control systems are part of organizational context (Towry, 2003; van Knippenberg, 
2000; van Dick et al., 2009b). In this dissertation I combine social identity and social-
determination theories, and I analyze the relationship between management control 
systems and social identity to influence team performance.  
 
 
2.5  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has described the main theories and variables used in this dissertation and 
also its relations. It can be concluded that management control systems in team-based 
settings should be focus on individual identified motivation (Adler & Chen, 2011; 
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Gagné & Deci, 2005). The literature surveyed does suggest two ways: the interactive 
use of MCS and the group performance reports. On one hand, related to the interactive 
use of MCS, it has often been suggested that participation and involvement of 
organizational members have positive effects on individual behavior in group-based 
settings. However, there is no empirical evidence of this relation (Tessier & Otley, 
2012). I develop two models related to the use of MCS. Chapter 3 analyzes the direct 
relation between the interactive use of MCS and the individual motivation in team-
based environments. Chapter 4 analyzes a mediating model between the interactive 
use of MCS and group performance, where the identified motivation is the mediating 
variable. Furthermore, I introduce social identity in the models tested in chapter 3 and 
4, because I posit identified motivation is also enhanced by social identity. Moreover, 
researchers suggest that social identity and management control systems interacts in 
team-based environments. 
 
On the other hand, related to the design of group performance reports, management 
accounting literature has highlighted the positive effects of its control feature at team 
level (see Coletti et al., 2005; Towry, 2003; Román, 2009). However, related to the 
informational feature, management accounting literature suggests different types of 
designs can positive influence team members´ behavior and performance (either 
aggregated either with individual performance information sharing on the group). 
Some authors suggest the design of performance report may push a group context 
(Rowe, 2004; Rowe et al., 2008), while other authors suggest the design may enhance 
social comparison process within the team to increase individuals´ performance 
(Coletti et al., 2005; Towry, 2003). Furthermore, social identity can also moderate 
these results as influences how individuals interpret group information (O´Fallon & 
Butterfield, 2012). I develop a mediating model in Chapter 5 where social comparison 
process is the intervening variable between management control systems, social 
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Today´s organizations face complex and dynamic environments. One important 
organizational development is the creation of inter- and intra- departmental teams to 
be more efficient and to enhance flexibility and innovativeness (Berry et al., 2009; 
Chenhall, 2008; Mathieu et al., 2008). However, the adoption of team-based structures 
does not automatically lead to performance improvement (Libby & Thorne, 2009; 
Lount& Phillips, 2007; Salas, Goodwin & Shawn, 2009). Researchers highlight 
successful teams require the commitment of team members with group projects and 
goals (Haslam et al., 2006; Katzenbach & Smith, 1993; Lau & Moser, 2008; Lount & 
Phillips, 2007). Given the importance of commitment, researchers have analyzed their 
antecedents (see Cater & Zabkar, 2009; Haslam et al., 2006; Meyer & Herscovitch, 
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2001). Management accounting researchers have point out accounting and control 
practices can increase individuals´ commitment (see Herda & Lavelle, 2011; Ketchand 
& Strawser, 2001; Lau & Moser, 2008). However, most of these studies have focused 
on organizational or professional commitment, while employees of team-based 
organizations are members of at least two entities or foci, the organization and the 
team. Nevertheless, the antecedents and outcomes of each type of commitment (to the 
organization or to the team) work in different way (Bishop et al., 2005; Vandenberghe, 
Bentein & Stinglhamber, 2004).  
 
This study is focused on the antecedents of team commitment. If organizations need to 
increase team members´ commitment, they may use practices specifically linked to the 
group interpersonal dynamics (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001; Vandenberghe et al., 
2004). This study follows the general model of workplace commitment of Meyer and 
Herscovitch (2001, p.316) to analyze what accounting and control practices can be 
used at team level to develop team members´ commitment. This model suggests any 
mechanisms that increase the involvement of an individual in a course of action will 
contribute to the development of commitment (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001, p. 316). 
Recent management accounting researchers have drawn on concepts such as the 
interactive use of management control systems (Simons, 1995, 2000) to highlight its 
features related to individual involvement in collaborative environments (Adler & 
Chen, 2011; Kominis & Dudau, 2012).  
 
Management control systems (MCS) are defined as formalized procedures and 
systems that use information to maintain or alter patterns in an organizational activity 
(Henri, 2006). An important feature of these MCS is how and for what they are used 
(Simons, 1995, 2000; Tessier & Otley, 2012). Simons (1995)´s levers of control 
framework distinguishes two styles of use: diagnostic and interactive. The diagnostic 
use represents the traditional feedback role of MCS, where control information is only 
used to monitor and reward pre-established goals. The interactive use represents a 
positive force, and control information is used not only to monitor and reward, but 
also to involve organizational members in decision activities (Henri, 2006; Widener, 
2007). It seems that an interactive use, which pushes the participation and involvement 
of organizational members, can produce positive effects on individual motivation and 
behavior (Adler & Chen, 2011; Bisbe, Batista-Foguet & Chenhall, 2007; Tessier & 
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Otley, 2012). However, despite the growing body of accounting literature related to 
Simons (1995) framework, the question of how different uses of MCS can influence 
individual behavior is yet unanswered (see Adler & Chen, 2011; Tessier & Otley, 
2012). The reason is interactive use has been traditionally analyzed as one-
dimensional concept; nevertheless, recent researchers suggest that it is a 
multidimensional concept (see Bisbe et al., 2007; Tessier & Otley, 2012). If 
researchers differentiate dimensions of the interactive use, it can distinguish 
antecedents and outcomes of each dimension, and understand how these dimensions 
influence individual behavior (see Bisbe et al., 2007, p.809). Following the general 
model of workplace commitment of Meyer and Herscovitch (2001), this study I 
proposes that one dimension of the interactive use, related to the intensity of its use 
between individuals, increases team members´ commitment to group goals and 
projects. 
 
Meyer and Herscovitch (2001, p.316) highlight other mechanisms to increase 
commitment to a specific target: a situation that contributes to the likelihood that an 
individual will derive his or her identification with an entity or group. This suggestion 
is in line with social psychology researchers who point out social identity of team 
members’ influences individuals´ motivation through group goals (Ellemers, de Gilder 
& Haslam, 2004; Haslam et al., 2006; van Dick et al., 2009). Social Identity Theory 
assumes that people classify themselves and others according to various social groups 
(e.g. nationality or religion) and also in terms of group membership (Haslam, 2001; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1986). If individuals define themselves in terms of their group 
membership, thus, they are motivated to achieve team goals, that is, they are 
committed with team goals and values (Ellemers et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 2006; van 
Knippenberg, 2000). Therefore, social identity researchers point to the importance of 
the identification process to develop commitment (Ellemers et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 
2006), while organizational behaviour researchers point to the importance of the 
involvement process instead of the identification process (Meyer & Herscovitch, 
2001; Wegge et al., 2006). Although Meyer and Herscovitch (2001) suggest the effect 
of the involvement process should be higher than the identification process on the 
development of commitment, nevertheless, there is no empirical evidence comparing 
the strength of these two processes.  
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This study has two goals. First, it is focused on the direct effect of the interactive 
control system on team members´ commitment. Secondly, it compares the effects of 
social identity and the interactive use of MCS on the development of team members´ 
commitment. Although, traditionally accounting researchers have analyzed the 
expected relation between accounting practices and commitment with survey studies, 
recent accounting researchers suggest using experiments to analyze individual 
behavior in team-based settings (see Libby & Thorne, 2009; Coletti, Sedatole & 
Towry, 2005). Experiments allow analyzing cause-effect relations between accounting 
practices and individual and group behavior (Sprinkle, 2003; Birnberg, 2011). The two 
objectives of this study were tested with an experiment conducted in Pablo Olavide 
University with 120 students. The independent variables are the interactive use of 
MCS (as a proxy of participation and involvement processes) and the social identity of 
the team (as a proxy of identification process). The results of the experiment support 
the hypotheses of the study. First, the interactive use of MCS increases team 
members´ commitment. Secondly, the effect of the interactive use is higher than the 
effect of social identity on the team members´ commitment. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it introduces the concept of 
team commitment in accounting literature, due to the increased number of teamwork 
studies. Traditionally organizations were based in hierarchical and vertical structures, 
with individuals working in single work conditions (Berry et al., 2009). In this 
situation, organizations were interested on increasing individuals´ commitment to 
these foci, that is, to the organization (see Ketchand & Strawser, 2001). However, 
team-based work is a main structure of today´s organizations, and social psychology 
researchers suggest that employees should be committed to these nearest foci instead 
of the organization to really be more efficient (Haslam et al., 2006; Vandenberghe et 
al., 2004). Secondly, it analyzes one dimension of the interactive use of MCS and its 
effects on individual behavior. Following recent calls of management accounting 
researchers (see Adler & Chen, 2011; Tessier & Otley, 2012), this study provides 
empirical evidence on the relation between the interactive use of MCS and individual 
behavior in team-based settings. This study follows one proposition of Adler & Chen 
(2011) and, using an experiment, demonstrates a direct relation between the intensity 
of use of MCS within teams and the development of affective commitment, that is, the 
development of self-determined behavior of team members (Meyer, Becker & 
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Vandenberghe, 2004). Finally, this study provides empirical evidence of the strength 
of two processes identified in the general model of workplace commitment of Meyer 
and Herscovitch (2001). Although psychology researchers stress the positive effects of 
social identity on team members´ motivation and commitment (see Haslam, 2001; 
Haslam et al., 2006; van Dick et al., 2009), the results of this study suggest 
organizations can push the development of individuals´ commitment only changing 
the style of use of control information within teams. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the 
hypotheses and the theoretical model. Section 3.3 describes the design of the 
experiment. Section 3.4 contains the results of the experiment. Finally, this chapter is 
concluded with section 3.5 which contains a discussion of the findings. 
 
 
3.2 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Commitment is a force that binds an individual to a course of action that is of 
relevance to a specific target (Den Hartog & Belschak, 2007; Meyer & Herscovitch, 
2001). It has been identified three types of commitment: affective, normative and 
continuance. Differences are in the types of mind-set (e.g. emotional attachment, sense 
of being locked in, belief in and acceptance of goals) (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). 
Affective commitment reflects an affective bond and emotional involvement with a 
target. Continuance commitment is accompanied by a cost-avoidance mind-set (that is 
the individual is committed to a course of action because of the perceived cost of 
failing to do so). And normative commitment reflects a perceived obligation to pursue 
a course of action (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001; Meyer et al., 2004). This study is 
focused on the affective commitment, because is the one which has strong links to 
individual behavior (Meyer et al., 2004; Lau & Moser, 2008). The reason is affective 
commitment is a component of autonomous individual motivation (Meyer et al., 
2004). This affective commitment is seen as a self-determined behavior of the 
individual, instead of a controlled behavior (Adler & Chen, 2011; Meyer et al., 2004). 
Researchers point out that people who feel affectively committed requires less control 
and supervision (Buchanan, 1975; Ouchi, 1979). 
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Affective commitment is related to a wide range of individual behaviors such as 
intention to quit the organization, loyalty, personal initiative or proactive behavior in 
job environments (Cater & Zabkar, 2009; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001; Meyer et al., 
2004; Spence et al., 2011). However, the direct effect of affective commitment on job 
performance is not clear. Yet some researchers suggest there is a positive and direct 
effect on job performance (Meyer & Allen, 1991; Nouri & Parker, 1998; O´ Connor, 
2006), while others suggest there is not direct effect (Den Hartog & Belschak, 2007; 
Vandenberghe et al., 2004). The reason may be explained by other dimension of 
commitment: the focus. An individual who works in an organization could be 
committed to different focus, as organization, supervisor or workgroup (Den Hartog & 
Belschak, 2007; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). It has been argued that focused and 
nearest commitment, as commitment to the team, might be better predictors of job 
performance than broad measures of commitment, as organizational commitment (De 
Gilder, 2003; Vandenberghe et al., 2004). Therefore, in contemporary organizations, 
focus in team-based work, it is particularly relevant analyzing how affective 




3.2.1  The interactive control system and team members´ commitment 
 
I follow the general model of workplace commitment of Meyer and Herscovitch 
(2001, p. 315) to understand how affective commitment can be developed. Meyer and 
Herscovitch (2001) point out that any mechanism or situational variable that 
contributed to the likelihood that an individual will become involved (absorbed) in a 
course of action will contribute to the development of affective commitment. I follow 
management accounting literature to identify control practices that have been 
positively related to affective commitment (see Hall et al., 2005; Ketchand & 
Strawser, 2001; Lau & Moser, 2008; Nouri & Parker, 1998; de Ruyter & Wetzels, 
1999). These studies analyze design features of management control systems, as 
budget participation or non-financial performance measures (Lau & Moser, 2008; 
Nouri & Parker, 1998). Moreover, they are focused on organizational and/or 
professional affective commitment instead of team commitment. However, the results 
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suggest accounting and control practices may produce positive emotions on employees 
to develop commitment (Nouri & Parker, 1998; Lau & Moser, 2008).  
 
Tessier and Otley (2012) have recently suggested a different style of use of control 
information can produce positive emotions on employees. The authors stress 
researchers may differentiate managerial intentions and employee perceptions of 
controls (see Adler & Chen, 2011; Tessier & Otley, 2012, p. 5). Despite of managers 
traditionally use MCS for controlling individual behaviors, if the style of use allows 
individuals´ involvement and participation in a course of action, individuals may feel 
they are important for achieving the objectives of this course of action, that is, 
individuals may feel motivated (Bishop et al., 2005; Spence et al., 2011; Tessier & 
Otley, 2012). Recent management accounting researchers point to the importance of 
the style of use instead of the design of management control systems to influence 
individual behavior (see Adler & Chen, 2011; Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Tessier & 
Otley, 2012). For example, Adler & Chen (2011) propose the interactive style of use 
of MCS is positively related to individual motivation. The authors suggest this 
interactive use is related to an autonomous motivation of individuals, and affective 
commitment is a component of this autonomous motivation (Meyer et al., 2004, 
p.996). However, there is no empirical evidence of the relation between the interactive 
control system and individual motivation (Adler & Chen, 2011). 
 
“Interactive control systems are formal information systems managers use to involve 
themselves regularly and personally in the decision activities of subordinates” 
(Simons, 2000, p. 95). This interactive use is opposite to a diagnostic use, which it is 
used by managers to monitor organizational outcomes and correct deviations from 
preset standards of performance (Simons, 2000, p. 59). Interactive use of MCS has 
been described as a positive force, as MCS are used to expand opportunity-seeking 
and learning throughout the organization (Henri, 2006). One of the main features of 
interactive use is the continuous interaction and involvement of organizational 
members, across levels and functions, related to control information (Bisbe et al., 
2007; Henri, 2006; Kominis & Dudau, 2012; Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 2006, 2007). 
 
Simons (1995, p. 86) describes organizational situations where the interactive control 
system is needed. He posit that when organizations are small, key managers and 
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employees can sit down around the same table and informally debate and discuss 
control information. However, when managers have less personal contact with 
employees, the organization needs formal systems to share emerging information 
between organizational members. The author highlighted that the interactive use is a 
formal system that allows regular contact and involvement of employees. However, 
the direct effect of this interactive use on employees´ behavior is yet unclear (Adler & 
Chen, 2011). Some researchers posit that the interactive use enhances cooperation 
between individuals; others that allows coordination in inter-functional teams; other 
that allows employees to commit to organizational goals, or that increases motivation 
(see Abernethy & Brownell, 1999; Henri, 2006; Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 2006; 
Widener, 2007). The reason for this variety of effects suggested in the literature has 
been recently explained. The interactive use of MCS is a multidimensional concept. 
Therefore, if researchers identify different dimensions, they can analyze its different 
antecedents and its different effects (see Bisbe et al., 2007, p.809). Nevertheless, so far 
researchers have suggested different effects of this interactive use, but without any 
empirical studies (see Tessier & Otley). 
 
The present study is focused only on one dimension of the interactive control system: 
the intensity of use by organizational members, also within organizational levels and 
across functions, that is, also in tem-based settings (see Henri, 2006; Naranjo-Gil & 
Hartmann, 2007; Kominis & Dudau, 2012). Although there is no empirical evidence 
of the relation between this interactive use and individuals commitment, management 
accounting researchers have described some of the positive effects of the interactive 
use at individual and group level: it is a powerful solidarity mechanism, it promotes 
stability and commitment between employees, it enhances a psychological bond 
among organizational members, or it induces a group frame (see Adler & Chen, 2011; 
Henri, 2006; Kominis & Dudau, 2012; Mundy, 2010). These descriptions help to 
understand the process by which the intensity of the interactive use of MCS influences 
team members´ commitment, that is, team members’ autonomous motivation (Adler & 
Chen, 2011; Henri, 2006; Mundy, 2010).  
 
Interactive use of MCS facilitates formal processes of participation and involvement 
between team members. The intensity of use means an intensive and regular 
involvement of team members in the use of control information. This intensity is 
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related to time-consuming (Henri, 2006; Mundy, 2010). If team members spend more 
time together discussing and debating control information related to group projects, 
therefore, they feel closer. This closer relationship can foster understanding between 
team members (Latané, 1981; Chidambaran & Tung, 2005). Therefore, an intense 
involvement of team members acts as integrative liaison device individuals, reducing 
distance, not only physical, but also psychological (Adler & Chen, 2011; Henri, 2006). 
If distance is reduced, an affective state may be enhanced among team members 
(Cater &Zabkar, 2009; Latané, 1981). This affective state is related to affective 
commitment, as individual feels he is attached to the group and its goals (Meyer et al., 
2004). Following this reasoning, I posit some management accounting researchers 
have just suggested the positive effects of the interactive use on individual 
commitment. For example, Abernethy and Brownell (1999, p.192) point out 
interactive use of budgets help employees reach a compromise. Mundy (2010) suggest 
interactive use promote employee commitment. Following this reasoning, I formulate 
the first hypothesis of this study: 
 




3.2.2  The interactive control system, social identity and team members´ 
commitment 
 
Meyer and Herscovitch (2001) model suggests an individual who derive his or her 
identity from association with an entity or group; he will develop commitment to this 
entity or group. Association with an entity or group is related to identification to this 
entity or group, that is, is related to social identity (Adler & Chen, 2011; Ellemers et 
al., 2004). Social identity is an individual feature which describes a psychological 
process that occurs when a person self-identifies as a social member (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986; Haslam, 2001). Although individuals have different social identities (i.e. as an 
organizational member, family member, or group work member), their behavior are 
guided by the identity is salient in a given moment (van Knippenberg, 2000). 
Therefore, if an individual identifies with his group work, thus, the group becomes 
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part of the individual, and the individual is motivated by group goals instead of his/her 
individual goals (van Knippenberg, 2000; van Dick et al., 2009).  
 
Social psychology researchers have extensively focused on social identity as a 
motivational factor (see Haslam, 2001; van Knippenberg, 2000; van Dick et al., 2009). 
However, few studies link this motivational state, pushed by social identity, with 
commitment, but an exception is Haslam et al. (2006). The authors demonstrate social 
identity helps to develop commitment to group projects. However, the results of 
Haslam et al. (2006) suggest other processes, in addition to social identity, influence 
team members’ commitment. The study of Haslam et al. (2006) analyzes the relation 
between social identity and commitment on group projects, even when problems arise 
to these projects. The authors indicated in their discussion commitment to group 
projects is not an automatic response to social identity. Moreover, during the task of 
Haslam et al. (2006) study, groups were allowed to discuss control information related 
to the evolution of the group project (as budgets or cost information). The authors 
point out that it was only over the time that social identity was observed to have an 
effect on team members´ commitment. That is, the more time team members spent 
participating and discussing control information, the more team members felt 
committed to the group project, even the negative control information. However, the 
authors did not control the process of involvement and participation and its effects on 
individuals´ commitment, because the study was only focused on the process of 
identification with the group. 
 
The results of Haslam et al. (2006) suggest that if both processes are presented, social 
identity and involvement, team commitment is higher than if only one process is 
present. However, Haslam et al. (2006) stress the importance of the identification 
process (social identity) instead of the involvement process. Contrary Meyer and 
Herscovitch (2001) stress the importance of the involvement process. The general 
model of workplace commitment suggests affective commitment is characterized by 
two features: a cognitive component and a positive emotion (Meyer & Herscovitch, 
2001, p.308). The authors highlight that the cognitive component (that is, recognition 
that there is an important purpose on what the individual is doing) is needed to 
develop affective commitment. Nevertheless, this cognitive component might be 
accompanied by a strong positive emotion to influence individual behavior.   
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The present study suggests the process of involvement has strong effects on team 
members´ commitment, than the process of identification, because the last one is 
related to a cognitive component, while the first one is related to an affective bond 
between individuals (Wegge et al., 2006). Social identity has been defined as a 
cognitive process, that is, the individual analyzes his context, interprets this context, 
and thus, adapts his behavior to the context (Haslam, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Contrary, involvement is related to affective-based behavior (Wegge et al., 2006; Weis 
& Corpanzano, 1996). The difference between the cognitive route (through social 
identity) and the affective route (through involvement and participation processes) 
does not imply that either no affective or no cognitive processes are involved 
respectively. But the relative weight and importance of the affective route should have 
a greater impact on team members´ commitment (Wegge et al., 2006). Following this 
reasoning, I posit that the interactive use of MCS (as a proxy of an involvement 
process) is nearest the affective route, while the social identity of the team (as a proxy 
of an identity relevance process) is nearest the cognitive route. Following this 
reasoning, I develop the second hypothesis of the study:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of the interactive control system on team members´ 
commitment is higher than the effect of the social identity of team members. 
 
The model of the present study is represented in Figure 3.1. I present the interactive 
use as a proxy of an involvement process and social identity as a proxy of 
identification process, following the general model of workplace commitment of 
Meyer and Herscovitch (2001). 
 






Source: own elaboration 
 
Interactive use of MCS 
 (involvement process) 
Team social identity 
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3.3 EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
 
This study analyzes the causal link between the interactive control system, social 
identity and team members´ commitment. Although management accounting 
researchers have analyzed the relation between accounting practices and commitment 
with survey studies, I contrast the hypotheses with an experiment for two reasons. 
First, management accounting researchers are introducing experiments in team-based 
studies. The reason is that experiments are useful mechanisms for studying cause-
effect relations between accounting practices and individuals´ behavior within teams 
(see Coletti et al., 2005; Libby & Thorne, 2009; Rowe, 2004; Towry, 2003). 
Furthermore, social psychology researchers use experiments to analyze causal link 
between psychology variables, such as social identity, with individual behavior within 
teams (see Haslam et al., 2006; van Dick et al., 2009). 
 
 
3.3.1  Design and overview 
 
This experiment uses a 2 x 2 (Interactive Use x Social identity) between-subjects 
factorial design (see figure 3.2.). The design of the experiment is modeled closely 
following the work by Haslam et al (2006), which examined the link between social 
identity and commitment to group projects. These authors designed a 2x1 experiment 
(social identity was the independent variable), where groups of three or four students 
were required to reflect upon plans for a Childcare Center being built in a down town. 
The work of Haslam et al (2006) is appropriated to contrast the hypotheses of this 
study for two reasons. First, authors manipulated social identity of teams, one of the 
independent variables of the present study. Secondly, groups in Haslam et al. (2006) 
study were allowed to discuss and debate information about the project, during 10 
minutes, before deciding their level of commitment. This interaction process between 
team members were repeated three times, because team members received in three 
different phases control information related to the group project. Therefore, this design 
allows to manipulate the other independent variable of the study, the interactive use of 
MCS, manipulating the intensity, that is, the time that team members spend discussing 
and debating the control information (Bisbe et al., 2007; Henri, 2006). 
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Figure 3.2. (3): Design of the experiment of study I. 
 High interactive use of 
MCS 








Source: own elaboration 
 
The experiment was programmed and conducted using the z-Tree software 
(Fischbacher, 2007) in a laboratory. When participants arrived, they were randomly 
assigned to teams of three individuals. Experimenter explained participants they were 
participating in a group decision-task. Groups had to select the level of investment in 
the construction of a Childcare Center in Seville city. The study had three temporal 
phases. At each phase groups were presented with control information (e.g. budgets, 
costs) about the progress of the project, and team members could debate and discuss 
this control information. The main control information used was the budget of the 
project, as represents one of the main important control practices to increase 
individuals´ commitment (see Abernethy & Brownell, 1999; Naranjo-Gil & 
Hartmann, 2007). At each phase, groups were given more negative information than 
the previous phase (e.g. a budget report with a 10% increase in total costs; it had 
appeared a contaminant material in the children’s sandpit). Nevertheless, none of these 
problems were fatal for the project’s viability, but their existence made it clear that the 
project was in difficulty. After each phase, each participant responded individually the 
level of investment to be made by his group in the project on a scale marked in 60.000 
€ increments (maximum: 300.000 €)2.Therefore, participants had to decide three 
times. The task was representative of a number of significant organizational tasks in 
which managers and/or steering committees or cross-functional teams have a 
“watching brief” over a particular activity (and have the power to make decisions to 
provide or withdraw support) but cannot directly intervene to change the structure of 
events themselves (Haslam et al., 2006). Moreover, the task was highly involving for 
participants, allowing the manipulation of the interactive use of MCS. 
                                                          
2Participants respond individually because I analyze a motivation problem, not a group decision task 
(Haslam et al., 2006). 
Team members´ commitment 
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3.3.2  Manipulation and measures 
 
There are three variables in this experiment: two independent variables (interactive 
use of MCS and social identity) and one dependent variable (team members´ affective 
commitment).  
 
The interactive use of MCS was manipulating through one of its dimensions: the 
intensity of use at team level. Intensity means more interaction between team 
members. Intensity tends to be time-consuming (Henri, 2006; Mundy, 2010). As the 
task allows team members to discuss and debate together control information about 
the project, I manipulated the intensity of use controlling the time team members used 
to this debate. In high interactive use condition, team members were allowed to 
discuss and debate control information for 10 minutes, in each phase. In low 
interactive use condition, team members were allowed for only 1 ½ minutes, in each 
phase. The experimenter controlled the discussion so that the debate only focused on 
the project control information and not personal issues, and also controlled that the 
communication was within and not between teams. As this study is the first one to my 
knowledge where the interactive use is manipulated in an experiment, I introduce a 
questionnaire to measure the level of interactive use within teams, only to support the 
results of the manipulating variable (see Appendix 3.1). This questionnaire has been 
used in several previous survey studies related to the interactive use of MCS (see 
Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 2006, 2007).  
 
The independent variable of social identity was manipulating through the salience of 
this identity (see van Dick et al., 2009). Social identity researchers point out that 
salience, that is, the relevance of a social category for the individual in a given 
moment, influences the level of social identity of team members (van Knippenberg, 
2000). I combined two procedures that have been used in previous works, color T-
shirts and group name. First, the use of color increases the salience of groups (Haslam, 
2001; Towry, 2003). The presence of two color groups promoted self-categorization, 
because the context reminds difference between in-group and out-groups. Secondly, 
meaning of the in-group could be increased by reinforcing the group identity or the 
individual identity with symbols and messages (Haslam et al., 2006). In high social 
identity condition, team members wore the same color T-shirt and were asked to 
generate a codename for their group. Contrary, in the low social identity condition, 
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team members wore their own clothes and should fill their individual name in each of 
their responses3. I follow Haslam et al. (2006) to measure the level of social 
identification (Rowe, 2004). This questionnaire was answered at individual level at the 
end of the group decision task (see Appendix 3.2). 
 
The dependent variable, team affective commitment, was measured following 
accounting and psychology researchers (see Coletti et al., 2005; Haslam et al., 2006). I 
measured two types of commitment: economic and attitudinal. Economic commitment 
was measured by using the level of investment that teams chose for the group project. 
If an individual feel commit to a project, therefore, the individual is going to maintain 
his/her initial strategy, despite the problems that may arise with the project (García-
Jurado et al., 2000; Nesse, 2001). That is, individuals who are committed are those 
who maintain the level of investment on the project, despite the problems and the 
negative control information (see Haslam et al., 2006). I create a dichotomy variable, 
in phase II and phase III. If the level of investment is maintaining (or increasing) by 
team members, between phase II and I, thus, economic commitment takes the value 
“1”. Contrary, if the level of investment decreases between phase II and I, thus, 
economic commitment takes the value “0”. The same values are used between phase 
III and II. The attitudinal commitment was measured with a questionnaire at the end of 
the group decision task, following Haslam et al. (2006)4 (see Appendix 3.3). Upon 
completion of the group decision task, a questionnaire was answered to assess 
manipulation checks and some demographic information (see Appendix 3.4).  
 
In this experiment participated 120 postgraduate students from Pablo de Olavide 
University at Seville in November 2010 (no specific knowledge or skills were required 
to participate). I follow management accounting and social psychology researchers 
who also use students in their experimental studies (see Haslam et al., 2006; Coletti et 
al., 2005; Towry, 2003). These studies analyse the effects of contextual factors and 
individual features on individual behaviour (Birnberg, 2011; Sprinkle, 2003). None of 
the variables included in the present study is related to tenure or work experience of 
                                                          
3Efforts were made to avoid other types of social identification between group members (e.g. friendships 
can contribute to members´ group identification, Van Dick et al., 2009). The experimenter made sure that 
individuals of the same field were assigned to different teams, and further, members of a team not known 
in advance. 
4 Commitment is a multidimensional construct (see Meyer & Herscovitch, 2002). This study analyzes the 
affective dimension, which means, the attitudinal attachment of team members to team project. 
Normative and continuance commitment are not measured. 
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team members (those variables would prevent using the select sample). It was formed 
10 teams of 3 students for each condition (there was four conditions). The mean age of 
the participants was 27,75 years. The 43,33% were male, and the 56,67% were female. 
An incentive of 5 euros was used as a show up fee5. Further, a completely random 
lottery of 200 euros was drawn among all the participants. Participation in the 
experiment took about 45 minutes on average. 
 
The support material used in the experiment is shown in a specific Appendix, at the 
end of the dissertation6. Two types of documents are presented: the documents given 
to students related to the evolution of the project, in phase I, II and III; and also the 





Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the three measures of the dependent 
variable, affective commitment: economic commitment phase II, economic 
commitment phase III and attitudinal commitment7. Economic commitment phase II 
and phase III are dummy variables (if commitment is maintaining or increasing, 
economic commitment takes value “1”; if commitment decreases , economic 
commitment takes value “0”). Table 3.2 presents frequency of economic commitment 
phase II and III. This study analyzes individual behavior within teams; therefore, the 
results are presented at individual level (Haslam et al., 2006; van Dick et al., 2009). 
Manipulation check questions were satisfactory8. 
                                                          
5 I wanted to avoid participants could be motivated by external controls. Recent accounting researchers 
stress that individual and fixed incentives do not influence individual behaviour at group level (see Libby 
& Thorne, 2009; Román, 2009). 
6
 See Appendix: Support material for experimental studies. 
7 A factorial analysis was made for the variable attitudinal commitment and Cronbach Alpha for the four 
items is 0,775. 
8Manipulation was checked with Kruskal-Wallis test across four conditions, because data does not 
represent a normal distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; p<0,05). 
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Table 3.1.(2): Descriptive statistics at individual level (4 conditions; N: 120) 
 
High interactive use of MCS (N: 60) Low interactive use of MCS (N: 60) 




Commitment phase II     0,87 
Commitment phase III    0,67 




Commitment phase II    0,90 
Commitment phase II     0,53 







Commitment phase II     0,87 
Commitment phase III    0,73 




Commitment phase II     0,83 
Commitment phase II     0,47 




Source: own elaboration 
 
Table 3.2.(3): Frequency - Dummy variables (4 conditions; N: 120) 
 
High interactive use of MCS (N: 60) Low interactive use of MCS (N: 60) 




Commitment phase II      4 
Commitment phase III     10 
26 
20 
Commitment phase II      3 






Commitment phase II      4 
Commitment phase III     8 
26 
22 
Commitment phase II      5 
Commitment phase III    16 
25 
14 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The dependent variable is measured with two types of variables: dummy (economic 
commitment phase II and phase II) and continuous variables (attitudinal commitment). 
For this reason, I analyze the first hypothesis with two type analyses: a probit model 
for the dummy variables, and an analysis of mean difference between conditions for 
the continuous variable (Coletti et al., 2005; Ordaz, Guerrero & Murillo, 2005).Table 
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3.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the three measures of the dependent variable, 
affective commitment, but only for the two interactive use conditions (high vs. low). 
 
 
Table 3.3.(4): Descriptive statistics at individual level (2 conditions; N: 120) 
High interactive use of MCS (N: 60) Low interactive use of MCS (N: 60) 
Mean S.E. Mean S.E. 
Commitment phase II    0,87 
Commitment phase III  0,70 




Commitment phase II    0,87 
Commitment phase III   0,50 




Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Probit models estimate the probability that y=1 (economic commitment) as a function 
of the independent variable, that is, as a function of the interactive use of MCS. I 
estimate the model for the two dummy variables, economic commitment phase II and 
phase III. The model is not significant for economic commitment phase II (p>0,1). 
However, the model is significant for economic commitment phase III (results in 
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Table 3.4.(5): Probit model. Dependent variable: economic commitment phase III (N:120) 
Independent variable: Interactive use of MCS 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic P-value  
Constant -0,524 0,366 -1,434 0,152 
Interactive use of MCS 0,524 0,235 2,233 0,026 
R2McFadden 0,031 Mean dependent variable 0,600 
Akaike info criterion 1,337     S.D. dependent variable 0,483 
Schwarz criterion 1,383     Loglikelihood  -78,24 
Hannan-Quinn criterion 1,356     Restr. log likelihood -80,76 
 LR statistic 5,041   
P-value(LR stat.) 0,024     
Observations with value =0 48      Total observations:  120 
Observations with value=1 72       
Goodness of fit Hosmer-Lemeshow test 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (H-L) criterion                11,333 
Degrees of freedom                                               8 
P-value (Chi-squared)                                   0,1835 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Table 3.4 presents the significance of the model (p-value LR statistic <0,05), the 
significance of the independent variable, the interactive use of MCS (t=0,524; 
p=0,026) and the acceptance of the null hypothesis (Hosmer-Lemeshow test, p = 
0,1835). The null hypothesis of Hosmer-Lemeshow represents no differences between 
observations and estimated values. Therefore, the results of the probit model confirm 
the independent variable, the interactive use of MCS, has an effect on economic 
commitment in phase III. 
 
The Mann-Whitney U test was used for the dependent variable, attitudinal 
commitment, because data did not represent a normal distribution (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, Z= 1,703; p<0,05). The model is significant (p= 0,031), that is, 
attitudinal commitment is different across the two interactive use conditions (high vs. 
low). The results of the probit model and the Mann-Whitney U test suggest the 
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interactive use of MCS influences team members affective commitment, that is, the 
higher the intensity of the interactive use, the greater the level of commitment. 
 
I also developed two analyses for contrasting the second hypothesis of the study. For 
the dummy variables (economic commitment phase II and phase II) a probit model 
was estimated, and for the continuous variable (attitudinal commitment) a correlation 
analysis was made, as data did not represent a normal distribution (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, Z= 1,703; p<0,05). Differences between hypotheses 1 and 2 are the 
number of independent variables. In hypothesis 1, there is only one independent 
variable, the interactive use of MCS. In hypothesis 2, there are two independent 
variables, the interactive use of MCS and the social identity, as I want to compare the 
strength of both independent variables to develop team commitment. 
 
The probit model is significant for the variable economic commitment phase III 
(p=0,08), but it is not significant for the variable economic commitment phase II 
(p>0,10). I find similar results to the first hypothesis (see Table 3.7 for the dependent 
variable economic commitment phase III for the second hypothesis, and Table 3.5. for 
the first hypothesis).  
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Table 3.5.(6): Probit model. Dependent variable: economic commitment phase III (N:120) 
Independent variables: Social identity and Interactive use of MCS 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic P-value   
Constant -0,519 0,506 -1,026 0,305 
Social Identity 









R2McFadden 0,031 Mean dependent variable 0,600 
Akaike info criterion 1,354 S.E. dependent variable 0,486 
Schwarz criterion 1,424 Log. likelihood -78,24 
Hannan-Quinn criterion 1,382 Restr. log likelihood -80,76 
LR statistic 5,041   
P-value (LR stat.) 0,080     
Observations with value =0 48 Total observations: 120 
Observations with value=1 72       
Goodness of fit Hosmer-Lemeshow test 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (H-L) criterion                  9,866 
Degrees of freedom                                                8 
P-value (Chi-squared)                                       0,2745 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Table 3.5 presents the significance of the model (p-value LR statistic <0,10) and the 
acceptance of the null hypothesis (Hosmer-Lemeshow test, p = 0,2745). However, 
only the coefficient of the independent variable, the interactive use of MCS, is 
significant (t= 0,524; p=0,026).  
 
I also conducted a second analysis for contrasting the second hypothesis with the 
continuous dependent variable, attitudinal commitment. In this analysis I used only 
continuous variables, either in the independent and the dependent variables. I wanted 
to contrast the results of the probit model, with other measures of independent 
variables, as traditionally the interactive use of MCS has been measured as continuous 
variable. Now the independent variables are measured thorough two questionnaires 
CHAPTER 3: STUDY I 
The use of Management Control Systems, Social Identity and Team Commitment 
70 
(interactive use– see appendix 3.1- and social identification – see appendix 3.2-)9. I 
wanted to contrast the strength of the two independent variables to influence team 
members´ affective commitment. I want to contrast the results of the present study 
with the results of Haslam et al. (2006), where authors only controlled for the social 
identity of the groups, in spite of team members were involved in group discussion 
during 10 minutes in each phase. Therefore, I did the present analysis with groups in 
the high interactive use condition, that is, with groups that discuss and debate control 
information during 10 minutes in each phase. Table 3.6 presents Spearman correlation 
coefficients for the independent variables (Bisbe & Otley, 2004). 
 
Table 3.6. (7): Bivariate correlations. Dependent variable: attitudinal commitment (N:60) 
Independent variables: Social identity and Interactive use of MCS 
Independent variables   












Source: own elaboration 
 
Table 3.8 presents the significance of coefficients of the two independent variables. 
The coefficient of the interactive use of MCS is higher than the coefficient of the 
social identity (0,354 vs. 0,315), and also the level of significance of the interactive 
use of MCS is the highest (p=0,005 vs. p=0,014). Therefore, the results of the probit 
model and the Spearman correlation coefficients suggest that the strength of an 
involvement process, that is, of the interactive use of MCS, is higher than the strength 
of an identification process, that is, of the social identity of the team to influence team 
members affective commitment (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). 
 
                                                          
9
 Cronbach Alpha of interactive use variable is 0,486. Cronbach Alpha of social identification is 0,766. 
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3.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has two main purposes. First, it analyzes the relation between the 
interactive use of MCS and team members´ commitment. Secondly, it compares the 
strength of this relation with the strength of the effect of social identity on team 
members´ commitment, following the general model of workplace commitment of 
Meyer & Herscovitch (2001). The results provide empirical support for the model of 
this chapter (see figure 3.1). First, the interactive use of MCS increases team 
members´ affective commitment (see Adler & Chen, 2011; Tessier & Otley, 2012). 
The results suggest the involvement process pushed by the interactive control system 
influences team members´ motivation (Adler & Chen, 2011). However, the results 
also suggest that a minimum of intensity of use is needed to influence individual 
behavior, as the interactive use only influences economic commitment after phase II. 
It seems that team members need to spend some time together, to really create this 
affective bond between them. Secondly, the results also highlight that the effect of the 
interactive use, characterized by high involvement and participation processes, is 
higher than the effects of the identification process pushed by the social identity of 
team members. Therefore, the results suggest organizations may use MCS in a 
different way in order to increase individuals´ commitment to group goals and 
projects.  
 
This chapter provides insights for both theory and practice. First, it introduces one 
specific dimension of commitment to management accounting literature: the 
commitment to the team or group. Traditionally researchers have analyzed how 
accounting and control practices can increase individuals´ commitment to the 
organization or to the profession. Nevertheless, in contemporary organizations, 
employees usually work in team-based environments (Berry et al., 2009). For this 
reason, social psychology researchers suggest differentiating foci of commitment, and 
also suggest that the nearest foci is the one that has the strong effect on individual 
behavior (see Bishop et al., 2005; Vandenberghe et al., 2004). I posit that team 
commitment should be considered in management accounting literature because is a 
key state to team effectiveness (see Mathieu et al., 2008 for a review of Team 
effectiveness).   
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Secondly, the present chapter is the first study, to my knowledge, that provides 
empirical evidence of the effects of the interactive use on individual behavior (Adler 
& Chen, 2011). Recent management accounting researchers point out organizations 
should adapt MCS to collaborative environments because the traditional design of 
MCS are producing negative effects on individual behavior (Coletti et al., 2005; 
Towry, 2003; Rowe, 2004; Román, 2009). It seems that concepts such as interactive 
control systems and enabling bureaucracy match with these collaborative 
environments because enhance process related to socialization, interaction and 
communication between employees. However, the processes by which these control 
systems influence individual behavior are yet unclear (Adler & Chen, 2011, p.64). For 
this reason management accounting researchers are just analyzing at theoretical level 
these control systems to differentiate dimensions that can influence in a different 
manner individual behavior (Bisbe et al., 2007; Tessier & Otley, 2012). The present 
study answers recent calls related to the interactive control system (Bisbe et al., 2007; 
Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Tessier & Otley, 2012, p.11). I present a quantitative analysis 
to verify construct validity of one dimension of the interactive use of MCS. The 
results are in line with Adler and Chen (2011) proposition 14a: the use of interactive 
use control system will be positively associated with identified motivation. Affective 
commitment has been defined as a component of the identified motivation of 
individuals (Meyer et al., 2004, p.996). 
 
Thirdly, the results also provide empirical evidence of the strength of two processes 
highlighted in the general model of workplace commitment: the involvement process 
and the identification process (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). The study compares the 
effects of the two processes when they are used together within groups. The results 
suggest that the effect of the involvement process (in that study measured with the 
interactive use of MCS) is stronger than the effect of the identification process 
(measured with the level of social identity of the team). It seems that the involvement 
process is nearest emotions and affect, while the identification process is nearest 
cognition (Wegge et al., 2006). Thus, the first one has a great impact on team 
members´ affective commitment. 
 
Finally, the results of this chapter have some interesting suggestions for managers and 
organizations. Due to the importance of team-based structures on contemporary 
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organizations, managers should ensure that team members commit with group goals 
and projects. If not, group performance can suffer and fail (Katzenbach & Smith, 
1993; Lount & Phillips, 2007). The results of this study highlight that only changing 
the style of use of control information in collaborative environments, managers can 
increase employees´ commitment. Therefore, economic incentives are not the whole 
solution to influence individual behavior (Adler & Chen, 2011; Rowe, 2004). 
Combining economic literature with social psychology literature can provide a whole 
knowledge on individual behavior (Birnberg, Luft & Shields, 2007). 
 
There are several factors that limit the generalizability of these results. The first one is 
related to the manipulation of the interactive control system in the experimental study. 
I manipulate intensity of the interactive use related to time-consuming, debating and 
discussing control information (more intensity, more time). However, the intensity of 
use can also be characterized by other features (as face-to-face meetings). I posit each 
feature could be related to different team outcomes (Bisbe et al., 2007). Future 
researchers should analyze the effects of these other features; since face-to-face team 
structure have been related to team cooperation, but not commitment (see Rowe, 
2004). Secondly, the study is only focused on team commitment, but team members 
can be committed to others foci, as the organization. Although researchers have 
suggested individuals´ behavior is influenced by the nearest foci of commitment, other 
researchers suggest individuals can be committed to various foci in a given context (as 
the organization, the supervisor, or the group) (Bishop et al., 2005; Vandenberghe et 
al., 2004). However, few researchers have analyzed how these multiple foci of 
commitment interact (Bishop et al., 2005; Vandenberghe et al., 2004). Finally, this 
study has assumed the positive effects of team members´ commitment on individual 
behavior in collaborative environments. However, the direct effect of affective 
commitment on individual´s performance is yet unclear (Den Hartog & Belschak, 
2007; Vandenberghe et al., 2004). Affective commitment is a component of individual 
autonomous motivation (Meyer et al., 2004). Researchers suggest this autonomous 
motivation works better in team-based environments where individuals might 
cooperate and coordinate their resources (Adler & Chen, 2011; Gagné & Deci, 2005). 
Therefore, I posit affective commitment could be included as a mediating variable in 
future studies, where researchers analyze the relation between management control 
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APPENDIX 3.1.: Interactive use of MCS questionnaire  
I adapt the instrument of Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann (2007) used for top management 
teams.  
Using a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (nothing) to 5 (totally), individual will indicate 
the extent to which he uses the MCS to:  
a) Set and negotiate goals and targets. 
b) Challenge new ideas and ways for doing tasks. 
c) Involvement in a permanent discussion with other members. 
d) Learning tool on this activity.  
 
 
APPENDIX 3.2.: Social identification questionnaire 
I adapt the instrument of Haslam et al (2006) using a 5-point scales, ranging from 1 
(nothing) to 5 (totally):  
a) I see myself as a member of my team (self-categorized). 
b) I am pleased to be a member of my team (pleased). 
c) I feel strong ties with other members of my team (tied). 
d) I identify with other members of my team (identified).  
 
 
APPENDIX 3.3.: Attitudinal commitment questionnaire 
I adapt the instrument of Haslam et al (2006) using a 5-point scales, ranging from 1 
(nothing) to 5 (totally):  
a) How sensible do you thing the original idea for the childcare center was? 
(good idea) 
b) How sensible is to proceed with the childcare center? (should proceed) 
c) How likely is it that any problems with the childcare center can be 
overcome? (problems temporary) 
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d) How disappointed will the community be if the childcare center does not 
proceed? (Community disappointed). 
 
 
APPENDIX 3.4.: Manipulation check questionnaire 
Please, in order to end up with the activity, ranging from 1 to 5 your satisfaction with 
the following questions (1=completely disagree; 5=completely agree) 
a) Respecting the nursery’s budget, my group has made the following task 
b) 1 (Making the budget)                                 5 (Interpreting the budget) 
c) It was compulsory that all the members in my group reached an agreement 
on the investment to select in each phase. 
d) I have children, brothers or sisters who currently attend day care or are in 
early childhood education. 
e) I have done practices or worked in a nursery or kindergarten school. 
f) In each phase of the activity the members of my team have discussed only 
about the nursery’s project 
g) I have had a good time during the time I have spent discussing the 
information with my colleagues 
h) While I have been taking parting the activity, I have felt that my two 
colleagues and I made a team. 
i) During the discussion with the members of my team we all have talked 
and participated. 
j) In my team, there was a member who acted as a leader. 
k) I haven’t changed my first opinion during the discussion with the other 
members of my team. 
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Management control systems are used to increase individuals´ motivation towards 
organizational goals. Incentives, rewards, performance reports are some of the 
practices used to direct employees effort and attention (Sprinkle, 2003; Birnberg, Luft 
& Shields, 2007). However, recent accounting researchers have found that the effects 
of these practices are less clear in collaborative environments, as group work10 (e.g. 
Chenhall, 2008; Libby & Thorne, 2009; Rowe, 2004; Román, 2009). For example, 
Libby and Thorne (2009) find group incentives influence team performance, instead of 
traditional individual incentives, in collaborative situations where team members 
                                                          
10The definition of a group or team includes a collection of individuals who have relations to one another 
that make them interdependent to some significant degree (Mathieu et al., 2008). 
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might cooperate to achieve group goals. However, Rowe (2004) posits group 
incentives create a group problem, because allow free-riders behaviors within the 
group. This author suggests to adapt accounting structures to group context for 
directing teammates behavior toward group goals. These different effects of control 
practices on individual behavior have an explanation. Individual motivation works in a 
different way in collaborative settings (Adler & Chen, 2011; van Dick et al., 2009). 
While management accounting researchers have largely focused on an external 
regulated motivation of individuals (e.g. incentives or rewards), psychology 
researchers found that an autonomous or self-determined motivation fits better in 
group settings (Adler &Chen, 2011; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Meyer, Becker & 
Vandenberghe, 2004; Wong-On-Wing et al., 2010).  
 
A review of recent studies highlights the inadequate use of the term motivation in 
management accounting literature (Adler & Chen, 2011; Malmi & Brown, 2008; 
Wong-On-Wing et al., 2010). Researchers do not differentiate among different types 
of motivation, in spite of each type of motivation works better in a given situation and 
leads to different individual behaviors (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Ryan & Deci, 2000; 
Wong-On-Wing et al., 2010). Based on Self-Determination Theory (Ryan & Deci, 
2000) motivation reflects an intention to act. This intention can be self-initiated 
(intrinsic motivation) or result from external regulation (extrinsic motivation). But, 
extrinsically motivated behavior can take different forms, as external or identified, 
depending on the level of self-determinate behavior (external means that others 
controlled individual behavior, while identified means controlled by the own 
individual) (see Meyer et al., 2004; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Identified motivation works 
better in team settings since group members need to feel a sense of autonomy to 
cooperate and coordinate their resources and strategies (Adler & Chen, 2011; Libby & 
Thorne, 2009). I follow management accounting and psychology literature to 
understand if and how organizations can influence individuals´ identified motivation 
(Adler & Chen, 2011; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Meyer et al., 2004; Wong-On-Wing et al., 
2010). 
 
Identified motivation has been related to affective commitment (Meyer et al., 2004, 
p.996). This identified motivation represents an affective force that binds an individual 
to a course of action. Identified motivation can be enhanced by two mechanisms: high 
CHAPTER 4: STUDY II 
The effect of Interactive Control Systems and Social Identity on team members´ motivation and 
performance 
81 
levels of involvement and participation between individuals and high levels of 
individuals´ identification (Adler & Chen, 2011, p. 68; Meyer et al., 2004). On one 
hand, recent management accounting research has drawn on concepts such as the 
interactive control system to lead to greater identified individuals’ motivation (Adler 
& Chen, 2011, p.77). Interactive control system is a part of Simons´ framework (1995; 
2000) and describes a type of use of control information, which is characterized by 
regular and frequent involvement and participation of managers and also of 
organizational members. In this study I follow Tessier & Otley (2012) to understand 
how the interactive use can influence individual identified motivation. Despite the 
large number of empirical studies that analyze the interactive controls system in 
management accounting literature, yet it has not been empirically demonstrated the 
relation between interactive control systems and individual motivation (Adler & Chen, 
2011; Tessier & Otley, 2012). I focus on the intensity of management control systems 
(MCS) use by group members to analyze how individuals perceive interactive control 
and how this perception influences individuals´ motivation (Bisbe, Batista-Foguet & 
Chenhall, 2007; Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Tessier & Otley, 2012, p.5). In this study I 
posit the intensity of interactive control system has an indirect effect on team 
performance, via the identified motivation of team members (Adler & Chen, 2011; 
Lau & Moser, 2008). Unlike the previous management accounting literature tends to 
emphasize the role of control systems in inducing and directing individual effort and 
performance, I suggest the path between management control systems and individual 
performance do work by inducing positive affect between organizational members, as 
teammates (Adler & Chen, 2011; Birnberg et al., 2007). 
 
On the other hand, identified motivation can also be enhanced by high levels of team 
identification (Adler & Chen, 2011; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). Team identity is a 
type of social identity representing the extent to which individuals perceive a sense of 
“oneness” with a particular organizational team (Haslam, 2001; Rowe, 2004; Somech, 
Desivilya & Lidogoster, 2009; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Psychology researchers stress 
that team members with strong team identity perceive group values and group goals as 
more important than their personal goals (Haslam, 2001; Towry, 2003). However, in 
some situations team identity does not influence team members´ behavior (e.g. Towry, 
2003; Lount & Phillips, 2007; van Dick et al., 2009). There are two possible 
explanations. First, team identity might be salient or cognitively activated to influence 
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team members´ motivation (Adler & Chen, 2011; van Dick et al., 2009; van 
Knippenberg, 2000). Individuals have different social identities, such as organizational 
member, group member or family member. However, the individual tends to behave 
following the social identity which matches with the context in a given moment (van 
Dick et al., 2009; van Knippenberg, 2000). Secondly, although traditionally 
researchers have analyzed direct relation between social identity and individual 
performance (Rowe, 2004; Towry, 2003; van Dick et al., 2009), nevertheless, I posit 
the effect of social identity on individual performance is mediated by the individual 
identified (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). In this study, I analyze how team identity is 
positively associated with team members´ identified motivation, and how this relation 
is moderated by the salience of the team.  
 
This study has three main purposes. First, it analyzes the indirect effect of the 
interactive control system on individual performance in team-based settings. 
Secondly, it analyzes also the indirect effect of team identity on individual 
performance. An affective and motivational state is suggested as the mediating 
variable between the interactive control system, social identity and team members´ 
performance, that is, the identified motivation of teammates. Finally, the study 
analyzes the moderating effect of the salience of team identity on individual 
motivation. The present study is tested using the same experiment of study I (Chapter 
3). Nevertheless, a brainstorming task is added to measure individual performance 
within teams (van Dick et al., 2009). The design of the experiment is 2x2 for 
analyzing the effect of the two independent variables, interactive control system and 
team identity, on team performance. The intervening variable, the identified 
motivation, is also measured for contrasting the mediating model proposed (Birnberg 
et al., 2007; Mathieu et al., 2008; Rowe, 2004). The revised Simons’ framework (see, 
Tessier & Otley, 2012) seeks new opportunities to researchers for quantitative analysis 
to verify construct validity of interactive control systems and for analyzing cause-
effect relations between control systems and individual behavior. Experiments allow 
quantitative analysis for studying these cause-effect relations within teams (see Libby 
& Thorne, 2009; Sprinkle 2003; Towry, 2003). The results of the experiment support 
the hypotheses. First, the intensity of use of the interactive control system influences 
team members´ motivation which increases team performance. Secondly, team 
identity also influences team performance through team members´ identified 
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motivation. Moreover, the effect of team identity on team members´ motivation is 
moderated by the level of team salience. 
 
The present chapter attempts to contribute to the management accounting and social 
psychology literature in several ways. Despite considerable attention to the relation 
between control systems and external motivation in management accounting literature 
(Malmi & Brown, 2008), the results provide evidence of the relation between 
interactive control systems and other type of individual motivation, that is, the 
identified motivation (Adler & Chen, 2011; Meyer et al., 2004). Secondly, the present 
chapter provides a quantitative analysis for construct validity for the revised 
framework´s concepts of Simons Levers of Control (Tessier & Otley, 2012). One 
dimension of the interactive control system is manipulated, related to the intensity of 
its use by team members. Furthermore, the results stress this interactive use has an 
indirect effect on individual performance. The results are in line with Tessier & Otley 
(2012) suggestions: organizational members have emotional responses to controls, and 
these responses can be positive, negative or neutral. It seems the intensity of use of 
MCS produces positive responses on individuals’ behavior in collaborative 
environments. Thirdly, this chapter sheds some light on the relation between social 
identity and team performance. The results suggest this relation is not direct, but via 
an affective state of team members, that is, via the identified motivation. Moreover, 
the results suggest some level of salience is needed to influence individual motivation 
through social identity (van Dick et al., 2009). Finally, this study provides a more 
comprehensive knowledge about the relation between input variables, as management 
control systems and individual features such as social identity, and team performance. 
Only including intervening variables, as motivational and affective states, researchers 
can identify the process by which organizational inputs (as accounting and control 
practices) can influence team outcomes (Birnberg et al., 2007; Mathieu et al., 2008).  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the 
hypotheses related to individual motivation, interactive control system, team identity 
and team performance. Section 4.3 summarizes the design of the experiment. Section 
4.4 contains the results of the experiment. Finally, this chapter is concluded with 
section 4.5 which contains a discussion of the findings. 
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4.2 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Motivation research distinguishes intrinsic from extrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 
1985; Gagné & Deci, 2005; Ryan & Deci, 2000). On one hand, a person is described 
as intrinsically motivated if he or she performs an activity for its own sake, and 
derives pleasure and satisfaction from participating in the activity. On the other hand, 
a person is extrinsically motivated when performs the activity as a means to an end. 
Furthermore, according to Self-Determination Theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000), 
extrinsically motivated behavior can take different forms as external and identified. 
Differences are on the level of perceive autonomy or self-determination by the 
individual. On one hand, external reasons are those where behavior is explained by 
reference to external authority, fear of punishment, or rule compliance, and it is 
associated with feelings of being controlled (e.g. rewards or incentives). On the other 
hand, identified regulation is captured by reasons involving acting from one´s own 
values or goals, and typically takes the form of “I want”. Although the task themselves 
might not be enjoyable, they are typically experienced as somewhat internal or self-
determined (e.g. studying for an upcoming exam rather than going out with friends) 
(Adler & Chen, 2011; Gagné & Deci, 2005; Wong-On-Wing et al., 2010). 
 
According to Self-Determination Theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000), external regulation 
(e.g. rewards or punishment) can produce negative effects on individuals´ behavior in 
collaborative environments, including lower task satisfaction or lower effort (Lau & 
Moser 2008; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Meyer et al., 2004). The reason is that rewards 
and punishments are related to hierarchical relations where the individual is controlled 
by an external regulation. In this situation the individual works because “s/he has”, not 
because “s/he wants”. Contrary, in team work situations individuals ought to 
cooperate and coordinate their resources and effort to achieve team goals. It is 
important that individuals really accept group goals, rather than goals are imposed by 
external regulation to team members (Adler & Chen, 2011; van Dick et al., 2009). In 
this collaborative situation, an identified motivation may enable coordination and 
promote supportive work climates between coworkers. This identified motivation has 
been related to work group supports, positive affect, job satisfaction and autonomy 
work climates (Adler & Chen, 2011; Meyer et al., 2004). I follow management 
accounting and psychology literature to identify potential antecedents of identified 
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motivation, and two mechanisms can be used: high levels of interaction and 
participation, and high levels of identification (Adler & Chen, 2011, p. 68; Lau & 
Moser, 2008; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001; van Dick et al., 2009).  
 
 
4.2.1  Interactive control system, identified motivation and team 
performance 
 
Recent management accounting researchers have suggested the use of interactive 
control systems to influence individual identified motivation (Adler & Chen, 2011). 
This suggestion points out that Simons´ framework (1995, 2000) can be analyzed at 
individual and team level despite the fact that traditionally has been analyzed at 
organizational level (see Abernethy & Brownell, 1999; Davila, Foster & Oyon, 2009; 
Henri, 2006; Kominis & Dudau, 2012; Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 2007). In the present 
study, I follow the revised framework of Simons Levers of Control to understand the 
change on the level of analysis (Tessier & Otley, 2012). First, the definition of 
interactive use of control systems differentiates two dimensions of the concept: the 
focus (on strategy uncertainty) and the level of intensity (by superiors and by 
organizational members) (Bisbe et al., 2007; Ferreira & Otley, 2009). If researchers 
differentiate dimensions of a concept, it is easy to analyze the antecedents and 
consequences of each dimension (Bisbe et al., 2007). Secondly, the revised framework 
differentiates between managerial intentions for controls and employee perceptions of 
theses controls (Tessier & Otley, 2012). In this study I am interested on how the 
dimension of intensity of interactive control system affects employees´ motivation in 
collaborative situations (Adler & Chen, 2011; Tessier & Otley, 2012). 
 
Researchers of Simons´ framework have described how the intensity of the interactive 
use of MCS is related to high levels of participation and involvement of organizational 
members, and how these processes produce different effects on individual behavior. 
On one hand, Abernethy & Brownell (1999) argue that a defining feature of 
interactive use of budgets is the continual interaction between organizational 
members. This interaction involves not only participation but also an ongoing dialogue 
between organizational members. Henri (2006) points out that interactive control 
system is used when the involvement of employees from different functional areas, as 
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cross-functional teams, is needed within the organization. Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann 
(2007) emphasize the role of the interactive use to engage in interaction with 
organizational members, across levels and functions. Mundy (2010) points out that 
organizations use interactively the control system to involve employees in budgetary 
processes. On the other hand, Simons´ framework researchers have also described the 
positive emotional responses of employees when the interactive control is used, and 
how these emotional responses influence individuals´ behavior in collaborative 
situations. For example, Abernethy & Brownell (1999) suggest interactive control 
system is consistent with the operation of cross-functional liaison groups, and help 
team members to reach a compromise with their goals. Mundy (2010) argues 
interactive control increases employee commitment. Kominis & Dudau (2012) point 
out that interactive control systems drive a socialization process within horizontal 
structures of partnerships, which induces a group-thinking and group frame. 
 
This group frame is the key to influence identified motivation and is pushed by the 
intensity of the interactive use (Adler & Chen, 2011; Rowe, 2004). The intensity of 
use tends to be time-consuming (Henri, 2006; Mundy, 2010). If team members spend 
more time together discussing and debating control information, they increase the 
sense of self-control (Wong-On-Wing et al., 2010). Furthermore, when time is 
spending together, team members feel close to each other, and an affective reaction is 
generated within the team (Blascovich, 2008; Latané, 1981; Spence et al., 2011). 
Identified motivation is associated with affective commitment, an important state 
which explains employee behavior (Den Hartog & Belschak, 2007; Lau & Moser, 
2008; Mathieu et al., 2008). Affective commitment reflects an affective bond and 
contributes to develop a mind-set in team members characterized by a desire to follow 
a course of action. In this situation, team members feel they want to exert effort for 
achieving team goals (Kidwell & Bennett, 1993; Lau & Moser, 2008; Meyer & 
Herscovitch, 2001). Following this reasoning, I posit identified motivation is enhanced 
by the interactive use of MCS, and, therefore team performance increases because 
team members increase their levels of effort on group tasks. I follow previous 
accounting researchers that have analyzed the relation between other accounting 
practices (as budget participation or the use of non-financial performance measures) 
and individual performance with mediating models, where motivation and 
commitment where the intervening variables (e.g. Lau & Moser, 2008; Nouri & 
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Parker, 1998; Scott & Tiessen, 1999; Won-On-Wing et al., 2010). For example, Lau & 
Moser (2008) demonstrate that the use of nonfinancial performance measures is 
associated with affective commitment, which in turn increases employee job 
performance. And Nouri & Parker (1998) results highlight that budget participation is 
associated with individual commitment, which in turn increases individual 
performance. Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The interactive control system increases team performance, mediated 
through team members´ identified motivation. 
 
 
4.2.2 Team identity, identified motivation and team performance 
 
Identified motivation can be enhanced by high levels of identification or association 
with an entity or group (Adler & Chen, 2011; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). Social 
identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Haslam, 2001) argues that people tend to 
classify themselves and others into various social categories (e.g. organizational 
membership, religious or gender). Team identity is a particular social identity and 
represents the extent to which individual team members perceive a sense of “oneness” 
with a particular organizationally based team (Ahsforth & Mael, 1989; Somech et al., 
2009). Social identity researchers point to team identity to increase team performance, 
because those individuals who identify with the team, prioritize group goals instead of 
their individual goals (Haslam, 2001; Haslam et al., 2006). However, team identity is 
not always related to team performance (e.g. Towry, 2003; van Dick et al., 2009). 
There are two possible explanations. First, the influence of team identity on team 
members´ behavior is not directed, but mediates by team members´ identified 
motivation (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001; van Knippenberg, 2000). Secondly, other 
process is needed for the emergence of identified motivation through team identity: 
the salience of the team identity (Adler & Chen, 2011; van Knippenberg, 2000, p. 
358). 
 
On one hand, team identity is associated with a cognitive process. That is, the 
individual analyses his social context, interprets this context and then adapt his 
behaviour to this context (Haslam, 2001; van Knippenberg, 2000). Therefore, first a 
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categorization process is initiated, that means, the individual defines himself with 
regard to the social environment (O´Fallon & Butterfield, 2012). But a second process 
is needed to influence individual behaviour through team identity: a motivational and 
affective state (Hogg et al., 2004; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001; Somech et al., 2009). 
When the individual feels a positive emotion to his team, thus, the team 
psychologically turns into a part of the self (Chidambaran & Tung, 2005; Haslam et 
al., 2006; van Dick et al., 2009; van Knippenberg, 2000). I posit individual behavior is 
regulated by his identified motivation when this second process is initiated, but not 
before. At this moment, the individual begins to act and think in accordance with the 
group´s perceived prototypical characteristics, because he perceives group goals are 
more important than his individual goals. Therefore, a congruent individual behaviour 
is to exert more effort to achieve team goals, as the individual specially values the 
group (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Ellemers, de Gilder & Haslam, 2004; van Dick et al., 
2009). In summary, firstly a categorization process is needed. Secondly, an affective 
process may follow the categorization process. And when this second process 
emerges, thus, identified motivation is enhanced, therefore, individuals value group 
goals and they are willing to work to achieve these group goals. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Team identity increases team performance, mediated through team 
members´ identified motivation. 
 
On the other hand, team identity needs to be salient or cognitively activated to 
influence group members´ motivation (Adler & Chen, 2011; van Dick et al., 2009; van 
Knippenberg, 2000). Two concepts may be differentiated related to team identity: 
team identification and salience. Team identification refers to the individual defining 
him- or herself in terms of a team or group. Salience describes the extent to which a 
specific group, amongst the many social categories possible an individual has in a 
given moment, is relevant for his thinking, feeling or behavior. Moreover, salience 
depends on the accessibility of a category and also on the fit of this category to the 
situation or context. Therefore, if the context reminds a group situation, the group 
identity is activated to influence individual motivation. For example, Towry (2003) 
demonstrates a moderating influence of the incentive system on the direct effect of 
team identity on team members´ effort. Under a horizontal incentive system (which is 
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relying on team self-management), a strong team identity increases team members´ 
effort. However, under a vertical incentive system, there is no relation between team 
identity and team effort. Oppositely, Rowe (2004) fails to show how team 
identification mediates the relation between accounting structure and team 
performance. But I suggest two possible explanations. First, Rowe (2004) proposes a 
direct relation between accounting structure and team identification, however, I 
suggest it is a moderating relationship (Towry, 2003; van Dick et al., 2009). That is, if 
the accounting structure reminds a group context, therefore, the individual interprets 
this context and his group identity is being activated to influence performance. 
Secondly, accounting structure used in Rowe (2004, p.1162) captures individual and 
group information. And when individual and group information is present the 
individual frame is more salient than the group frame (Gaertner et al., 2002). 
Therefore, the context of Rowe (2004) does not remind a group context, therefore, 
does not activate the group salience. Following this reasoning, I posit context may 
activate group salience, and when group salience is activated, team identity influences 
individual motivation (van Dick et al., 2009; van Knippenberg, 2000): 
 
Hypothesis 3: The salience of team identity moderates the relation between team 
identity and team members´ identified motivation, that is, the higher the group 




4.3 EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
 
This experiment uses a 2 x 2 (Interactive Use x Team Salience) between-subjects 
factorial design. There are four group conditions, but also a control condition is added. 
This condition represents individuals working alone and allows to compare individual 
motivation across conditions (that is, when an interactive use of MCS is used and 
when it is not used) (Karau & Williams, 1993; van Dick et al., 2009). The experiment 
was programmed and conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) in a 
laboratory.  
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The experimental design combined two tasks: a group decision task following the 
work by Haslam et al. (2006) and a brainstorming task following the work by van 
Dick et al. (200). The first task is the same task used for study I (Chapter 3) of this 
dissertation. This task was used for two purposes. First, I need a context where the 
interactive use of a control system can be manipulated. The task represents a group 
decision task where team members may discuss control information during three 
phases. The mean control system used in this task was the budget of a group project, 
because is one of the major features of MCS and is used to facilitate organizational 
members´ commitment (Abernethy & Brownell, 1999). Secondly, I need a task where 
identified motivation can be measured. I follow Haslam et al. (2006) for measuring 
commitment as a proxy of identified motivation because commitment has been 
showed as a component of motivation (Meyer et al., 2004, p.991, 996)11. The second 
task is a group brainstorming task which represents an additive task where individual 




4.3.1  Manipulation and measures 
 
There are five variables in this study: two independent variables (interactive control 
system and team salience); two intervening variables (commitment and team 
identification) and one dependent variable (team performance).  
 
The interactive control system was manipulated through one of its dimensions: the 
intensity of use at team level. Intensity means more interaction between team 
members to discuss and resolve problems. Intensity tends to be time-consuming 
(Henri, 2006; Mundy, 2010). As the first task allowed team members to discuss and 
debate together control information about the project, I manipulated the intensity of 
use controlling the time team members used to this debate. In high interactive use 
condition, team members were allowed to discuss and debate control information for 
10 minutes, in each phase. In low interactive use condition, team members were 
allowed for only 1 ½ minutes, in each phase. The experimenter controlled the 
                                                          
11 Commitment is a multidimensional construct (see Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). In this study I analyze 
the affective dimension, which means, the attitudinal attachment of team members to team project. 
Normative and continuance commitment are not measured. 
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discussion so that the debate only focused on the project control information and not 
personal issues, and also controlled that the communication was within and not 
between teams.  
 
The independent variable of team salience was manipulated combining two 
procedures that have been used in previous works, color T-shirts and group name 
(Haslam, 2001; Towry, 2003). First, the use of color increases the salience of groups 
(Towry, 2003). The presence of two color groups promoted self-categorization, 
because the context reminds difference between in-group and out-groups. Secondly, 
meaning of the in-group could be increased by reinforcing the group identity or the 
individual identity with symbols and messages (Haslam et al., 2006). In high team 
salience condition, each team was asked to generate a codename for their group. 
Participants should fill their group name in each of their responses. Oppositely, in the 
low team salience condition, participants should fill their individual name in each of 
their responses12.  
 
The two intervening variables were measured with two questionnaires at the end of the 
group decision task, and before participants played the brainstorming task. I followed 
Haslam et al. (2006) to measure the level of team identification as a dimension of team 
identity (Rowe, 2004). This questionnaire was answered at individual level (see 
Appendix 4.1). I also measured the mediating variable attitudinal commitment, as a 
proxy of identified motivation, with a questionnaire at the end of the first task (Haslam 
et al., 2006; Meyer et al., 2006) (see Appendix 4.2).  
 
The dependent variable, team performance, was measured with the level of effort each 
team developed in the brainstorming task, that is, with the number of ideas reached by 
the group (van Dick et al., 2009). Upon completion of the brainstorming task, a third 
questionnaire was answered to assess manipulation checks and some demographic 
information (see Appendix 4.3).  
 
                                                          
12 Efforts were made to avoid other types of social identification between group members (e.g. friendships 
can contribute to members´ group identification, Van Dick et al., 2009). The experimenter made sure that 
individuals of the same field were assigned to different teams, and further, members of a team not known 
in advance. 
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4.3.2  Participants and procedure 
 
A total of 144 postgraduate students from Pablo de Olavide University at Seville 
participated in this experiment in November 2010 (no specific knowledge or skills 
were required to participate). It was formed 10 teams of 3 students (total: 30 
individuals) for each group condition. And also there were 24 students working alone 
in the control condition. The mean age of the participants was 24 years. The 45,83% 
were male, and the 54,17% were female. A show up fee of 5 euros was used13. 
Further, a completely random lottery of 200 euros was drawn among all the 
participants. Participation in the experiment took about 45 minutes on average.  
 
Participants were randomly assigned to teams of three individuals when they arrived 
to the lab. First, the experimenter explained participants they were participating in a 
group decision-task. Groups had to select the level of investment in the construction of 
a Childcare Center in their city (Haslam et al., 2006). The study had three temporal 
phases. At each phase groups were presented with control information (e.g. budgets, 
costs) about the progress of the project, and team members could debate and discuss 
this control information14. At each phase, groups were given more negative 
information than the previous phase (e.g. a budget report with a 10% increase in total 
costs; it had appeared a contaminant material in the children’s sandpit). Nevertheless, 
none of these problems were fatal for the project’s viability, but their existence made 
it clear that the project was in difficulty. After each phase, each team, through its 
members, should decide the level of investment on the project15.  
 
Secondly, participants initiated the brainstorming task, following the work of van Dick 
et al. (2009). Team members were asked to brainstorm ideas in their individual 
                                                          
13 This study used a 5 euro fixed incentive, instead of an incentive linked to performance, because wanted 
to avoid participants could be motivated by external rewards. Recent accounting researchers stress that 
individual and fixed incentives do not influence individual performance at group level (see Libby & 
Thorne, 2009; Román, 2009). 
14Participants in control condition used the same control information. However, these participants could 
not debate and discuss information, because they were playing an individual decision task. This condition 
allowed to contrast the effect of one dimension of the interactive control system, related to the 
involvement and participation processes, on individual motivation (comparing interactive use conditions 
with control condition). 
15Participants respond individually because I analyze a motivation problem, not a group decision task 
(Haslam et al., 2006). 
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computers, about activities that could be done in a Childcare center16. Typical 
brainstorming instructions were provided (e.g. they were asked to only use verbs to 
describe the activity, they were informed that there were no wrong answers, they 
should write down any possible idea irrespectively of their personal preferences)17 
(Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; van Dick et al.,2009). The support material used in the 






Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of three variables: the dependent variable -
performance-, and the intervening variables–commitment and team identification-. 
Performance is measured with the number of ideas reached by each individual. 
Commitment is measured with the mean of the four items of the questionnaire (see 
Appendix 4.2). And team identification is measured with the mean of the four items 
(see Appendix 4.1)19. I present these results at individual level for comparing 
differences between the four conditions and the control condition, which represents 
individuals working alone. Manipulation check questions were satisfactory.20 
 
                                                          
16Participants in control condition played an individual brainstorming task. 
17 In the manipulation check questionnaire the previous experience and knowledge of participants in 
childcare center activities were controlled (see Appendix 4.3) 
18
 See Appendix: Support material for experimental studies. 
19 Cronbach Alpha of commitment is 0,761. Cronbach Alpha of team identity is 0,773. 
20Manipulation was checked with Kruskal-Wallis test across five conditions, because data did not 
represent a normal distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test ; p<0,05). 
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Table 4.1.(8): Descriptive statistics at individual level (5 conditions, N: 144)21 





                                            Mean         S.E. 
Performance                        17.37         6.95 
Commitment                        3.76          0.82 
Team identification              3.73          0.84 
 (N = 30) 
                                            Mean         S.E. 
Performance                         17.23       5.81 
Commitment                         3.46        1.06 
Team identification               3.55        0.78 





                                            Mean         S.E. 
Performance                       17.43          7.28 
Commitment                       3.93           0.77 
Team identification             3.57          0.79 
 (N = 30) 
                                            Mean         S.E. 
Performance                      16.53          5.34 
Commitment                       3.53          0.79 
Team identification             3.43          0.89 





                                            Mean         S.E. 
Performance22                     10.92         3.40 
Commitment                        3.32          0.74 
(N: 24) 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
I did two types of analyses for the first hypothesis: an analysis of mean difference 
between conditions, and a variance-based approach for the estimation of the mediating 
model. Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics of two variables: performance and 
commitment, but only for the two interactive use conditions (high vs. low) and the 
control condition.  
 
Table 4.2.(9): Descriptive statistics at individual level (3 conditions, N: 144) 
High interactive use of MCS 
(N: 60) 
Low interactive use of MCS 
(N: 60) 
Individual control condition 
(N: 24) 
                        Mean         S.E. 
 
Performance   17.40        7.06 
Commitment    3.85         0.79 
 
                       Mean         S.E. 
 
Performance   16.88        5.54 
Commitment    3.49        0.93 
                       Mean         S.E. 
 
Performance   10.92        3.40 
Commitment    3.32        0.74 
Source: own elaboration 
 
I compare individual behavior between the two interactive use conditions (high vs. 
low) and the control condition. For the mediating variable of commitment I did 
Kruskal-Wallisnon-parametric test, because data did not represent a normal 
distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; Z= 1,668; p<0,05). I found that the model 
                                                          
21
 In brackets it is indicated the number of the table or figure in the full document. 
22Participants in control condition could not discuss the control information with colleagues because they 
were playing alone (an individual decision task and an individual brainstorming task). For this reason 
team identity was not measured in this condition.  
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was significant (p<0,10), that is, commitment was different across the three 
conditions. I also did Mann-Whitney non-parametric test between the two use 
conditions, and the model was also significant (p< 0,05), that is, team members´ 
commitment differed across the two interactive use conditions. These results suggest 
the interactive use of MCS produces a direct and positive effect on team members´ 
commitment. The highest level of commitment is reached when teams use with high 
intensity the interactive control system (see Table 4.2).  
 
Secondly, I developed an ANOVA analysis for the dependent variable of 
performance, because data represented a normal distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test; Z= 0,995; p= 0,275). The model was significant (F=11,013; p<0,001). That is, 
performance was different across the three conditions analyzed (high interactive use, 
low interactive use and the control condition). However, I did not find significant 
differences comparing only high and low interactive use conditions (results for 
Student´s-test; t= 0,446; p> 0,10). Therefore, related to performance, I only found that 
team members, in the two interactive use conditions, developed higher levels of effort, 
than individuals in the control condition (see Table 4.2). 
 
Following previous results, I want to contrast the mediating model proposed in the 
first hypothesis. That is, if interactive control systems influence team performance, 
through team members´ identified motivation. Now, I developed the analysis at group 
level, comparing group behavior across the two interactive conditions (Somech et al., 
2009; Towry, 2003; van Dick et al., 2009). The mediating model was tested using the 
partial least squares (PLS) technique (Chin, 1998; Wold, 1982). PLS is a variance-
based approach for the estimation of path models involving latent constructs that are 
indirectly measured with multiple indicators. PLS can estimate models with small 
sample sizes and does not make distributional assumptions about the data used for 
modelling (Chin, 1998). The independent variable is a dummy variable (0, low 
interactive use; 1, high interactive use). The four items of commitment (see Appendix 
4.2), are used as indicator of the latent mediating variable23. The dependent variable, 
team performance, is measured with the number of ideas reached at group level. 
Related to the structural model, Figure 4.1 displays the results from the test of the full 
model. It contains the detailed output statistics of the analysis of path coefficients in 
                                                          
23 Composite reliability: 0,905; Average variance extracted: 0,705. 
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the structural model, and reports on the significance of the standardized βs that 
resulted from this analysis, based on a bootstrapping procedure that used 500 samples 
with replacement.  
 
Figure 4.1.(4): The structural model: interactive control system, commitment and team 





aSignificant at 0,001 level,  bSignificant at 0,01 level (R2 0,132)
24
. 
Source: own elaboration 
 
These results point to the use of interactive control systems at team level to increase 
team performance, via the group members´ commitment, that is, via the group 
members´ identified motivation (the total effect is: 0,262 x 0,363 = 0,095) (see Figure 
4.1). 
 
The second hypothesis of the present study also predicts a mediation relation, but now 
the independent variable is the team identity 25 instead of the interactive use of MCS. 
The mediating model was tested again using the partial least squares (PLS) technique 
(Chin, 1998). The four items of team identification (see Appendix 4.1) are used as 
indicator of the latent variable of team identity26. Figure 4.2 displays the results from 
the test of the full model. It contains the detailed output statistics of the analysis of 
path coefficients in the structural model, and reports on the significance of the 
standardized βs that resulted from this analysis, based on a bootstrapping procedure 
that used 500 samples with replacement.  
                                                          
24 I did two supplemental analysis: 1) I analyzed the direct path between the interactive use of MCS and 
team performance, but it was not significant (p>0,10). 2) I also checked the full model of figure 1 at 
individual level. I found similar results between the interactive use of MCS and commitment (t=0,211; 
p<0,05). However, the path coefficient between commitment and performance was lost (t=0,180; p>0,10). 
25 Team identity at group level represents the collective level of team identification occurring across all 
members of a team (Gundlach et al., 2006; Somech et al., 2009). 
26 Composite reliability: 0,816; Average variance extracted: 0,537. 
Interactive  
control system 
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aSignificant at 0,001 level,  bSignificant at 0,01 level (R2 0,116)
27
. 
Source: own elaboration 
 
These results point out that team identity increases team performance indirectly via the 
group members´ commitment (the total effect is: 0,410 x 0,341 = 0,139) (see Figure 
4.2).  
 
Finally, I analyse the third hypothesis that predicts team salience moderates the 
relation between team identity and team members´ identified motivation. I use the 
partial least squares (PLS) technique (Chin, 1998; Wold, 1982) and I compare 
regression coefficients between high team salience groups and low team salience 
groups (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Figures 4.3 and 4.4 display the results from the test of 
the full model. It contains the detailed output statistics of the analysis of path 
coefficients in the structural model, and reports on the significance of the standardized 
βs that resulted from this analysis, based on a bootstrapping procedure that used 500 
samples with replacement. 
 
Figure 4.3. and 4.4.(6): The structural model: team identity and team commitment 




aSignificant at 0,001 level; (R2 0,280).   aSignificant at 0,001 level; (R2 0,237) 
Source: own elaboration 
 
                                                          
27 I did two supplemental analysis: 1) I analyzed the direct path between team identification and team 
performance, but it was not significant (p>0,10). 2) I also checked the full model of figure 2 at individual 
level. I found similar results between team identification and commitment (t=0,252; p<0,01). However, 
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These results support the third hypothesis, the higher the salience of the team, the 
greater the effect of team identity on group members´ commitment, that is, group 
members´ identified motivation. 
 
I conducted a supplemental analysis focused on the manipulated independent variable 
of the interactive use of MCS. I followed previous researchers who pointed out 
organizational variables can influence salience of a social category (Towry, 2003; van 
Dick et al., 2009; van Knippenberg, 2000). Towry (2003) study demonstrates the 
design of incentive systems influences salience of a social category. In the study of 
Towry (2003) team identity influences performance only when teams work with a 
group horizontal incentive, that is, in a context that reminds a group frame. I have 
described that the intensity of the interactive use of MCS pushed a group frame 
between team members (Adler & Chen, 2011; Rowe, 2004). Thus, I recalculated the 
previous models of the third hypothesis, but now the moderator variable was the 
interactive use conditions instead of the salience of team identity. I expected the 
higher the intensity of interactive use of MCS, the greater the effect of team identity 
on team commitment. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 display the results from the test of the full 
model using the partial least squares (PLS) technique (Chin, 1998), for the high 
interactive use condition, and for the low interactive use condition. It contains the 
detailed output statistics of the analysis of path coefficients in the structural model, 
and reports on the significance of the standardized βs that resulted from this analysis, 
based on a bootstrapping procedure that used 500 samples with replacement. 
 
Figure 4.5 and 4.6(7): The structural model: team identity and team commitment 




aSignificant at 0,001 level; (R2 0,254).           aSignificant at 0,001 level; (R2 0,185) 
Source: own elaboration 
 
These results are in line with Towry (2003) results, which indicate that the design of 
incentive systems moderates the direct effect of team identity on individuals´ 
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characterized by a different use instead of a different design. An interactive use of 
MCS moderates the direct effect of team identity on team members identified 
motivation, that is, the higher the interactive use of MCS, the greater the effect of team 
identity on individuals´ behaviour. 
 
 
4.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter analyses the effect of the interactive use of MCS and team identity on 
individuals´ identified motivation and team performance. The results provide evidence 
that the interactive use of MCS increases team members´ performance, via the 
identified motivation. Further, team identity also influences team performance via this 
type of motivation. Finally, the results support that the effect of team identity on team 
members´ motivation is enhanced by the salience of the group identity. 
 
This research provides useful insights for both theory and practice. First, this chapter 
sheds some light related to the role of control system on individuals´ motivation in 
collaborative situations. Although, traditional management accounting researchers 
have focused on external motivation, the results of the present study demonstrate that 
control systems can influence other type of motivation, as identified. Identified 
motivation works better than external motivation in collaborative situation (Adler & 
Chen, 2011; Mundy, 2010). Thus, organisations should analyse what type of 
motivation works better in a given situation to design and use correctly control 
systems. This chapter suggests that if organizations changed the style of use of control 
information within teams, team members´ would be highly motivated. 
 
Secondly, this chapter stresses the importance of the style of use of the control 
information to influence employees’ performance. Organizations have moved toward 
horizontal structures, where control and regulation should combine with cooperation 
and coordination. Communication, socialization and interaction processes are 
important to support these opposite objectives (Adler & Chen, 2011; Berry et al., 
2009; Chenhall, 2008). I follow the revised framework of Simons Levers of Control 
(Tessier & Otley, 2012) and I manipulated one dimension of the interactive use of 
MCS: the intensity of use by team members. This dimension points to an involvement 
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process which produces positive effects on individual motivation (Tessier & Otley, 
2012). The results support an indirect relationship between this dimension, the 
intensity of use, and individual performance. Therefore, the revised framework seeks 
an opportunity to future researchers’ to analyse the effect of other dimensions of 
interactive control system and individual performance (Tessier & Otley, 2012, p.11). 
 
Thirdly, this chapter sheds some light related to the role of team identity on team 
performance. Two mechanisms are needed to influence team members´ behaviour 
through team identity. First, team identity might be cognitively activated. And 
organizational context can activate this team identity. Following Towry (2003), I 
demonstrate the intensity of the interactive use of MCS can moderate the effect of 
team identity on team members´ motivation. That is, the higher the intensity, the 
greater the effect of team identity on individuals´ motivation. Secondly, the influence 
of team identity on individuals´ performance is mediated by their identified motivation 
(Meyer &Herscovitch, 2001; van Knippenberg, 2000). I suggest that, besides the 
cognitive process of team identification, also emotion and affect is needed to influence 
individual behaviour through the team identity.  
 
Finally, this chapter introduces a mediation model in management accounting research 
focused on team performance (Birnberg et al., 2007; Mathieu et al., 2008). Mediating 
models can help understanding the processes by which organizational variables, such 
as control systems, and individual features, such as social identity, influence group 
performance. The key is to identity mediating variables as commitment or individual 
motivation which help to understand the process by which organizational variables 
influence group behavior (see Birnberg et al., 2007). The mediating model that I 
present can be applied to other features of control systems that have been recently 
highlighted in management accounting literature, as belief system, enabling 
bureaucracy or cultural controls (Adler & Chen, 2011; Malmi & Brown, 2008). 
 
As any empirical study there are several limitations. Some limitations are inherent to 
the experimental method, such as the manipulation of the interactive control system. 
As this variable has been traditionally analysed at organizational level, I have found 
difficulties in its manipulation. I focused on one dimension of the interactive use, the 
intensity use by organizational members, and I followed Simons´ researchers’ 
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description to identify one important feature for manipulation, the time-consuming 
(e.g. Abernethy & Brownell, 1996; Henri, 2006; Kominis & Dudau, 2012; Mundy 
2010). However, the intensity of the interactive use is also characterized by other 
features, as face-to-face meetings. Following Social Impact Theory individual 
motivation at team level depends on distance between team members (physical -
individuals working in different physical spaces- or psychological -e.g. individuals 
with different goals-) (Chidambaram & Tung, 2005; Latané, 1981). Therefore, future 
research could analyze the impact of other feature of the interactive control system, as 
face-to-face relations, on individual motivation. Limitations may also be found on the 
type of task used to measure team performance, a brainstorming task. Van Dick et al. 
(2009) suggest the type of task can moderate the effect of team identity on team 
performance. Moreover, Libby & Thorne (2009) also suggest the type of task 
moderates the effect of control system on team performance. I suggest the important 
feature is not the type of task, but if the task represents a really collaborative situation 
where team members can gain benefits of cooperation (Libby & Thorne, 2009). 
Nevertheless, I cannot demonstrate this suggestion with the design of the experiment. 
Future researchers can fit the model of this study with other type of group tasks. In 
sum, this study stresses the importance of following an input-mediator-outcome 
framework of teamwork in management accounting research (Birnberg et al., 2007; 
Mathieu et al., 2008). Future work is needed to analyse every dimension of the 
interactive use of MCS and team identity, and how the relationship between them 





APPENDIX 4.1.: Team identification questionnaire 
I adapt the instrument of Haslam et al (2006) using a 5-point scales, ranging from 1 
(nothing) to 5 (totally):  
a) I see myself as a member of my team (self-categorized). 
b) I am pleased to be a member of my team (pleased). 
c) I feel strong ties with other members of my team (tied). 
d) I identify with other members of my team (identified).  
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APPENDIX 4.2.: Attitudinal commitment questionnaire 
I adapt the instrument of Haslam et al (2006) using a 5-point scales, ranging from 1 
(nothing) to 5 (totally):  
a) How sensible do you thing the original idea for the childcare center was? 
(good idea) 
b) How sensible is to proceed with the childcare center? (should proceed) 
c) How likely is it that any problems with the childcare center can be 
overcome? (problems temporary) 
d) How disappointed will the community be if the childcare center does not 
proceed? (Community disappointed). 
 
APPENDIX 4.3.: Manipulation check questionnaire 
Please, in order to end up with the activity, ranging from 1 to 5 your satisfaction with 
the following questions (1=completely disagree; 5=completely agree) 
a) Respecting the nursery’s budget, my group has made the following task 
1 (Making the budget)                                              5 (Interpreting the budget) 
b) It was compulsory that all the members in my group reached an agreement on 
the investment to select in each phase. 
c) In the taskwe had to write “verbs which represent activities to be performed in 
a Childcare center” what mattered was the originality of the activities. 
d) I have children, brothers or sisters who currently attend day care or are in 
early childhood education. 
e) I have done practices or worked in a nursery or kindergarten school. 
f) In each phase of the activity the members of my team have discussed only 
about the nursery’s project 
g) I have had a good time during the time I have spent discussing the information 
with my colleagues 
h) In the task we had to write “verbs which represent activities to be performed 
in a Childcare center” what mattered was my result not that of my teammates. 
i) While I have been taking parting the activity, I have felt that my two 
colleagues and I made a team. 
j) During the discussion with the members of my team we all have talked and 
participated. 
k) In my team, there was a member who acted as a leader. 
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l) I haven’t changed my first opinion during the discussion with the other 
members of my team. 
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Team-based incentives motivate team members to increase individual effort in 
collaborative environments (Libby & Thorne, 2009; Román, 2009; Towry, 2003). 
However, these team-based incentives can also result in free-riding behavior 
(Bandiera, Barankay & Rasul, 2005; Rowe, 2004; Román, 2009). If team members 
observe free-riding, they can usually choose two options: team members can free-ride 
and cooperation may fail, or team members can try to influence free-riders to adapt 
their behaviour to the social norm of cooperation (Kocher & Sutter, 2007; van Dick et 
al., 2009a). Researchers often examine the type of control and incentive mechanisms 
that are used to reduce free-riding behaviour. Yet, economic incentives and control 
mechanism are not the only solution to the problem. Evidence indicates that 
individuals also respond to psychological and social principles (Birnberg, Luft & 
Shields, 2007; Sprinkle, 2003; Rowe, 2004). Individual and contextual features 
influence psychological and social motives within teams (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; 
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Christensen et al., 2004; Rowe, 2004; van Dick et al., 2009b). Social identity is an 
individual feature which can influence how individuals behave working in teams (see 
Haslam, 2001). Further, accounting information can act as a contextual factor 
influencing team members´ behaviour (Birnberg et al., 2007; Rowe, 2004) Group 
feedback has been highlighted as an antecedent of individual motivation within teams. 
Nevertheless, the effects on free-riding behaviour of subtle variations in the way 
performance feedback is presented in team-based settings have not deserved much 
attention (Coletti, Sedatole & Towry, 2005; Román, 2009). I design an experiment to 
analyze subtle changes in performance reporting, and suggest that design of these 
reports can be crucial in settings where teams develop a high social identity.  
 
One crucial factor to stimulate effort and to avoid free riding behaviors is to make the 
team meaningful to the individual team member. To achieve this, one should stimulate 
individual self-determined motivation instead of external motivation which 
traditionally has been related to incentives and controls (Christensen et al., 2004; 
Gagné & Deci, 2005; Kocher & Sutter, 2007; van Dick et al., 2009b). Both social 
identity and accounting practices can be helpful in this respect (Adler & Chen, 2011; 
Haslam, 2001; Rowe, 2004; van Dick et al., 2009a). Social identity affects the 
individual’s perception that he or she belongs to a social group (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986). In teams with a strong social identity, team members perceive group values and 
group goals as more important than their personal goals, which may reduce free-riding 
behaviors (Haslam, 2001; Towry, 2003; van Knippenberg, 2000). Organizations, 
however, can also use contextual factors to make the team concept more meaningful to 
individual team members (Christensen et al., 2004; Rowe, Birnberg & Shields, 2008; 
van Dick et al., 2009b). Recent accounting researchers show the importance of 
accounting information as a contextual factor to influence team members´ cognition 
and behavior (Birnberg et al., 2007; Rowe, 2004; Rowe et al., 2008). Researchers have 
stressed the importance of performance reports to increase individual motivation and 
effort (see Coletti et al., 2005; Román, 2009). However, few studies have analyzed the 
causal link between the informational feature of performance reports and team 
members´ motivation to cooperate (Drake, Wong & Salter, 2007; Román, 2009).  
 
This chapter analyzes two types of performance reports in a setting where team-based 
incentives are present. Both reports provide information about total team performance 
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containing summary information, related to inputs, outcomes or/and outputs of the 
group and allow team members to asses free-riding. However, the information is either 
provided in an aggregated form (only the group-level information) or in a detailed 
form (group information plus information of each team member input to the group) 
(Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Bouwens & Abernethy, 2000). Differences are thus in the 
level of detail of the feedback provided to team members. Although the detailed 
performance report can generate some positive effects within the team (e.g., it allows 
team members to compare their own inputs with that of their members, which may 
increase the social comparison process), a detailed form can also produce negative 
effects. Combining both individual and group information may confuse team 
members, because they receive signals of both individual and group behaviour. In this 
situation, the social comparison process may reinforce free-riding behaviour 
(Festinger, 1954; Molleman, Nauta & Buunk, 2007; Rowe, 2004). Contrary to this, 
performance reports in an aggregated format at least send a clear message reinforcing 
the group context, because the individual information is left out. This study shows 
how a performance report in an aggregated form can increase team members’ effort 
and reduce free-riding behaviros, in particular in teams with a strong social identity. 
 
The experiment uses a traditional social dilemma of experimental economics. I adapt 
the task of Coletti et al. (2005) to a three-person team, where an incentive to free ride 
is constant across periods. During 30 periods, participants decide how much of 
resources to devote to a joint project (with other two team members). The first 
manipulated factor is social identity, varying the salience of team identity within 
teams as either strong or weak. The second factor is the design of the performance 
report in which I manipulate the information report as either displaying aggregated 
feedback or detailed feedback. Further, I measure social comparison process within 
teams with an exit-questionnaire, following the method of Molleman et al. (2007). The 
primary dependent variable is the level of individual effort within the team. The 
results show that social identity and performance reports influence team members´ 
motivation and behaviour. Moreover, results show these individual and contextual 
features interact within teams. Social identity affects how individuals interpret 
performance reports. In settings with high social identity it is better to opt for 
aggregated feedback because represents a standard norm of cooperation within the 
group. Contrary, providing feedback in the detailed form induces more free-riding 
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behaviors. In teams where social identity is low, differences between the two types of 
reports do not matter. The results also show that, only groups with high social identity 
and aggregated form of group feedback maintain high levels of effort across all 
periods. 
 
This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides answers to 
calls for adopting a “behavioural-economics” approach (Birnberg et al., 2007; 
Sprinkle, 2003). I vary the type of feedback such that, economically speaking, team 
members can always assess the level of teammate’s effort (or free-riding). The results 
point out that the subtle variation in level of detail of performance reports may interact 
with a cognitive individual feature, such as social identity. In some situations, this 
interaction can have negative consequences for team members’ behaviour. Managers 
should thus carefully present information to team members, because too detailed 
information can increase free-riding behaviour. Secondly, the present study extends 
previous research focused on the role of ex-ante accounting information in a single 
period setting (see Rowe, 2004). I analyse the effect of ex-post information in a multi 
period setting, since managerial decisions are in nature multi-period (Sprinkle, 2003). 
In this context, aggregated information can help to avoid free-riding behaviors. 
Finally, this chapter provides evidence of how performance reports influence social 
comparison processes within teams (Towry, 2003, p.1089). Researchers stress that 
more empirical research is needed about how organizational factors influence social 
comparison processes (Goodman & Haisley, 2007, p.110; Spence et al., 2011). The 
detailed performance report increases social comparison within teams. However, team 
members may compare themselves with low-performers, to follow the self-interested 
norm of free-riding. This negative effect depends on the context and the social identity 
of the team. The results show that social comparisons within teams can sometimes be 
destructive for individual motivation and effort (Molleman et al., 2007). Hence, the 
way of designing performance reports within teams may have strong consequence on 
the social norms that may arise in teams and, in the end, the corporate culture that 
might arise on the work floor.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 I reviews the 
literature and develop the hypotheses related to the design of performance report, 
social identity and team performance. Section 5.3 I describes the design of the 
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experiment. Section 5.4 contains the results of the experiment. Finally, this chapter is 
concluded with section 5.5 which contains a discussion of the findings. 
 
5.2 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
There are opposites lines of argument related to the free-rider problem along periods 
in the accounting literature (Brown, Evans & Moser, 2009; Libby & Thorne, 2009; 
Rowe, 2004; Román, 2009). On one hand, researchers point out that self-interested 
behavior precludes cooperation when group rationality is in contradiction with 
individual rationality. In this situation, the individual prioritizes his/her individual 
goals versus the group goals (Gold & Sudgen, 2007). On the other hand, researchers 
point out that this free-riding behavior can be allowed if group goals are really 
meaningful for each team member. In this situation the individual thinks he is working 
for “us” and not for “me”, therefore, individuals “want” to (instead of “have” to) work 
for achieving team goals (Adler & Chen, 2011; Gagné & Deci, 2005).Two 
mechanisms can be used for this purpose. First, the situation may activate the social 
identity of team members (Haslam, 2001; van Dick et al., 2009b). Secondly, 
contextual factors, as accounting information, may reinforce the group frame versus 
the individual frame (Bandiera et al., 2005; Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Gold & Sudgen, 
2007; Karau & Williams, 1993; Rowe, 2004).  
 
 
5.2.1  Social identity and team members´ effort 
 
Social identity is an individual feature which describes a psychological process that 
occurs when a person self-identifies as a social member (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; 
Haslam, 2001).People tend to classify themselves and others into various social 
categories, such as organizational membership, religious, gender or team (Ahsforth & 
Mael, 1989). Psychology researchers point out that what functions as a motivating 
factor depends on “who you are” in any given context: someone who is going it alone, 
or someone who is part of a social category (Haslam, 2001). Nevertheless, it is 
necessary that this identification with a social category has some emotional 
significance attached to the membership. For example, van Dick et al. (2009a) did not 
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find a relation between social identification and team members´ effort. It seems that 
the reason was that the group category in this study was less relevant to memberships 
than other social categories. Two processes are needed to influence individual 
behavior through social identity perspective (O´Fallon & Butterfield, 2012). First, 
individuals need to classify into a group. This categorization allows individuals to 
define themselves with regard to the social environment. Secondly, depersonalization 
is also needed. It occurs when the individual begins to act and think in accordance 
with the group´s perceived prototypical characteristics, such as norms, values and 
beliefs. If an individual feels is a part of a team and feels a positive emotion and value 
related to this team, thus, the team, psychologically, turns into a part of the self 
(Chidambaran & Tung, 2005; van Dick et al., 2009b; Van Knippenberg, 2000).  
 
Following this reasoning I propose social identity can reduce free-riding behaviours’ 
within teams across periods (Towry, 2003). Free-riding problem occurs because team 
members prioritize individuals’ goals instead of group goals, but, social identity can 
change this priority. Social identity moves an individual away from “feeling and 
thinking like a distinct individual, to feeling and thinking like a representative of a 
social group or team” (Lembke & Wilson, 1998; O´Fallon & Butterfield, 2012). If the 
individual identifies with the group, thus, group goals are the important value. The 
individual will be willing to exert more effort to achieve these goals, allowing the self-
interested behavior. Following this reasoning, the first hypothesis is formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Social identity increases team members’ effort. 
 
 
5.2.2  Performance report and team members´ effort 
 
The manner in which accounting information is presented influences individual 
behavior within organizations (i.e. budgets, accounting reports or cost reports) 
(Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Cardinaels, 2008; Nikias et al., 2010; Rowe, 2004). 
Performance feedback is one of the key aspects to influence individual behaviors 
(Drake et al., 2007; Román, 2009). Although researchers have analyzed the relation 
between feedback and individual motivation, their results may not be generalized to 
situations where employees are given feedback related to a group rather than their own 
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individual performance. Feedback regarding teammate’s performance enables social 
comparison process which is not present where only individual feedback is offered 
(Drake et al., 2007; Goodman & Haisley, 2007). 
 
Coletti et al. (2005) and Román (2009) shed some light related to feedback in team 
settings. In the study by Coletti et al. (2005) teammates share group information and 
individual information of each team member. In the study by Román (2009), 
teammates share only group information. In both studies, the authors point out these 
performance reports increase individual effort within teams, that is, increase 
cooperation. However, the two studies compare situations where performance reports 
are used with situations where performance reports are not present. These results 
stress the importance of the control feature of feedback, nonetheless, there is other 
important feature related to information that can also influence individuals’ motivation 
(Deci, 1975; Drake et al., 2007). The informational feature of a group feedback can 
influence individual behavior through three processes: information related to 
individual competence (this process also occurs when the report is individual) (Drake 
et al., 2007); social comparison process (individuals can compare with teammates) 
(Festinger, 1954; Molleman et al., 2007); and a cognitive process (the individual 
receives information related to the context where he is working) (Rowe, 2004; Rowe 
et al., 2008). I analyze ways of presenting group-performance information within the 
team: a detailed and an aggregated form. When the detailed form is used, teammates 
share group-level information but also their own individual information (see Coletti et 
al., 2005). Contrary, with an aggregated form team members only share group-level 
information (see Román, 2009). Although the two ways of presenting information 
may influence individual behavior within teams, I propose that only one of them, the 
aggregated form, can help to avoid free-riding behaviors along periods. The reason is 
the social comparison and cognition processes enhanced by the detailed form should 
produce negative effects within teams (Molleman et al., 2007; Rowe, 2004). 
 
Social comparison process describes a human tendency to evaluate his opinions and 
abilities against similar others (Festinger, 1954). It has been identified three specific 
motives for comparison: self-evaluation (how am I doing?), self-improvement (the 
desire to improve about their abilities) and self-enhancement (the desire to 
protect/enhance one´s attitude towards the self). Researchers have found social 
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comparison is a multi-dimensional concept (Buunk et al., 2003, 2005; Molleman et al., 
2007). First, individuals engage in both upward (compare with others performing 
better) and downward comparisons (compare with others performing worse). 
Secondly, these comparisons can produce two types of effects: contrast (“that person 
is not me”) and assimilation (“that person could be me”) (Buunk et al, 2005; Bunnk & 
Gibbons, 2007; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; Goodman & Haisley, 2007). I want to point 
out that not only social comparison process is enhanced by the detailed form, but also 
by the aggregated form of feedback. However, social comparison process is different 
across the two types of group feedback. The reason is social comparison is influenced 
by the type of context, particularly when working in teams. The main difference is if 
team members are working in a competitive or cooperative environment (Brown et al., 
2007; Goodman & Haisley, 2007; Spence et al., 2011). And the manner in which 
accounting information is presented can frame or reframe context within teams (Rowe, 
2004; Rowe et al., 2008). I propose that each type of group feedback (detailed vs. 
aggregated) influences different dimensions of social comparison processes, because 
influences in a different way the cognitive process of team members (Molleman et al., 
2007; Spence et al., 2011). 
 
On one hand, when a detailed form of group feedback is used within the team, the 
individual receives mixed signals related to the context where he is working 
(individual and group information are present). Researchers highlight the individual 
frame dominates the group frame when mixed signals are present (Haslam, 2004; 
Rowe, 2004, p. 1159). If the individual frame dominates, thus, self-interested 
behaviour is enhanced, and the individual interprets the context as competitive (Buunk 
et al., 1990; Rowe, 2004). When competition is presented, the individual used the 
social comparison process to self-enhance his own interests and benefits. Therefore, 
the individual compares with low-performers (or free-riders), that is, the individual 
develops a downward comparison with his/her teammates. If the individuals perceive 
others are receiving desired benefits (e.g. higher pay) with less effort, hence, the 
individual is going to follow the free-riders to feel better (to self-enhance). In 
summary, the individual develops a downward assimilation comparison along periods, 
which influences his behaviour, that is, which decreases his levels of effort (Brown et 
al., 2007; O´Fallon & Butterfield, 2012; Spence et al., 2011).  
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On the other hand, the aggregated form reminds the group frame because only group-
level information is shared (Rowe, 2004). A group frame reminds a non-competitive 
context, and in this context, comparison is used to self-improve. In this situation, an 
upward comparison (with high performers) may produce positive emotions, because 
the individual wants to self-improve, thus, want to be as his “high” performers 
(upward assimilation effect) (Buunk et al., 1990; Román, 2009). I expect in this 
situation team members avoid the downward comparison, and develop upward 
comparison with teammates (Buunk et al., 2005). Román (2009, p.594) points out 
aggregated performance information is given to team members for stimulating effort 
and controlling the free-rider problem among teams. In summary, I expect team 
members who receive an aggregated form of group feedback develop upward 
assimilation comparison process and follow the social norm of cooperation (Rowe, 
2004; Rowe et al., 2008; Solomon & McLaren, 2008). Contrary, I expect team 
members who receive a detailed form of group feedback develop downward 
assimilation comparison process and follow free-riding behaviours’ along periods. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The design of group performance reports increases team members´ 
effort, mediated through team members´ social comparison process. 
 
 
5.2.3  The interaction between social identity and performance report 
 
Researchers suggest feedback influences team members´ behavior to the extent that 
people have adopted the relevant group identity (O´Fallon & Butterfield, 2012; 
Towry, 2003). The reason is social identity affects how information is interpreted 
within teams because this information sends signals related to the typical group 
behavior (Christensen et al., 2004; Haslam, 2001; O´Fallon & Butterfield, 2012; 
Towry, 2003).  
 
Individuals who identify with a social category want to maximize similarities within 
the group and differences between groups. One manner of maximizing similarities is 
follow the social norm or behavioral standard of the group (Haslam, 2001; Towry, 
2003). Feedback regarding teammate’s performance is a descriptive norm, that is, a 
CHAPTER 5: STUDY III 
The effect of Group Performance Report on cooperative effort 
116 
norm which presents what most teammates do regardless of its appropriateness. Thus, 
I propose in this study that in high social identity teams, the design of group feedback 
sends a message to team members related to the social norm of the group (Christensen 
et al., 2004; O´Fallon & Butterfield, 2012). However, the social norm is different 
across the two types of group performance report. 
 
On one hand, a detailed form of group feedback facilitates information about free-
riding behavior of teammates. In contexts where free-riders behavior is frequent and 
widespread, teammates provide normative support for unethical behavior. Where 
unethical behavior is common, this evaluation leads individuals to conclude that this 
behavior fits the group prototype, which increases the likelihood of free-rider 
behaviors (O´Fallon & Butterfield, 2012; Towry, 2003). In that sense, I follow the 
results of Towry (2003, p.1083) where high social identity teams report less ethical 
than low social identity teams. The reason is high social identity groups are more 
likely to coordinate their strategies, unless involves unethical behaviors. Moreover, the 
results of Towry (2003, p. 1084) suggested that high social identity groups were less 
likely to punish shirking behaviors, than low social identity groups. One possible 
explanation is teammates assume that free-riding behaviors are the standard behavior 
of the group, when the group identity is high (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Christensen et 
al., 2004). On the other hand, the aggregated form of group feedback avoids the 
individual information related to free-riders behaviors. Further, sharing group 
information should be interpreted as a cognitive bias (Haslam, 2001). Finding out and 
sharing publicly what “we” have in common is essential to reinforce group identity. 
This group information is used as a behavioral standard within the group (van 
Knippenberg, 2000). If the group category is the important identity, the individual 
follow the cooperative group norm (van Dick et al., 2009b). Following this reasoning, 
I expect a moderating effect of social identity on the relation between the design of 
performance report and individual effort: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the social identity of the team, the greater the effect of the 
design of group performance reports on team members´ effort. 
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5.3 EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
 
I design a 2 x 2 experiment, with two independent variables: the design of team-based 
performance reports either in aggregated form or detailed form, and the level of social 
identity manipulated as either high or low. I use a between-subject design in which 
each individual is exposed to only one treatment or condition (Charness, Gneezy & 
Kuhn, 2012).The experiment was programmed using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 
2007). I adapt the study of Coletti et al. (2005) (which analysed collaboration between 
two people) to a three-person team. The task represents a group decision task during 
30 periods.  
 
Participants assumed the role of a research and development (R&D) manager at a 
pharmaceutical company. Three participants (three R&D managers) formed a team 
within the same company. The company asked the three R&D managers to work 
together in a R&D project to develop a new product. For each period, each R&D 
manager had to decide how much of his division R&D resources to devote to the joint 
R&D project. There were only two choices: a high or a low level of resources. The 
joint income of the R&D project increased with the level of resources invested by the 
three R&D managers. However, each participant incurred a cost of 15 points if s/he 
decided to invest a high level of resources. The cost was zero if the participant chose a 
low level of resources. This cost provided an incentive for free-riding behaviours, that 
is, to devote only a low level of resources to the joint project, because the three 
participants equally shared the income from the joint project. Participants made their 
decision for 30 separate periods. Communication among participants was completely 
restricted. I summarize in Exhibit 5.1 and 5.2 the experimental parameters: 
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Exhibit 5.1.(10): Payoff structure  
- If participants choose to invest high resources, their division is charged 15 points (cost). If they 
choose low resources, their division is charged 0 points. 
- Joint project income is shared equal by the three team members (1/3). 
- Joint project income increases with the level of resources dedicated to the joint project: 
 If three divisions choose low, joint project income= 15 points (therefore, the 
individual income is 5 points). 
 If three divisions choose high, joint project income= 75 points (therefore, the 
individual income is 25 points). 
 If any other situation (one chooses high, two choose low; two choose high, one 
chooses low), joint project income= 45 points (therefore, the individual income is 15 
points). 
 
Exhibit 5.2.(11): Strategic form for three-player game 
 
 Player 3: High  Player 3: Low 
  Player 2  Player 2 
  High Low  High Low 
Player 1 
High* 10, 10, 10** 0, 15, 0  0, 0, 15 0, 15, 15 
Low* 15, 0, 0 15, 15, 0  15, 0, 15 5, 5, 5 
Source: own elaboration 
*Represents the level of resources dedicated to the joint project (high or low). 
** Represents the payoff (points) to Player 1, Player 2 and Player 3, respectively. 
 
Exhibit 5.2 represents a prisoner´s dilemma situation which is created by the design of 
the group incentive within the team (Towry, 2003). The dilemma is that group 
performance is higher and everyone may benefit if all players chose high levels of 
resources (cell 10, 10, 10). However, at the margin each player is strictly better off 
free-riding that is, choosing low levels of resources (cell 5, 5, 5) (Rowe, 2004). 
Therefore, in this situation, the unique Nash Equilibrium is for each player to devote 
low level of resources to the joint project (cell 5, 5, 5), because the option of low level 
of resources strictly dominates the option of high level of resources. Yet the three 
players would be better off if each one chose high level of resources (cell 10, 10, 10). 
This last option is namely the cooperative equilibrium (Gold & Sudgen, 2007). Exhibit 
5.2 presents a prisoner´s dilemma situation for one period decision. Nevertheless, the 
Nash Equilibrium is the unique solution also in multi-period decisions, when 
individuals know the number of times they will play the game (Gold & Sudgen, 2007).  
 
CHAPTER 5: STUDY III 
The effect of Group Performance Report on cooperative effort 
119 
5.3.1 Manipulation and measures 
 
The design of the experiment included two independent variables (performance report 
and social identity), one dependent variable (individual effort), and one mediating 
variable (social comparison). I manipulated the independent variable of group 
performance report manipulating the manner in which accounting information was 
presented within the team either in an aggregated form or in a detailed form28. In the 
aggregated condition, after each period, team members received feedback about the 
joint project income of the group29. In the detailed condition, after each period team 
members received information related to the joint project income, and also related to 
profits and contributions of each team member30. Note that the information in both 
aggregated and detailed conditions allows participants to assess if other people free 
ride in their team, given that the total project income is provided in both types of 
reports and that each individual knows what effort he or she has delivered to the team. 
The detailed performance feedback simply makes the fact that some people provide 
low effort to the team more salient, because individual inputs are displayed to all team 
members. This design allows to focus on behavioural consequences of information 
provision, as economically speaking both performance feedback conditions should not 
matter, because the group incentive system is constant across conditions. 
 
I manipulated the independent variable of social identity combining two procedures 
that increase group salience, and have been used in previous works: color T-shirts and 
competition between groups. Social identity researchers point out that salience 
describes the relevance of a social category for the individual in a given moment. And 
this salience influences the level of social identity when the situation matches with the 
expectations of the individual (van Knippenberg, van Dick et al., 2009a). First, 
participants who work for the same company were wearing the same color T-shirt to 
increase their level of social identity (as workers of the same company). At least two 
groups of students which represented two different companies participated in the same 
session. The presence of two color groups promoted self-categorization. That is, 
                                                          
28
Group performance information was only available within the team. Hence, no team had access to the 
performance information of other teams 
29
For example, if the three participants chose high level of resources, they were informed that the join 
project income was 75 points. 
30
For example, if the three participants chose high level of resources, they were informed that the joint 
project income was 75 points, and also that the participant A (also B and C) chose high level of resources, 
the cost of his Division was 15 points and the profit of his Division was 10 points (75/3 – 15). 
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participants were able to easily identify the company for which they worked and social 
identity may be clarified by this in-group/out-group comparison31. Secondly, meaning 
of the in-group could be increased by having an out-group present with which the 
group could compete (Haslam, 2001; van Dick et al., 2009b). Participants in the high 
social identity condition were informed that the companies they represented were 
competing for market share, and that the new R&D project was very important for 
increasing that market share. Nevertheless, this competition did not change the group 
incentive across conditions. In summary, teams in high social identity condition used 
color T-shirts to self-identify and also were informed that their companies were 
competing. Contrary, participants in low social identity condition wore their own 
clothes (therefore, with different colors) and they were not informed about a 
competition between companies they represented. 
 
The mediating variable, social comparison was measured with a questionnaire at the 
end of the activity (5-point scale) (following the work by Molleman et al., 2007). 
These authors measured four types of social comparison-based thoughts referred to 
teammates: upward assimilation, upward contrast, downward assimilation and 
downward contrast. For example, I measured upward comparison with the following 
sentence: “There must have been situations in which you experienced someone 
performing higher (investing higher) than you in your team. In such a situation, how 
often do you think…?” Following this introduction there were two items on 
assimilation thoughts: “I will do that as well” and “That´s the way I will do it, too”. 
And there were two items on contrasting thoughts: “I will never invest like that” and 
“I will not attain that”32. The validity of the four types of social comparison-based 
thoughts has been supported by a series of studies (Buunk et al., 2003, 2005). These 
studies have demonstrated that the consequences of social comparison depend not 
only on its upward or downward direction, but also on its contrasting (“that person is 
not me”) or assimilation nature(“that person could be me”), which support the idea of 
distinguishing the four types of thoughts resulting from social comparison. 
                                                          
31
I used at least 12 participants in each session for the high social identity condition, because I need 
maintain the anonymity feature. For example, in one session with 12 participants, I made two groups of 6 
participants (each group represented a pharmaceutical company), and I used two color t-shirts for each 
company. After participants put on their color t-shirts, I randomly assigned participants of the same color 
company to a three-person team. Within a team they knew that they belonged the same company, but did 
not know exactly with whom of the other five members they were paired to form the three-person group. 
32Social comparison questionnaire available in Appendix 5.1. 
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Furthermore, these studies have been conducted in different countries among different 
groups of respondents, demonstrating external validity of these concepts as well.  
 
Finally, the dependent variable was individual effort represented by the level of 
resources chosen. In prisoner’s dilemma situations the players´ level of effort is 
represented by the decision of to cooperate or to defect (see Gold & Sudgen, 2007). 
Accounting researchers have adapted this strategy game to situations developed within 
organizations. The level of individual effort is represented by the level of resources 
invested by managers in the group project (low resources are as “to defect”, high 
resources are as “to cooperate”) (see Coletti et al., 2005; Rowe, 2004; Towry, 2003). I 
analyze a motivational problem which produces free-riding behaviors within teams. 
Thus, I am interested on individual behaviors within teams. The dependent variable 
was measured with the cumulative number of times an individual in the team choose 
to dedicate high resources to the joint project in the 30 periods (Coletti et al., 2005). 
 
 
5.3.2 Participants and procedure 
 
The participants were 144 graduate students from Pablo Olavide University at Seville. 
The 48% of the subjects were male. Participants had a mean average age of 24. I 
formed 48 teams of three participants. Participation in the experiment took about 45 
minutes on average. I run eight sessions between April and October2012. Participants 
were randomly assigned to a three-person team. The task was performed via 
computers and participants’ didn´t know the identity of the person with whom s/he 
was paired. However, participants knew that they were paired with the same two 
participants during the 30 periods. 
 
When participants entered into the room, an experimental instructor gave them a 
document with instructions. He or she explained that participants would be randomly 
assigned to a three-person team through a computer. After reading this information for 
five minutes, participants went into a second room and took place behind a separate 
and individual cubicle, where each of them responded to the decision task (i.e. 
deciding among effort choices) and to the post-questionnaire questions that followed 
after the task. Participants were informed that they would receive a real incentive 
CHAPTER 5: STUDY III 
The effect of Group Performance Report on cooperative effort 
122 
depending on the level of profit of their Department at the end of the task (1 euro for 
every 50 points of profit earned). They could receive between 0 and 9 euros for his 
participation. Average total payoffs for all subjects was 4,76 euros. At the end of the 
task, participants had to respond in their computers other questionnaires for 
controlling that participants had a good understanding of the procedures and the 
manipulation of the variables were successful33.  
 
The support material used in the experiment is shown in a specific Appendix, at the 
end of the dissertation34. Two types of documents are presented: the instructions given 
to students related to the incentive system and the performance reporting used at group 






Table 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the four conditions. The dependent 
variable is individual effort. For a given period, this variable could equal 0 (low effort, 
that is, low resources) or 1 (high effort, that is, high resources). The cumulative 
variable for all 30 periods ranges from 0 to 30. I analyze three more dependent 
variables: individual effort in early stage (periods 1 and 10), middle stage (periods 11 
and 20) and late stage (periods 21 and 30). These three variables can range from 0 to 
10. These last three variables allow to analyze behavioral across stages or periods 
(Bloomfield and Luft, 2008). I asked manipulation check questions to ensure 
participants understood the scenarios. Manipulation check was satisfactory.35 
 
                                                          
33 Manipulation check questionnaire is available in Appendix 5.2. 
34
 See Appendix: Support material for experimental studies. 
35Manipulation was checked with ANOVA analysis across conditions. 
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Table 5.3.(12): Descriptive statistics (4 conditions, N:144) 





                                            Mean         S.E. 
Individual effort                  17.67        8.99 
Early individual effort         6.40          2.69 
Middle individual effort      5.87          3.30 
Late individual effort          5.40          3.50 
(N = 30) 
                                            Mean         S.E. 
Individual effort                  15.21        8.55 
Early individual effort         6.88          2.87 
Middle individual effort      4.90          3.39 
Late individual effort          3.43          3.47 





                                            Mean         S.E. 
Individual effort                  25.53        4.77 
Early individual effort         8.70          1.78 
Middle individual effort      8.60          1.96 
Late individual effort          8.40          2.03 
(N = 30) 
                                            Mean         S.E. 
Individual effort                  19.40        8.44 
Early individual effort         6.93          2.38 
Middle individual effort      7.14          3.17 
Late individual effort          5.33          3.69 
(N = 42) 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Table 5.4 presents the results of the full model with ANOVA analyses. Hypothesis 1 
predicts that individual effort is higher in high social identity teams than in low social 
identity teams. Results in Panel A (Table 5.4) support this hypothesis (F= 20.511; 
p<0.000). Hypothesis 2 predicts that the design of group performance report increases 
individual effort. I expect team members with an aggregated form develop higher 
levels of individual effort than teams members with a detailed form. Results in Panel 
A (Table 5.4) support this hypothesis (F= 10.504; p<0.001).  
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that social identity moderates the effect of performance report 
on individual effort. A moderator is a qualitative or quantitative variable (social 
identity) that affects the direction and/or the strength of the relation between the 
independent variable (design of performance report) and the dependent variable 
(individual effort) (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  Results in Panel B (Table 5.4) support this 
hypothesis. In groups with low social identity the design of performance report does 
not influence individual effort (F= 1.379; p<0.244). Contrary, in groups with high 
social identity, the design of group performance report influences individual effort (F= 
13.559; p<0.000). Thus, social identity affects how information is interpreted within 
teams (Towry, 2003). It seems that the design of performance report plays a major role 
in influencing individual behavior when team members´ are high identified with 
teammates.  
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Table 5.4.(13): Hypotheses test – Full model - ANOVA on individual effort36 
Panel A: Main effects. Between subjects 
Factor Dof Mean square F p-value 
Social identity 1 435.813 20.511 <0.000 
Design of group Perform. report 1 223.186 10.504 <0.001 
Social identity x Design of group 
Performance report 
1 43.072 2.027 <0.157 
 
Panel B: Simple effects for each Social identity condition. Between subjects 
 Dof Mean square F p-value 
Effect of group Perform. report 
under low social identity groups 
 
1 35.083 1.379 <0.244 
Effect of group Perform. report 
under high social identity groups 
1 231.175 13.559 <0.000 
 
Panel C: Main effects. Within subjects 
Factor Dof Mean square F p-value 
Stages  1.739 103.393 34.138 <0.000 
Stages x Social identity 1.739 22.519 7.435 <0.001 
Stages x Design of group 
Performance report 
1.739 37.194 12.281 <0.000 
Stages x Social identity x Design 
of group Performance report 
1.739 8.027 2.650 <0.080 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 also predicts that social comparison process mediates the relation 
between performance report and team members´ effort. I measured four types of social 
comparison processes (the mediating variable). Each type of comparison was 
measured with two items (see Appendix 5.1.).  
 
The mediating relation of hypothesis 2 was tested using the partial least squares (PLS) 
technique (Chin, 1998; Wold, 1982). PLS is a variance-based approach for the 
estimation of path models involving latent constructs that are indirectly measured with 
                                                          
36Analyses at group level (group effort) produce qualitative similar results for the three hypotheses. In 
particular performance reports have significant effects on group effort in high social identity condition (F: 
6.909; p<0.015). In low social identity condition I do not find a difference (F: 0.791; p<0.383). 
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multiple indicators. PLS can estimate models with small sample sizes and does not 
make distributional assumptions about the data used for modelling (Chin, 1998). The 
mediating model analyses individual behaviour, that is, how the individual compares 
with teammates and how this comparison (mediating variable) influences individual 
effort (dependent variable). I used the eight items of social comparison questionnaire, 
as indicators of the latent mediating variables (upward assimilation, upward contrast, 
downward assimilation, and downward contrast) 37. The independent variable, 
performance report, is a dummy variable (0, aggregated performance report; 1, 
detailed performance report). 
Related to the structural model, Figure 5.1 displays the results from the test of the full 
model. Table 5.5 contains the detailed output statistics of the analysis of path 
coefficients in the structural model, and reports on the significance of the standardized 
βs that resulted from this analysis, based on a bootstrapping procedure that used 500 
samples with replacement. Table 5.5 also reports the R2 statistics for the dependent 
variable (individual effort) and the mediating variables (social comparison processes).   
 
Table 5.5.(14): Results from PLS analysis: full model (path coefficients, N: 144) 






















    -0,002 





    0,038 
Downward 
contrast 
0,041     0,002 
Individual 
effort 
-0,216 b 0,043 -0,266 b -0,392 a 0,117 0,353 
aSignificant at 0.001 level,  bSignificant at 0.01 level , cSignificant at 0.05 level  
Source: own elaboration 
 
                                                          
37I made a factorial analysis for analyzing if the measures were reliable: Cronbach Alpha for the two 
items of upward assimilation is 0,806; for upward contrast is 0,738; for downward assimilation is 0,749; 
and for downward contrast is 0,788. The results are in line with recent social comparison studies who 
point out that social comparison is a multi-dimensional variable (see Buunk et al., 2003, 2005; Molleman 
et al., 2007).  
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Figure 5.1.(8): The structural model (study III): performance report, social comparison and 











aSignificant at 0.001 level,  bSignificant at 0.01 level , cSignificant at 0.05 level (R2 0.394) (solid lines 
represent significant paths). 
Source: own elaboration 
 
These results point out that group performance report influences individual effort 
directly and also via social comparison process. As the design of performance report 
was measured as a dummy variable (0, aggregated performance report; 1, detailed 
performance report), the model suggests the detailed form decreases individual effort, 
comparing to the aggregated form. Two processes are enhanced with the informational 
feature of the performance report. First, a cognitive process influences individual 
motivation (represented by the direct effect). The detailed form reinforces the 
individual frame, thus, the individual develops more self-interested behaviour (Rowe, 
2004). Contrary, the aggregated form reinforces the group frame, thus the individual 
increases his level of effort within the team. Secondly, a social comparison process 
also influences individual motivation (represented by the indirect effect). The detailed 
form increases the level of downward assimilation process (I compare with others 
performing worse, to follow them). That is, the individual compares with free-riders 
teammates, and decides to follow them, that is, decides to free-ride. The results are in 
line with Molleman et al. (2007). In this study results point out that downward 
assimilation inhibit team members’ motivation. However, related to the upward 
comparison process, I do not find that an aggregated form enhances this upward 
process, as I expected. Nevertheless, in teams where the detailed form is used, I find 
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high-performers but not to follow them, but to the contrary. This upward contrast 
comparison also reduces individuals’ effort within the team. 
 
Finally, hypothesis 3 predicts that social identity moderates the effect of performance 
report on individual effort, and results support this hypothesis (see Panel B, Table 
5.4.). To give a strong support to this result I estimate again the mediating model (see 
figure 5.2. and Table 5.6) for high social identity teams using the partial least squares 
(PLS) technique (Chin, 1998; Wold, 1982). I want to compare regression coefficients 
between the general model (figure 5.1.) and the model of high social identity teams 
(figure 5.2.) (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
 
Table 5.6.(15): Results from PLS analysis: full model for high social identity teams (path 
coefficients, N: 72) 




























    0,039 
Downward 
contrast 
0,207c     0,040 
Individual 
effort 
-0,323 a 0,024 -0,133 -0,444 a 0,134 0,382 
aSignificant at 0.001 level,  bSignificant at 0.01 level , cSignificant at 0.05 level  
Source: own elaboration 
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Figure 5.2.(9): The structural model for high social identity teams (study III): performance report, 












aSignificant at 0.001 level,  bSignificant at 0.01 level , cSignificant at 0.05 level (R2 0.382) (solid lines 
represent significant paths). 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Some differences can be finding if we compare Figures 5.1 and 5.2. First, the direct 
effect of the design of performance report on individual effort is strongest when social 
identity is high (t= -0,323, p<0,001 for high social identity teams; t= -0,216; p<0,01 
for all sample). Secondly, the indirect effect via downward comparison process is also 
strongest when social identity is high (I compare 0,196 x - 0,444= -0,087 for high 
social identity teams; with 0,203 x -0,392= -0,078 for all sample). Finally, in groups 
with high social identity the design of performance report also influences the contrast 
comparison processes (upward and downward), although these two processes do not 
influence individual behaviour. It seems that the detailed form of performance report, 
where the individual information is presented, enhances personal self-construal instead 
of the interdependent self-construal (which relies on the group). And contrast effects 
are more likely to occur when personal self-construal is presented (Greenberg et al., 
2007). 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the trends in individual effort for teams with high and low social 
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members with high social identity and aggregated group performance report maintain 
levels of effort across periods38. 
 
Figure 5.3.(10): Trends in groups with high social identity vs groups with low social identity 




Source: own elaboration 
 
 
5.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter analyses the effects of the design of performance report and social 
identity on individual effort within teams and across periods. The results provide 
evidence that social identity increases individual effort. Further, the informational 
feature of group performance report can help to avoid free-riding behaviours across 
periods. Moreover, the results showed that the informational feature of feedback can 
influence individual behaviour within teams through two processes: a cognitive 
process (which allow stressing a group or individual frame) and a social comparison 
process (which allow teammates to compare and follow other teammate’s behaviour). 
Finally, this chapter provides evidence that the effectiveness of the design of group 
performance report is enhanced by the level of social identity of the team. The results 
suggest that teams with high social identity can maintain high levels of individual 
                                                          
38
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effort across periods only when feedback aggregated is provided. In settings where 
team identity is lower, the type of performance reports matters less.  
 
This chapter provides useful insights for both theory and practice. First, this chapter 
sheds some light related to the role of information in strengthening (or weakening) the 
links between control and cooperation within teams in multi-period settings (Coletti et 
al., 2005, p. 497). The present study shows that the informational feature of feedback 
can influence team members’ behaviour in a positive or negative way. The manner in 
which team-based information is disseminated or presented influences individual 
motivation. A performance report in aggregated form frames a group context and can 
avoid future free-riding behaviors (Rowe, 2004; Rowe et al., 2008).  
 
Secondly, the present chapter provides evidence that social identity is a main 
individual feature and affects how information is interpreted within groups. The work 
of Towry (2003) focused heavily on a control feature, and demonstrated that the 
effectiveness of an incentive system can be enhanced or degraded by a sense of team 
identity. The results show that the effectiveness of subtle changes in presentation 
format of performance reports (that economically speaking should have little effect on 
cooperation) may also be enhanced or degraded by a sense of team identity. I provide 
more evidence related to the importance of supplementing economic theories with 
social psychological theories to analyse and understand individual behaviour within 
teams (Birnberg et al., 2007). In teams with high social identity, the information of the 
group feedback becomes a behavioural standard, that is, team members think this is 
the standard behaviour that the group should follow. This study shows that the more 
individuals perceive that others are engaging in unethical activities (which should 
happen more when feedback is more detailed), the more they believe that unethical 
behavior is consistent with the norms, values and beliefs of their relevant social group 
(O´Fallon & Butterfield, 2012, p.126). 
 
Finally, this chapter answers recent calls for analysing organizational factors which 
influences or can be influenced by social comparison processes (Goodman & Haisley, 
2007; Spence et al., 2011). The more institutionalized and visible a mechanism is 
within the organization, the more they should stimulate social comparison processes 
(Goodman & Haisley, 2007). Providing team information may reinforce these social 
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comparison processes within the team. Nevertheless, the results also point out that 
providing too much detail on team based performance could be negative for individual 
effort. Supplementing group information with individual information related to team 
members’ performance can increase downward assimilation processes, increasing 
free-riders behaviour within the team. Contrary to my expectations, I don´t find an 
aggregated form of performance report enhances an upward comparison process. One 
possible explanation is participants in the experimental task did not perceive they 
could control the situation where they worked. Social comparison researchers point 
out that not only a cooperative context is needed to develop an upward comparison 
process, but also individuals should feel they have the means to attain a higher level of 
performance (Buunk et al., 1990; Greenberg et al., 2007). In the experimental task, 
individual performance depends on other teammate’s effort. However team members 
cannot communicate and cannot help each other to influence other team members´ 
effort. 
 
As any empirical study, this chapter presents several limitations. First, participants did 
not communicate face to face and simply chose effort choices. When communication 
is allowed, people who deliver more effort might stimulate others to deliver effort 
through this communication, which can moderate the results of this study. In that 
sense, I think the negative effect of the detailed form of feedback could change, if 
teammates feel they had more control over the situation to improve team-based 
performance (Greenberg et al., 2007; Román, 2009). Secondly, this study uses an 
experiment to analyze the effect of social comparison related to performance 
feedback. In real situations, workers can also compare other dimensions, as salary or 
working conditions (Brown et al., 2007) which either can complement or conflict with 
the type of feedback workers receive. Thirdly, this study demonstrates individuals 
interpret information in different ways, depending on their level of social identity, that 
is, depending on individual differences. However, other individual differences can 
also influence how team members interpret group information, as demographic 
differences or background (i.e. skills´ job or skills´ task) (Chandler, Honig & Wiklund, 
2005; Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 2007). Finally, I analyze a situation where teammates 
receive group performance information each period. The frequency of feedback might 
also play a role on individual behavior. Too frequent information related to free-riding 
behaviors of teammates, may produce negative effects on individual behavior, such as 
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frustration (Buunk et al., 2005; Nikias et al., 2010; Román, 2009). A next step could 
be analyzing the relation between the manner in which information is shared amount 
team members’ and the frequency with which this information is shared. In summary, 
this study sheds some interesting results related to the effect of group feedback 
information within teams. However, future work is needed to understand how 
accounting and control information can influence cooperation and free-riding behavior 





APPENDIX 5.1.: Social comparaison questionnaire 
 
I adapt the instrument of Molleman et al. (2007) using a 5-point scales, ranging from 1 
(never) to 5 (often):  
 
(upward assimilation) 
There must have been situations in which you experienced someone performing 
higher (investing higher) than you in your team. In such a situation, 
- How often do you think “I will do that as well”? 
- How often do you think “That´s the way I will do it, too”? 
 
(upward contrast) 
There must have been situations in which you experienced someone performing 
higher (investing higher) than you in your team. In such a situation, 
- How often do you thing “I will never invest like that”? 
- How often do you thing “I will not attain that”? 
 
(downward assimilation) 
There must have been situations in which you experienced someone performing lower 
(investing lower) in your team. In such a situation, 
- How often do you think “That will happen to me, too”? 
- How often do you think “Presently, I will do the same”? 
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There must have been situations in which you experienced someone performing lower 
(investing lower) in your team. In such a situation, 
- How often do you thing “I will do much better”? 
- How often do you thing “I´m glad that I´m not doing so badly”? 
 
 
APPENDIX 5.2.: Manipulation check questionnaire 
 
In order to finish with the activity, please indicate on a scale from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 5 (completely agree): 
 
1. I have worked hard on this activity. 
2. I was highly motivated to take part in this activity. 
3. Taking part in this activity was fun. 
4. The reward I receive from this activity only depends on my decisions. 
5. The common project’s reward depends on the decisions of every member in 
the team. 
6. While taking part in the activity, I felt that the three of us being responsible in 
the Department set up a team. 
7. I have felt compromised with the activity. 
8. My personal interests were not as important as the common ones. 
9. In any period in the activity, the members of my team have discussed our 
decisions. 
10. During the activity I have identified to the members of my team. 
11. I have met my colleagues in the team before the beginning of the activity. 
12. I have identified my colleagues in the team before the beginning of the 
activity. 
13. After every decision in the 30 periods, I knew the benefit for the common 
project. 
14. After every decision in the 30 periods, I knew the benefit for my department. 
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15. After every decision in the 30 periods, I knew the benefit for the two others 
departments. 
16. Choose from the two figures below the one that best fits with your feelings 
towards your team during the time that you have involved in the activity.  
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The final chapter provides an overview and discussion of the findings of the three 
studies of this dissertation and their implications for research and practice. First the 
findings of the three studies are summarized in section 6.2. Next, section 6.3 discusses 
the limitations of these dissertation´s and identifies directions for future research. 
Finally, section 6.4 summarizes findings for management accounting and social 
psychology research and practice. 
 




6.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
This dissertation set out to study the following research question: 
 
How are management control systems designed and used in team-based settings to 
increase team members´ motivation and performance? 
 
Three experimental studies were performed to answer this question. The first and 
second study focused on the use of management control systems and social identity, 
and its effects on team motivation and performance. These studies were conducted in 
the tradition of psychology-based experimental work. The first study focused on 
explaining the effect of the interactive use of control systems and social identity on the 
identified motivation (i.e. an affective state) of individuals within a team. The second 
study analyses a mediating model, where identified motivation is the intervening 
variable between interactive control systems, social identity and team performance. 
The third study focused on the design of management control systems and social 
identity, and its effects on team motivation and cooperation. This study was conducted 
using a traditional social dilemma of experimental economics. The study focused on 
the design of performance reports at team level and social identity, and its effects on 
team cooperation, through other intervening variable, the social comparison process 
between team members. The remainder of this section contains a concise summary of 
the findings of the three studies. 
 
The first study titled “The use of Management Control Systems, Social Identity and 
Team Commitment” focuses on the effect of the interactive use of control system and 
social identity on team members´ identified motivation. The general model of 
workplace commitment of Meyer and Herscovitch (2001) is followed to support these 
relations. First, any mechanism that increases involvement and participation of 
individuals in a course of action can increase motivation and commitment to specific 
target. An interactive use of control systems are characterized by involvement and 
participation of managers, but also, of organizational members. Secondly, any 
mechanism that increases identification and association with a specific target can 
increase motivation and commitment to this target. Social identity is a cognitive 
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process which helps individuals to identify with a specific social category. The more 
the individual identifies with the social category, the more the individual is going to 
follow the group norms and values. 120 postgraduate students of Pablo Olavide 
University participated in the experimental study. The results supported the 
hypotheses of the model. That is, the interactive control system increased team 
members´ motivation and commitment. Secondly, the social identity of the team 
increased team members´ motivation and commitment. Finally, the effect of the 
interactive control system was stronger than the effect of social identity on team 
members´ motivation and commitment. The results of this study were satisfactory; 
especially because one newly developed instrument were used to manipulate the 
interactive control system in an experimental study, and because one new dimension 
of commitment (to the team instead to the organization) has been incorporated to 
management accounting literature. 
 
The second study titled “The effect of Interactive Control Systems and Social Identity 
on team members´ motivation and performance” follows the first one. As I found a 
direct effect of the interactive control system and social identity on team members´ 
identified motivation, I analyzed how this motivation influenced team performance. 
Therefore, I developed a mediating model where the two independent variables were 
the interactive control system and social identity, the mediating variable was the 
identified motivation of team members, and the dependent variable was the team 
performance. The experimental study was the same of the first study, but now 144 
postgraduate students participated, and the experiment included a second task for 
measuring team performance. I used two types of analyses: an analysis of mean 
difference between conditions, and a variance-based approach for the estimation of the 
mediating model using Partial Least Squares (PLS) technique. The results supported 
the mediating model. I did not find a direct relation between the interactive control 
system and social identity and team performance. However, I found indirect relations. 
The interactive control system increased team performance but through the identified 
motivation of team members and the social identity increased team performance also 
through the identified motivation of team members. Moreover, the results suggested 
the interactive control system can influence salience of team identity, as the interactive 
control system pushed a group frame.  
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The third study titled “The effect of Group Performance Report on cooperative effort” 
is focused on the design of one important practice of management control system 
which is the performance feedback or reporting. I focused on the informational feature 
of performance report designed at group level, differentiating two designs: an 
aggregate form (only group information was given to group members) and a detailed 
form (which combined group and individual information related to teammates). The 
study also included a second independent variable, the social identity of the team 
because influenced how individuals interpreted group information. This study, 
following the second one, also presented a mediating model, but now the intervening 
variable was the social comparison process, a variable that has been highlighted in 
social psychology literature for influencing individual performance in group-based 
settings. Although management accounting literature recently highlighted that both 
designs of feedback influenced group performance, I suggested in this dissertation that 
the effect of the aggregate form was higher than the detailed form, as pushed a group 
frame which facilitated positive (assimilation) social comparison process between 
team members. I expected a direct relation between the design of performance report 
and team performance, but also an indirect effect through the social comparison 
process developed within teams. The model was tested with an experimental study, 
following economic literature. 144 postgraduate students of Pablo Olavide University 
participated in the experimental study. I used two types of analyses: an analysis of 
mean difference between conditions, and a variance-based approach for the estimation 
of the mediating model using Partial Least Squares (PLS) technique. The results 
supported the mediating model. That is, an aggregate performance feedback increased 
team performance through the social comparison process developed within the team. 
Moreover, the aggregate form also had a direct effect on team performance, through a 
cognitive process which pushed a group context on individual mind. Finally, social 
identity moderated the effect of group performance reports on individual behaviour. In 
teams with high social identity, the positive effects of the aggregate performance 
reports are stronger than in teams with low social identity. Nevertheless, the negative 
effects of the detailed form of performance reports are also stronger in teams with high 
social identity than in teams with low social identity. Therefore, the design of 
accounting structures is more important in teams where individuals are highly 
identified with the group. 
 




6.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This dissertation analyzes the relation between the design and use of management 
control systems, social identity and team members´ motivation and performance. I 
analyze the hypotheses predicted in Chapter 3, 4 and 5 with two experimental studies. 
As any empirical study, this dissertation presents limitations, but also new insights for 
future researchers. 
 
The first study titled “The use of Management Control Systems, Social Identity and 
Team Commitment” focuses on one dimension of the interactive use of management 
control systems to influence individual motivation. The first limitation is related to the 
interactive control system. I developed a new instrument to manipulate the interactive 
control system in an experimental study. I followed recent revised framework of 
Simons´ Levers of Control of Tessier and Otley (2012) for manipulating this variable. 
However, interactive control system is a broad concept and it is characterized by 
different features and dimensions. I only focused on one dimension, related to its 
intensity, which is related to the time consuming within the team discussing and 
debating control information. Bisbe, Batista-Foguet and Chenhall (2007, p.809) 
describe in detail the dimensions of the interactive control system and suggest 
different effects. For example, the authors suggest the dimension focus on strategic 
uncertainties refers to the object of the use of the control information, while a non-
invasive involvement refers to leadership style. Recently Abernethy, Bouwens and 
Van Lent (2010) have demonstrated that leadership style is an antecedent of the 
interactive control system. However, these authors do not analyze the effects of the 
leadership style and the interactive control system on individual behavior, but they 
suggest some positive effects. Future researchers could analyze the effects of other 
dimensions of the interactive use on individual behavior using experimental studies. 
 
The first study has a second limitation related to the operationalization of the 
identified motivation of team members. I measured identified motivation though team 
members´ affective commitment because researchers suggest commitment is a 
component of individual motivation (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001; Meyer, Becker & 
Vandenberghe, 2004, p.991). However, identified motivation is characterized by other 
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features, such as perception of being evaluated (Wong-on-Wing, Guo & Lui, 2010). 
Future research is needed for supporting construct validity and internal validity of the 
model of the first study.  
 
Finally, the first study had a third limitation, because the study analyzed the effects of 
interactive control system and social identity on individual identified motivation. 
However, this study did not analyze the effects of this identified motivation on 
individual behavior within teams. However, the second study of this dissertation 
covers this gap. 
 
The second study titled “The effect of Interactive Control Systems and Social Identity 
on team members´ motivation and performance” introduces a mediating model, where 
identified motivation is the mediating variable between management control systems 
and social identity and team performance. I operationalized the identified motivation 
through team affective commitment. Nevertheless, individuals can commit to different 
foci, as supervisors or organization, instead of the team. And each type of commitment 
may be enhanced by different processes and also may lead to different individuals´ 
behavior (Vandenberghe, Bentein & Stinglhamber, 2004). Researchers suggest 
commitment to the supervisor also influences individual job performance (Bishop et 
al., 2005; Vandenberghe et al., 2004). And it seems that interactive control system is 
also related to supervisor leadership style (Abernethy et al., 2010). Therefore, future 
researchers may focus on other dimensions of the interactive use of management 
control systems, individuals´ supervisor commitment and job performance.  
 
A second limitation of the second study is related to the type of task used in the 
experimental study. I used a brainstorming task for measuring team performance. 
However, communication and cooperation were forbidden between team members. 
Researchers posit that the type of task can moderate the effects of accounting practices 
and also social identity on team members´ behavior (Libby & Thorne, 2009; van Dick 
et al., 2009). That is, the type of task used limits the generalizability of the results. As 
a consequence, future experimental studies are needed to analyze the model of the 
second study and support the external validity of the model.  
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The third study titled “The effect of Group Performance Report on cooperative effort” 
has also a limitation related to the type of task used for measuring cooperative effort 
within the team. I used a task based on social dilemma situations and communication 
was forbidden between team members. However, in organizations communication 
often happens on the work floor and actions can be taken to help others teammates. I 
posit that the results of the third study may change when communication is allowed 
between team members (Libby & Thorne, 2009, Román, 2009). The results stress that 
a detailed performance report may increase a negative downward comparison process 
between team members. Nevertheless this comparison process may be different in 
situations where the individual controls the way for increasing team performance 
(Greenberg, Ashton-James & Ashkanasy, 2007. If team members can cooperate and 
communicate high-performers can help low-performers and group performance may 
improve (Román, 2009).  
 
A second limitation of the third study is related to the sample chosen. Only students 
participated in the third study. However, if participants in the sample were 
professionals or managers, other individual characteristics could be considered 
because might moderate the results of the study. For example, I posit social identity 
influences how individuals interpret control information, but other individual features, 
such as prior experience or background, can also influence the relation between 
individual behavior and control information (Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 2007).  
 
A third limitation of the third study is related to the mediating variable which is the 
social comparison process. I assumed that individuals in the third study only compared 
with teammates related to performance feedback at group level. However, individuals 
can compare other dimensions, as salary or working conditions (Brown et al., 2007). 
However, I did not control for other social comparison processes between team 
members. And it is suggested that these other social comparison processes can 
complement or conflict with the type of performance feedback participants received in 
the experimental study.  
 
Finally, other limitation of the third study is related to the feature of the design of 
performance reports I chose. I focused on aggregation feature. However, there are 
other features as frequency (high vs. low) or the type of information (financial vs. non-
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financial measures) which can influence individual behavior. For example, some 
researchers posit that too frequent information related to teammate’s free-riding 
behaviors may produce negative effects on individual behavior such as anger and 
frustration (Nikias et al., 2010). And Lau and Moser (2008) found that non-financial 
performance measures produced positive effects on job performance, because increase 
the individual commitment to the organization.  
 
In sum, this dissertation posits the importance of individual identified motivation on 
management accounting literature. Results have shown the design and use of 
management control systems can influence this identified motivation and therefore 
team performance. However, I only focus on a specific design of performance reports, 
and on a specific use of management control systems at group level. Future 
researchers should analyze the effects of other features of the design and the use of 






The main purpose of this dissertation was to analyze and identify how organizations 
should design and use management control systems to increase individuals´ 
motivation and performance in team-based settings. The first and the main conclusion 
is that organizations should adapt the traditional design and use of control systems to 
these collaborative environments to influence individual motivation. An interactive 
control system and an aggregate performance report can increase team members´ 
motivation and performance. Furthermore, these control systems practices interact 
with individual features such as social identity to influence team members´ motivation 
and performance. 
 
This dissertation provides useful theoretical and methodological insights for 
management accounting research and social psychology research, and also provides 
useful insights for practice. Related to theory, I incorporate a type of individual 
motivation (the identified, contrary to the external) in management accounting 
literature at empirical level. Following a motivational model of social psychology and 
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organizational behavior research (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001) and theoretical studies 
of recent management accounting researchers (see Adler & Chen, 2011), I analyze the 
relation between management control systems and individual identified motivation. I 
point out that practices that enhance socialization, involvement, interaction and 
participation of individuals in a course of action, may increase employees identified 
motivation, and therefore, employees effort. The use of motivational models of related 
literatures such as social psychology can help management accounting researchers to 
understand the process by which management control systems influence individual 
behavior in collaborative environments (Birnberg, Luft & Shields, 2007).  
 
Secondly, I posit that combining economic and social psychology literature can help 
researchers to identify variables that mediate the relation between management control 
systems and individual performance. For example, the third study focuses on 
performance reports, social identity and cooperative efforts within teams. I present a 
social dilemma situation which is created by the use of group incentives within the 
team. Economic literature suggests tic-tac or grim trigger strategy in social dilemma 
situations (that is, each player choose cooperate and continues to choose this 
cooperative action as long as the other player has always choose cooperate; if the 
opponent choose defect, thus the player choose defect too in next round) (Gold & 
Sudgen, 2007). This grim trigger strategy describes a process of social comparison 
between team members, a process that have been extensively analyzed in social 
psychology literature (Molleman, Nauta & Buunk, 2007). Therefore, if management 
accounting researchers combine both type of literatures, it is easy to identify what 
processes can be enhanced with the use of control. Following economic literature, the 
use of a detailed performance feedback in team settings, can facilitate the tic-tac 
strategy, that is, the downward assimilation comparison (I follow the low-performer). 
Therefore, cooperation will fail across periods. Contrary, following social psychology 
researchers, the use of aggregate performance feedback in collaborative environments 
can push a group context, where employees compare with high-performers (upward 
assimilation) and thus cooperation may increase across periods.  
 
I also provide some contributions to social psychology researchers. First, this 
dissertation demonstrates that the effect of social identity on team members´ behavior 
depends on the context, that is, on the salience of the social category in a given 
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moment. Traditionally salience is manipulated with colors or group competition (see 
Haslam, 2001). However, following Towry (2003), I demonstrate that a specific use of 
control information can also activate the group identity. In this context, where group 
identity is activated, the team members´ identification influences individuals´ 
behavior. Secondly, this dissertation provides some interesting results to 
organizational behavior literature. I demonstrate the design of performance report can 
push a social comparison process within teams. Therefore, although comparison is a 
basic human tendency, organizations can force this process with accounting and 
control practices. Moreover, the design of these control practices can enhance upward 
and downward comparison processes. However, in this dissertation I only find a 
relation between the group performance report and the downward assimilation process 
instead of the upward process, which is positively related to individual behavior 
within teams. 
 
Related to methodology, this dissertation answers recent calls of management 
accounting researchers for empirical studies which support the validity of constructs 
of the revised framework of Simons´ Levers of Control (Tessier & Otley, 2012; p.11). 
The manipulation of the interactive control system can be used in future works to 
analyze its relation with other team outcomes, as trust or conflict between team 
members.  
 
This dissertation also provides some interesting conclusions for practice. In spite of 
the widespread use of incentives and rewards within organizations to increase 
employees´ motivation, this dissertation stress that managers can use other features of 
management controls systems. None of the studies developed in the present 
dissertation used incentives to influence individual behavior. None of the studies 
analyzed the control feature of control practices (that is, how the individual acts when 
knows his behavior and performance is controlled). The first and second studies focus 
on the socialization process of control practices and the third study focuses on the 
informational feature of performance reports.  
 
Secondly this dissertation suggests organizations can achieve higher levels of 
individual performance through socialization processes than through practices that 
enhance identity of the groups. For example, organizations have traditionally used 
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tournaments or group competition to increase social identity of employees with their 
teams (units or departments). This competition caused individuals to work hard in 
their teams or units. However, I posit that organizations can achieve higher effects on 
individual effort through the involvement and participation process than through the 
social identity process pushed by the group competition. Moreover, competition has 
been related to negative individual attitude, as frustration.  
 
Finally, this dissertation suggests that managers may not show information related to 
teammates´ performance in some situations. For example, there are employees who do 
not identify with their group and receive periodically control information related to 
teammates. This information can stress that other teammates perform better than the 
individual. Therefore, when the individual compares with his high-performers, he can 
feel frustration. As a consequence, the individual may reduce his effort on the group, 
and group performance may suffer. 
 
In sum, economic incentives and control are not the whole solution for motivating 
individuals within organizations. Individuals respond to social, moral and ethical 
principles, and management control systems can be used to influence individual 
through these other processes, enhancing group context and positive social 
comparison processes between teammates (Adler & Chen, 2011; Rowe, 2004; 
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A) Support material Study I and II 
A.1. Documents given to the participants related to the group 
project. 
A.2. Screens of Z Tree software. 
 
 
B) Support material Study III 
B.1. Documents given to the participants related to the group 
project. 
B.2. Screens of Z Tree software. 
 
 
 A) SUPPORT MATERIAL STUDY I AND II 
 
In this appendix I present three type of material. First, the instructions given to the 
participants in study I and II of the dissertation are shown (chapter 3 and 4)39. 
Secondly, the documents used to the group decision and brainstorming tasks are 
shown. The documents given to the participants are different in phase I, II and III. 
Finally, I present the screens that participants saw when they were participating. I 
present instructions, documents and screens only for one experimental condition (High 
interactive use of management control system). 
                                                          
39
 Study I “The use of Management Control Systems, Social Identity and Team Commitment” 
and Study II “The effect of Interactive Control Systems and Social Identity on team members´ 
motivation and performance”. 
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A.1  Instructions and documents given to participants40 
 




You are at Phase I of the activity. You are a member of a team of investors interested 
in investing in the construction of a Child care center. The project has already been 
approved by the local city government. When the construction is finished, the local 
government will invite tenders for the management of the Nursery. 
 
Here you can find the information dossier of the Phase I, for the project for 
constructing the Nursery. This information provided is previous to the beginning of 
the jobs for construction. You have five minutes to read it. 
 
Once you have read this information, your team and you have ten minutes to discuss it 
in your work desk. You cannot talk about personal issues, but about the Child care 
Project and the information you have been given. In this room, the person in charge 
will look after the fulfilment of the rules. Furthermore, this manager will keep you 
informed when the time for discussion is finished. 
 
Once the time for discussion is finished, you must enter one by one to the Computers 
Room. Every participant will sit at the table assigned with the same letter and number 
of his/her sticker. 
 
From your computer you will have to answer how much will your team invert in the 
construction of the Public Nursery (maximum: 300.000, 00€). Remember that it is not 
necessary that every member at the group agrees on the money to invest. 
 
Below you will find: 
 
1. Plans for the project (first and seconds floor) 
2. Position at the city map 
                                                          
40 Some documents are presented in Spanish language, because the experiments were made 
with Spanish students. 
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3. Duration of the construction project 
4. Budget of the project 
5. A letter from the mayor which states the approval of the project and explains 
the reasons of why is necessary the project of this Child care center for the 
city. 
 
Remember that once you have finished reading the following information, you have 
ten minutes to discuss with your team. Once the time is finished, you will have to go 
ahead the Computers Room to answer about the level of investment. 
 
If there might be anything about the instructions that you have not understood, please 
ask the person in charge of the room. 
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1.- PROJECT PLANS: SECOND FLOOR 
Escaleras y 
ascensor 
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2.-POSITITION AT SEVILLE´S MAP  
 
* 
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3.- DURATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION PROJECT 
 
- El edificio será construido sobre un área de 270 metros cuadrados, localizado en el Polígono Industrial de Sevilla. 
 
- El Excmo. Ayuntamiento de Sevilla cede para su explotación el terreno en el que se situará la Guardería por un 
periodo de cincuenta (50) años.  
 
- El edificio abarcará un área total de 210 metros cuadrados (dos plantas), y un patio de 159 metros cuadrados. 
 
- La construcción del edificio durará nueve (9) meses. 
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Desbroce y limpieza del terreno 1.300,00 €           
Movimiento de tierra 2.300,00 €           
Cimentación y estructura 78.400,00 €         
Albañilería: 19.600,00 €         
Revestimientos: 41.500,00 €         
Cubierta 13.200,00 €         
Instalación de fontanería y saneamientos: 11.700,00 €         
Instalación de electricidad: 7.800,00 €           
Carpintería, cerrajería y vidrios: 33.600,00 €         
Pinturas: 10.600,00 €         
Total presupuesto (obra y construcción): 220.000,00 €       
Mobiliario: 20.000,00 €         
Total presupuesto 240.000,00 €       
 
4.- PROJECT´S BUDGET 
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COMUNICADO DE PRENSA 




El Alcalde de Sevilla ha concedido la licencia de obras para la construcción de una guardería pública 
en el Polígono Industrial de Sevilla. Esta concesión es fruto del compromiso asumido por el Alcalde 
y permitirá que los trabajadores de este Polígono Industrial tengan atendidos a sus hijos durante las 
horas de trabajo en un moderno centro. 
 
El nuevo centro, con un presupuesto cercano a los 250.000 euros, se construirá en una parcela cedida 
por el Excmo. Ayuntamiento, concretamente en la calle Aviación, esquina con la SE-30. Este centro 
tendrá dos plantas con un total de 210 metros cuadrados. Además, el edificio contará con un patio al 
aire libre de más de 100 metros cuadrados, parcialmente cubierto. 
 
Esta acción complementará las mejoras realizadas por el Excmo. Ayuntamiento en los Polígonos 
Industriales de la ciudad. 
 
Sevilla, Octubre 2010. 
APPENDIX: SUPPORT MATERIAL FOR EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 
 
 158 
a.1.2. Documents Phase II. 
 









35- Colocada la primera piedra en la Guardería del 
Polígono Industrial de Sevilla. 
 
 
El Ayuntamiento de Sevilla ha confirmado el inicio de las obras del 
Centro Infantil que dará servicio a los trabajadores del Polígono 
Industrial. Las obras tienen una duración prevista de 9 meses. 
 
 Xxxlllll xxxllllll xxxxlllll  
 
  Xxxlllll xxxllllll xxxxlllll  
 
El Alcalde de Sevilla 
inaugura hoy las obras 
del Centro Infantil del 
Polígono Industrial 
 
  Xxxlllll xxxllllll xxxxlllll  
 
SABADO 30 DE OCTUBRE DE 2010 
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Esta carta es para informar que las obras de la guardería se han iniciado el día 25 de Octubre. 
 
El plazo de ejecución de las obras es de nueve (9) meses, por lo que la fecha límite de 
finalización está previsto para el día 25 de Julio de 2011. La guardería estará abierta para el 
próximo curso 2011-2012. 
 
Estamos orgullosos  de informarles que el proyecto  cumplirá con los términos acordados con el 






La Empresa Constructora 
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El motivo de esta carta es comunicarles que el presupuesto inicial para el proyecto de 
construcción de la Guardería ha sido modificado. El problema detectado es que en el 
presupuesto inicial no se había incluido la adecuación e idoneidad de la cubierta del patio, y 
tampoco el mobiliario necesario para la zona de recreo del patio. 
 
Estos cambios suponen un incremento del 10% sobre el presupuesto inicial. Así, el nuevo 
presupuesto asciende a 264.000,00€. 
 
Les pedimos disculpas por los inconvenientes que este hecho pueda causar, pero consideramos 
que es nuestra obligación informarles, tan pronto como sea posible, de los cambios que se 




La Empresa Constructora 
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URBAN NATURE es una organización sin ánimo de lucro que supervisa y controla el 
comportamiento de las empresas en base al Proyecto de Ciudades Sostenibles de la Comunidad 
Europea. Este Proyecto promueve la sostenibilidad urbana en Europa, y tiene como objetivo 
influir en las políticas y la planificación ambiental a nivel europeo, nacional, regional y local. 
 
Nuestro objetivo es asegurar que los nuevos proyectos adopten prácticas de ejecución de 
acuerdo con el Proyecto de Ciudades Sostenibles de la Comunidad Europea (proyecto en el que 
se incluye la ciudad de Sevilla). Por esta razón, les solicitamos un informe completo sobre el 
impacto ambiental que tendrá el proyecto de la construcción de la Guardería en la zona del 
Polígono Industrial y alrededores. Además, les solicitamos un informe sobre las alternativas 
energéticas a utilizar, y un informe sobre la gestión de residuos.  
 
En el caso de que no recibiéramos en el plazo de un mes estos informes, cumpliendo con las 
buenas prácticas locales, se informará al área de Medio Ambiente del Excmo. Ayuntamiento de 
Sevilla, para que tome las medidas oportunas (la obra podría ser retrasada o paralizada, según 
Ordenanza local nº80/2007). 
 




Coordinadora de Sevilla 
URBAN NATURE 
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a.1.3. Documents Phase II. 
 
1. NEWSPAPER ARTICLE 
 
 Xxxlllll xxxllllll xxxxlllll  
 
 Xxxlllll xxxllllll xxxxlllll  
 
MARTES, 7  DE JUNIO, 2011 
Descubren arena contaminada en 
la guardería del Polígono 
Industrial de Sevilla P.20 
20- Arena contaminada en la guardería del Polígono Industrial de 
Sevilla 
 
Los trabajadores del Polígono Industrial de Sevilla están muy 
preocupados por el proyecto de la guardería, porque la empresa 
constructora ha utilizado un material contaminante en la zona de 
recreo del patio. 
Nuevos problemas en la 
guardería del Polígono 
Industrial de Sevilla 
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Me dirijo a Vds. como representante de los trabajadores del Polígono Industrial de 
Sevilla. Hemos tenido conocimiento del uso de un material tóxico en la Guardería que 
será inaugurada el día 1 de Agosto por el Alcalde de la ciudad. 
 
Como padres estamos preocupados por la salud de nuestros hijos. Queremos 
informarles de que nuestros niños no serán matriculados en este Centro hasta que se 






El representante de los trabajadores 
Polígono Industrial de Sevilla 
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Sevilla, 30 Junio, 2011. 
Estimados inversores, 
 
El motivo de esta carta es informarles del problema que hemos detectado en la arena 
de la zona de recreo del patio de la Guardería. Nuestro proveedor nos envió material 
contaminado por un error en su proceso de control de calidad. En la actualidad, 
nuestro abogado está revisando el contrato de compra firmado con el proveedor. El 
objetivo es reclamar una indemnización por estos hechos. 
 
Este problema tiene importantes implicaciones para nuestro proyecto. En primer lugar, 
serán necesarias costosas correcciones si se quiere obtener el permiso de apertura del 
Centro. Estas correcciones implican un nuevo incremento en el presupuesto del 20% 
sobre el total, lo que supone que el nuevo presupuesto supera los 300.000,00 euros. En 
segundo lugar, la fecha límite de finalización de las obras se retrasará dos meses. 
Aunque el Alcalde inaugurará la Guardería el próximo mes de Agosto, sólo podrá 
inaugurar una parte. Por tanto, la apertura completa de la Guardería no se podrá 
realizar hasta el mes de Octubre (2011). Sin embargo, nuestra empresa seguirá 
haciendo un gran esfuerzo para ajustar el presupuesto y terminar el trabajo tan pronto 
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COMUNICADO DE PRENSA 
El Alcalde inaugurará la Guardería pública para el Polígono Industrial de Sevilla 
el próximo día 1 de Agosto de 2011. 
 
El Alcalde de Sevilla inaugurará la nueva Guardería pública para el Polígono 
Industrial de Sevilla el próximo día 1 de Agosto. Con este proyecto, el Alcalde cumple 
con los compromisos adquiridos con los trabajadores del Polígono Industrial de 
Sevilla. 
 
Este nuevo centro se ha construido sobre una parcela cedida por el Excmo. 




Sevilla, Julio 2011. 
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A.2  Screens of Z Tree software: Studies I and II41 
 
I present screens participant saw in one experimental condition (High interactive use 





                                                          
41 Support material is presented in Spanish language, because the experiments were made with 
Spanish students. 





Screen economic commitment of phase I (II and III are the same): 
 
 





Screen Interactive use questionnaire: 
 




Screen Social identity questionnaire: 
 
 
Screen attitudinal commitment questionnaire: 
 








Screen Brainstorming task (only used for Study II – Chapter 4): 
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 B)  SUPPORT MATERIAL STUDY III 
 
 
In this appendix I present the instructions given to the participants in study III42 and 
the screens that participants saw when they were participating. I present instructions 
and screens only for one experimental condition (Aggregated performance report and 
High social identity teams). 
 
 




You are the Head of the Unit of Investigation and Development (I+D) at a 
pharmaceutical company.  The company has also two other departments of I+D, with 
their own Head of Units. 
 
The manager of the company has called for a meeting to the three Head of Units. In 
this meeting the director has launched a new project where you three will participate 
and set up a new work team. The company thinks that the participation of the three 
departments of I+D will generate bigger incomes. The company is willing to produce 
as much incomes as possible. 
 
 
REMEMBER! THIS PROJECT IS RATHER IMPORTANT FOR YOUR 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY, AS IT WILL ALLOW YOU TO 
INCREASE THE MARKET SHARE AND TAKE IT AWAY TO YOUR 
COMPETITORS 
(those participants wearing a different colour skirt) 
 
 
                                                          
42
 Study III “The effect of Group Performance Report on cooperative effort”. 
43 Some documents are presented in Spanish language, because the experiments were made with Spanish 
students. 
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A. Description of the activity 
 
You, as the Head of one of the Units of I+D, must decide in the name of your Unit 
about the level of investment in the new project. You have to choose between these 
two options: 
 
- Investing a high level of resources at your Department for the common project. 
- Investing a low level of resources at your Department for the common project. 
 
Here below you can find the costs and incomes that every option can generate for the 
common Project and for the Department. 
 
 
a) The costs for your department: The costs for the participation of your Department in 
the common Project are the following one: 
 
- If you choose investing a high level of resources in the common Project: 
o This means a cost of 15€ for your Department. 
- If you choose investing a low level of resources in the common Project: 
o This means a cost of 0€ for your Department. 
 
b) The incomes of the common Project (to share between the three Units):  The 
incomes of the common project have been estimated as follows: 
 
- If the three Head of Units choose to invest a high level of resources in the 
common Project: 
o An income of 75€ for the common Project will be generated, equally 
divided between the three Units (this means 25€ for each one) 
- If any of the three Heads of Units choose to invest a low level of resources (but 
only if the other two choose a high level of resources):  
o An income of 45€ for the common Project will be generated, equally 
divided between the three Units (this means 15€ for each one) 
- If the three Head of Units choose to invest a low level of resources for the 
common Project:  
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o An income of 15€ for the common Project will be generated, equally 
divided between the three Units (this means 5€ for each one) 
This activity consists of 30 periods. 
 
Your Department’s level of investment for the project must be decided in every 
period. 
This means that the incomes for the project will be generated in every period 
depending on the investment chosen by the three Head of Units. 
 
After every period, a yield report will be sent to your computer, telling this: 
 
- The income of the common project generated in that period (to share 
between the three departments) 
 
B. Your profits at this activity 
 
The profits of your Unit in every period will be equal to the proportional part of 
the common Project’s income less the costs of your Unit based on the invested 
resources. 
 
Once the activity is finished, you, as manager of your Unit, will receive a profit 
depending on your Unit’s profit. You will be paid depending on the total income 
generated for your Unit in the 30 periods. This is, for every 50€ of profit for your 
Unit, you will receive 1€. For instance:  
 
- If your Unit has reached profits of 10€ in every period, and therefore has 
accumulated 300€ in the 30 periods (10€ x 30 periods), you will receive 6€ as 
reward for the activity (300€/50€ = 6€). 
- If your Unit has reached profits of 0 euros in the first fifteen periods, and 10€ 
in the next fifteen, and therefore has reached 150€ in the thirty periods, you 
will receive 3 euros as reward for the activity 150€/50€ = 3€). 
 
Be aware that every period is able to generate different profits for your Unit, 
depending on the decision of the three different Heads of Units. 




Once the activity is finished, you will be paid in the other room the reward you have 
gotten. To get this, you must mark at the last screen the letter and the number of the 
computer you have used for the activity. 
 
C. Activity Procedural 
 
Three participants’ teams will be made with the people wearing the same colour 
of T-shirt and company. That said, the activity is COMPLETELY 
ANONYMOUS, because any of the participants knows exactly who their colleagues 
at the company working for the common project are. 
 
At the beginning of the activity, the computer will inform you about your 
identification as manager of the common project (manager X, manager Y or 
manager Z). 
 
D. Beginning of the activity 
 
Once the participants have read the instructions, we will go ahead the Computers 
Room. You will start by answering some questions at the computer, in order to ensure 
you have understood the activities’ instructions. Once these have been understood by 
everyone, the manager of the room will indicate the beginning of the activity. 
Remember that you have to choose during 30 periods. 
 




B.2  Screens of Z Tree software Study III. 
 
I present screens participant saw in one experimental condition (Detailed performance 
report and High social identity teams).  
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Screen with a detailed performance report after period 1: 
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Screen social comparison questionnaire: 
 
 
Screen manipulation check questionnaire: 
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RESUMEN EN ESPAÑOL: 




A.1. La importancia de estudiar los entornos de trabajo en equipo 
A.2. La importancia de estudiar los sistemas de control de gestión 
A.3. La importancia de estudiar la identidad social 
B) Pregunta de investigación y contribuciones 






Esta tesis investiga empíricamente cómo las organizaciones deben diseñar y usar los 
sistemas de control de gestión en entornos de trabajo en equipo. Además, analiza 
cómo los sistemas de control de gestión interaccionan con la identidad social de los 
equipos para influir en su rendimiento. Se analizan dos características de los sistemas 
de control de gestión: el uso interactivo y el diseño de informes de rendimiento 
grupales. La hipótesis general es que los sistemas de control de gestión, cuando se 
usan en entornos colaborativos, deben influir sobre la motivación identificada de los 
individuos. Y esta motivación tiene un efecto directo y positivo sobre el 
comportamiento individual de los miembros del equipo, y por tanto, sobre el 
rendimiento del grupo. 
 
La hipótesis de esta tesis se ha testado con dos estudios experimentales realizados en 
la Universidad Pablo de Olavide de Sevilla (España) donde participaron 288 
estudiantes. Se presentan dos modelos de mediación. El primer modelo analiza el 
efecto indirecto del uso interactivo de los sistemas de control de gestión y de la 
RESUMEN EN ESPAÑOL (SUMMARY IN SPANISH) 
 
 180
identidad social en el rendimiento del grupo, vía la motivación identificada de los 
miembros del equipo. El segundo modelo analiza el efecto directo e indirecto de los 
informes de rendimiento grupales y de la identidad social en el rendimiento del grupo, 
vía el proceso de comparación social entre los miembros del equipo. En general, los 
resultados de los estudios experimentales validan los dos modelos presentados. 
 
Esta tesis contribuye a la literatura en varias líneas. En primer lugar, incorpora un tipo 
de motivación (la identificada) en la literatura de control de gestión, donde 
tradicionalmente se ha analizado la motivación extrínseca de los individuos. En 
segundo lugar, combina la literatura de economía y de psicología social para plantear 
dos modelos de mediación que permiten identificar las variables mediadoras entre los 
sistemas de control de gestión y el rendimiento de un equipo de trabajo. Estas 
variables son la motivación identificada de los individuos y el proceso de comparación 
social entre individuos de un mismo grupo. Por último, esta tesis analiza 
conjuntamente dos variables: los sistemas de control de gestión y la identidad social 
de los equipos. Se pone de manifiesto que estas dos variables interactúan entre sí, y 
esta interacción produce diferentes efectos sobre el rendimiento del grupo. 
 
 
A.1  La importancia de estudiar los entornos de trabajo en equipo 
 
En las dos últimas décadas las organizaciones se han tenido que adaptar a entornos 
más competitivos y globalizados. Como consecuencia, las organizaciones han buscado 
estructuras más flexibles y planas. Varios métodos se han utilizado para conseguir esta 
flexibilización, como por ejemplo, la centralización de las actividades principales y la 
externalización de actividades secundarias, y la utilización de entornos de trabajo en 
equipo, tanto dentro de las organizaciones, como entre las organizaciones (Berry et al., 
2009; Chenhall, 2008). 
 
Estas estructuras basadas en equipo han supuesto cambios importantes. Por un lado, el 
tipo de relación entre empleados de una organización ha cambiado. Tradicionalmente 
las relaciones dentro de las organizaciones han sido verticales y jerárquicas. A nivel de 
investigación se analizaba la relación entre un superior y su/s subordinado/s. Sin 
embargo, el trabajo en equipo implica relaciones a nivel horizontal, donde dos o más 
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individuos deben alcanzar unos objetivos comunes, y para ello deben coordinar sus 
recursos y cooperar entre ellos. Por otro lado, estas relaciones colaborativas entre 
individuos han puesto de manifiesto nuevos procesos que no se dan en entornos de 
trabajo individual, como la comparación social entre individuos, la identidad social o 
el proceso de supervisión mutua entre los miembros del grupo, que pueden influir en 
el rendimiento del grupo. 
 
El trabajo en equipo debe llevar a mejoras en la flexibilidad y eficiencia de las 
organizaciones, sin embargo, la realidad es bien distinta, y el trabajo en equipo no 
lleva automáticamente a mejoras en el rendimiento (Lount y Phillips, 2007; Salas, 
Goodwin y Shawn, 2009). Cuando no se alcanza el rendimiento esperado en un grupo 
de trabajo se señalan dos motivos principales: la falta de coordinación y la falta de 
motivación. La falta de coordinación hace referencia a la incapacidad de los miembros 
del equipo de poner en común toda la información o recursos que tienen disponibles 
para realizar eficientemente la tarea asignada. La falta de motivación hace referencia a 
la disminución del esfuerzo de los miembros del equipo, en comparación con el 
esfuerzo que son capaces de realizar cuando trabajan solos. Esta tesis se centra en el 
problema de falta de motivación de los miembros de un equipo de trabajo. Esta falta 
de motivación produce problemas adicionales dentro de los grupos de trabajo, como el 
polizón (o free-rider) que se produce cuando un individuo del grupo intenta 
aprovecharse del trabajo de los compañeros; o como la holgazanería social que se 
produce cuando todo el grupo reduce su nivel de esfuerzo; o como el conflicto, que se 
produce cuando los miembros del equipo no se ponen de acuerdo en la organización 
del trabajo (Mathieu et al., 2008). 
 
Desde la literatura de psicología social se ha sugerido que la motivación de los 
individuos en entornos de trabajo en equipo funciona de manera diferente a la 
motivación en entornos de trabajo individual (Adler y Chen, 2011; Gagné y Deci, 
2005). Tradicionalmente se ha asumido que los individuos son egoístas y sólo realizan 
las tareas de trabajo si van a obtener algo a cambio, o bien si van a evitar algún 
castigo. Este tipo de motivación se conoce como la motivación extrínseca. Sin 
embargo, se ha sugerido que en entornos de trabajo en equipo el individuo debe sentir 
que los objetivos del grupo son coherentes con sus propios valores y prioridades, y 
debe sentir estos objetivos como suyos propios para implicarse realmente en el grupo. 
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Este tipo de motivación se identifica con una motivación más autónoma, en contra de 
la extrínseca, donde el individuo siente que él puede decidir sobre su propio 
comportamiento. Es decir, no trabaja para el grupo porque hay un control externo que 
le obliga a hacerlo, sino porque el propio individuo realmente quiere hacerlo.  
 
En resumen, se ha sugerido que la investigación sobre el rendimiento de un grupo 
debe focalizarse hacia una motivación más autónoma de los miembros del grupo 
(principalmente a la motivación que se denomina identificada), en lugar de la 
motivación extrínseca tradicionalmente analizada en la literatura de control de gestión 
(Adler y Chen, 2011; Gagné y Deci, 2005). Y que debe tener en cuenta procesos como 
la identidad social o comparación social, porque influyen de manera directa o indirecta 
en el rendimiento del grupo (Haslam, 2001; van Dick et al., 2009a,b). 
 
 
A.2  La importancia de estudiar los sistemas de control de gestión 
 
Los sistemas de control de gestión se utilizan con el propósito de incrementar el valor 
de la organización a través del uso eficaz y eficiente de los recursos de la empresa 
(Berry et al., 2009; Sprinkle, 2003). Estos sistemas de control de gestión proveen de 
información contable y de control a los directivos y empleados de una organización, a 
través de herramientas como los sistemas de costes, presupuestos, sistemas de 
incentivos o medidas de rendimiento. La información de control se suministra para 
dos fines principales dentro de las organizaciones: (1) para proveer información 
necesaria para la planificación y toma de decisiones, (2) para motivar a los individuos 
hacia los objetivos de la organización (Sprinkle, 2003). 
 
Esta tesis se centra en el estudio de la información de control para motivar a los 
individuos que trabajan en un entorno de equipo. Se han destacado dos aspectos 
fundamentales de los sistemas de control de gestión: el diseño y el uso (Chenhall y 
Morris, 1986; Malmi y Brown, 2008; Simons, 1995, 2000). El diseño se refiere a 
aspectos técnicos como qué características debe tener un sistema de costes (fijo, 
variable o de imputación racional, por ejemplo), o qué características debe tener un 
sistema de incentivos (fijo o variable, por ejemplo), o qué características debe tener 
una medida de rendimiento (información sobre el esfuerzo realizado, o sobre el 
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beneficio obtenido, o sobre las dos cosas, por ejemplo). El uso se refiere a la forma en 
la que esta información de control se utiliza dentro de la organización (Simons, 1995, 
2000). Se han destacado dos tipos de usos en la literatura: diagnóstico e interactivo. El 
uso diagnóstico hace referencia al uso de la información de control para detectar 
desviaciones sobre objetivos predeterminados, analizar estas desviaciones y tomar 
decisiones para corregir estas desviaciones. Este uso diagnóstico envía la información 
de arriba abajo en las organizaciones (desde los directivos hacia la base) y la 
información que sube de abajo hacia arriba solo tiene como objetivo calcular y 
analizar desviaciones. El uso interactivo hace referencia a un uso de la información de 
control más abierto, buscando nuevas oportunidades e ideas dentro de la propia 
organización. Este uso se caracteriza porque la información fluye en la organización, 
de arriba a abajo pero también de abajo a arriba, e incluso traspasando barreras 
organizacionales (es decir, entre departamentos o áreas).  
 
La investigación en control de gestión se ha centrado en analizar el mejor diseño y uso 
de la información de control para motivar a los individuos hacia los objetivos 
organizacionales. Ahora bien, esta investigación principalmente ha analizado la 
motivación de los empleados en entornos de trabajo individual, centrándose 
principalmente en cómo influir en la motivación extrínseca de los individuos. 
Prácticas como los sistemas de incentivos, informes de rendimiento individuales, o 
sistemas de control externos (por ejemplo, auditores) influyen en el rendimiento de los 
empleados. Ahora bien, cuando estas prácticas se utilizan en entornos de trabajo en 
equipo, no siempre producen los resultados esperados (Libby y Thorne, 2009; Román, 
2009). Por ejemplo, se ha demostrado que los incentivos individuales (cada individuo 
es recompensado en función de lo que produce) no incrementan el rendimiento de un 
grupo de trabajo, mientras que los incentivos grupales (cada individuo es 
recompensando en función de lo que el grupo produce) sí influyen sobre el 
rendimiento. Aunque, según el tipo de tarea grupal, el incentivo de grupo puede 
provocar otros problemas, como el polizón (es decir, un miembro del equipo no se 
esfuerza, porque sabe que será recompensando gracias al esfuerzo realizado por sus 
compañeros) o el conflicto (cuando un miembro del grupo detecta que otros miembros 
reciben la misma recompensa a pesar de realizar menores niveles de esfuerzo). 
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A.3  La importancia de estudiar la identidad social 
 
La literatura de psicología social señala la identidad social como una de las variables 
más importantes que influye en el comportamiento de los individuos en grupo 
(Haslam, 2001). Según la Teoría de Identidad Social (Tajfel y Turner, 1986), el 
comportamiento de los individuos se puede describir como un continuo donde en un 
extremo está el comportamiento individual y en el otro extremo el comportamiento 
grupal. Esto quiere decir que hay situaciones donde el individuo se comporta 
siguiendo sus propias iniciativas, mientras que hay situaciones donde el individuo se 
comporta siguiendo el comportamiento de un grupo o categoría social con la cual él se 
identifica.  
 
Un individuo tiene diferentes identidades sociales, es decir, se puede identificar con 
diferentes categorías sociales, como por ejemplo, con una organización (la universidad 
para la que trabaja), con un departamento (el departamento de la universidad para la 
que trabaja), con un grupo de investigación (el grupo de investigación al que 
pertenece) o con un género (femenino o masculino). Aunque un individuo se puede 
identificar con diferentes categorías sociales, el contexto determina, de alguna manera, 
qué categoría es la importante. Por ejemplo, un profesor de universidad que está 
asistiendo a un consejo de departamento donde se está eligiendo al director del 
departamento, tendrá activada en ese momento la identidad de miembro del 
departamento. La activación de esta identidad social hace que este individuo se 
comporte de forma similar a los otros miembros de la categoría social (es decir, de 
forma similar a los otros profesores del departamento). 
 
El contexto influye en la identidad social de un individuo. Y las organizaciones 
pueden influir en el contexto en el que los individuos trabajan (Towry, 2003; Rowe, 
2004). Se ha señalado que las prácticas contables y la información de control pueden 
activar contextos más cooperativos o más individuales. Es decir, si se utiliza 
información de control que remarque la importancia del grupo, sus objetivos y sus 
logros, entonces, se estará activando la categoría social de grupo. Y si se activa la 
categoría social de grupo en los individuos, se puede influir en el rendimiento del 
grupo porque la identificación de los miembros de un grupo con su propio grupo hace 
que éstos estén dispuestos a trabajar más y mejor por el grupo y sus objetivos (van 
Dick et al., 2009a,b). 









B.1  Pregunta de investigación 
 
Esta tesis se plantea la siguiente pregunta de investigación: 
 
¿Cómo deben ser diseñados y usados los sistemas de control de gestión en entornos 
de trabajo en equipo para incrementar la motivación de sus miembros y el 
rendimiento del grupo? 
 
Para contestar esta pregunta de investigación se han realizado tres estudios en esta 
tesis. El primer estudio se recoge en el capítulo 3 de la tesis. Analiza la relación entre 
el uso interactivo de los sistemas de control de gestión, la identidad social y la 
motivación identificada de los miembros de un grupo. Este estudio parte del modelo 
de compromiso en el lugar de trabajo de Meyer y Herscovitch (2001). El compromiso 
es un componente de la motivación identificada de los individuos. El modelo de este 
estudio se testó con un experimento realizado en Noviembre del año 2010 con 120 
estudiantes de la Universidad Pablo de Olavide de Sevilla. Se realizó en el Laboratorio 
de Empresa y Economía Experimental. Esta tesis ha utilizado experimentos para 
validar sus hipótesis porque permiten analizar las relaciones causa-efecto de los 
modelos planteados. Los resultados del experimento validan las hipótesis del primer 
estudio. Es decir, las organizaciones pueden conseguir que los miembros de un grupo 
estén más motivados (es decir, estén dispuestos a esforzarse más por el grupo) 
haciendo un uso más interactivo de la información de control e incrementando el nivel 
de identidad social de los individuos con el grupo.  
 
El segundo estudio se recoge en el capítulo 4 de la tesis y amplía los resultados del 
primer estudio. Analiza los efectos del uso interactivo de los sistemas de control de 
gestión y la identidad social en el rendimiento del grupo, vía la motivación 
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identificada de los miembros del grupo. Es decir, este segundo estudio plantea un 
modelo de mediación donde la variable mediadora es la motivación identificada de los 
individuos. Este modelo se valida con el mismo experimento que el primer estudio. 
Para contrastar el modelo de mediación se ha utilizado la técnica de mínimos 
cuadrados parciales (Chin, 1998) que permite validar modelos con muestras de tamaño 
pequeño. Los resultados confirman el modelo de mediación, es decir, el uso 
interactivo de los sistemas de control de gestión influye de manera indirecta en el 
rendimiento de un equipo, vía la motivación identificada de sus miembros. Así mismo, 
la identidad social también influye de manera indirecta en el rendimiento de un grupo, 
vía la motivación identificada.  
 
El tercer estudio se recoge en el capítulo 5 de la tesis. Analiza una característica 
destacada en el diseño de los sistemas de control de gestión, que son los informes de 
rendimiento a nivel de grupo. En este estudio se analiza cómo un diferente diseño de 
la información de rendimiento puede influir en la motivación de los individuos cuando 
trabajan en grupo y por tanto en su rendimiento. El estudio plantea también un modelo 
de mediación, donde la variable mediadora es la comparación social que se produce 
entre los miembros de un grupo de trabajo a partir de la información compartida de los 
informes de rendimiento. El modelo plantea que los informes de rendimiento empujan 
un proceso de comparación social dentro del grupo, y este proceso influye en la 
motivación de los miembros del grupo y en su rendimiento. Además, el modelo 
propone un efecto directo de la identidad social sobre el rendimiento del grupo. Por 
último, el modelo también propone que la identidad social modera el efecto de los 
informes de rendimiento sobre el rendimiento del grupo. El modelo es testado con un 
segundo experimento realizado entre Abril y Octubre del año 2012 en la Universidad 
Pablo de Olavide de Sevilla, donde participaron 144 estudiantes. Los resultados del 
experimento avalan el modelo planteado en este tercer estudio. Es decir, los informes 
de rendimiento grupales influyen de manera directa e indirecta, vía el proceso de 
comparación social, en el rendimiento de un equipo de trabajo. Así mismo el efecto de 
los informes de rendimiento sobre el rendimiento del grupo es mayor en equipos con 
alta identidad social que en equipos con baja identidad social, porque los informes de 
rendimiento se convierten en normas de comportamiento a seguir en los equipos de 
alta identidad social. 
 




B.2  Contribuciones 
 
Esta tesis realiza contribuciones a distintas literaturas como la literatura de control de 
gestión, de comportamiento organizacional y de psicología social. También realiza 
contribuciones para la gestión práctica de las organizaciones. En primer lugar, en 
relación a la literatura de control de gestión, esta tesis pone de manifiesto que un 
diferente uso de los sistemas de control de gestión influye en el comportamiento 
individual de los miembros de un grupo. En este sentido la aportación se centra en los 
efectos del uso interactivo a nivel individual, dado que tradicionalmente la literatura 
de control de gestión ha analizado los efectos del uso interactivo a nivel 
organizacional. Los resultados señalan que el efecto del uso interactivo sobre el 
comportamiento de los individuos no es directo, sino vía la motivación identificada de 
los individuos. Este modelo de mediación se ha podido plantear incorporando un 
modelo motivacional de la literatura de comportamiento organizacional a la literatura 
de contabilidad y control de gestión. En segundo lugar, esta tesis destaca que los 
informes de rendimiento influyen en el comportamiento individual dependiendo del 
diseño de información grupal que dispongan. Esta tesis no se centra en el efecto que 
estos informes produce sobre el individuo al sentirse controlado, sino en el efecto que 
estos informes produce sobre el individuo al conocer la información de una manera 
más agregada (el individuo solo recibe información del grupo) o de una manera más 
detallada (el individuo recibe información del grupo y de cada uno de los miembros 
del grupo). En ambos casos el individuo está siendo controlado por la organización, 
ahora bien, parece que el efecto cognitivo de los informes detallados puede ser 
negativo para la motivación del individuo. Si un miembro del equipo tiene 
información sobre sus colegas y esta información destaca que sus colegas están 
holgazaneando (free-rider), entonces el individuo puede decidir holgazanear también, 
lo que puede provocar un descenso continuado del rendimiento del grupo. 
 
En relación a la literatura de psicología social, esta tesis destaca que la identidad social 
no siempre tiene un efecto directo sobre el rendimiento de un grupo. Si el contexto 
refuerza un contexto de grupo y cooperación, la identidad social influye sobre el 
rendimiento del grupo. Ahora bien, si el contexto refuerza en un grado menor el 
contexto de grupo, el efecto de la identidad social sobre el rendimiento del grupo es 
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menor o incluso puede desaparecer. Es importante tener en cuenta que las prácticas 
contables y de control de gestión (entiéndase presupuestos, sistemas de incentivos, 
sistemas de costes, medidas de rendimiento, etc.) pueden reforzar una identidad 
grupal, pero también pueden reforzar una identidad individual. Además, esta tesis 
pone de manifiesto que la información contable y de control puede convertirse en una 
señal sobre la norma de comportamiento del grupo. En esta tesis, los grupos que 
recibían información de su rendimiento a nivel detallado (es decir, donde los 
miembros del grupo podían comprobar que otros colegas estaban holgazaneando) y 
que tenían una alta identidad social, eran grupos que a lo largo del tiempo iban 
reduciendo cada vez más su rendimiento. El motivo es que los miembros del grupo 
acababan asumiendo que el comportamiento prototípico del grupo era holgazanear en 
lugar de cooperar.  
 
En relación a la literatura de comportamiento organizacional, esta tesis destaca la 
importancia de los sistemas de control de gestión para reforzar los procesos de 
comparación social entre empleados. Tradicionalmente la comparación social se ha 
analizado en contextos de estudiantes (donde se compara el rendimiento académico), 
contextos de pacientes (donde se compara el estado de salud) o incluso en contexto de 
parejas (donde se compara lo que aporta cada uno a la familia). Habiéndose 
demostrado la importancia de este proceso sobre el comportamiento de las personas, 
pocos estudios han analizado cómo las organizaciones pueden empujar estos procesos 
entre los empleados de una organización. Esta tesis analiza cómo una práctica 
relacionada con la contabilidad y el control de gestión, los informes de rendimiento a 
nivel de grupo, pueden empujar este proceso de comparación social entre los 
miembros de ese grupo, y cómo esta comparación, puede producir diferentes efectos. 
Si los informes de rendimiento resaltan las diferencias entre los miembros del grupo y 
ponen de manifiesto que algunos individuos están holgazaneando, la comparación 
social produce efectos negativos en el tiempo, porque los miembros del grupo acaban 
siguiendo a los holgazanes. Tradicionalmente se ha destacado los efectos positivos de 
la comparación social, porque se suponía que los individuos se comparaban con los 
mejores empleados (los que se esfuerzan más) porque querían mejorar y ser como 
ellos. Pero los resultados aquí presentados señalan que los individuos en grupo 
también se comparan con los peores trabajadores (los que se esfuerzan menos, pero 
ganan lo mismo) y pueden decidir ser como ellos (es decir, reducir su esfuerzo). Por 
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tanto, los efectos del proceso de comparación social dentro de un equipo pueden ser 
dañinos para el rendimiento del grupo. 
 
Por último, esta tesis realiza algunas aportaciones a nivel práctico. En primer lugar, 
esta tesis demuestra que se puede influir en la motivación de los individuos sólo 
cambiando el uso que se realiza de la información contable y de control. En los 
estudios aquí presentados no se ha utilizado ningún incentivo ni ningún sistema de 
control externo (por ejemplo, un auditor que vigile a los individuos) para influir en el 
comportamiento de los individuos. Los individuos actúan de diferente manera si 
sienten que participan más en las decisiones de la empresa y si reciben información 
que refuerce un contexto de grupo y de cooperación, en lugar de un contexto 
individual. Por otro lado, esta tesis señala que las organizaciones deben tener en 
cuenta el nivel de identidad social de los individuos que trabajan en ellas, sea con la 
propia organización, sea con sus departamentos o áreas. Si el nivel de identidad grupal 
es muy fuerte, no se debe diseñar información de control a nivel individual, poniendo 
de manifiesto comportamientos diferentes entre los empleados. Esta información de 
control entregada de forma periódica a los empleados, puede convertirse en una norma 
a seguir por ellos, donde existe una alta identidad grupal. Si unos compañeros 
holgazanean, pueden acabar todos los compañeros del departamento holgazaneando. 
Por tanto, las organizaciones deben tener en cuenta aspectos como la identidad social 
de los individuos y los procesos de comparación social, a la hora de diseñar prácticas y 
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